На главную
Вы находитесь в Хранилище файлов Белорусской цифровой библиотеки

Alexander Tomov. The Fourth Civilisation

© Alexander Tomov, Sofia, 1996 © David Mossop (English Translation), Sofia, 1996
Sofia 1996 Dedicated to the memory of my dear mother, Radka Tomova, whose dream was to be able to read this book. Contents Foreword 7 Section One The Crisis Chapter One The Birth Of The Global World And The Crisis Of Modernity 1. Integration And The Transition Of Civilisation 11 2. The Birth Of The Global World 20 3. The 20[th] Century - The Search Of A Model For The Global World 24 4. The Common Crisis And The Collapse Of The Third Civilisation 28 Chapter Two Collapse No.I: The Explosion in Eastern Europe 1. Decline And Death Throes 33 2. Reform And Illusions 39 3. Two Options And The "Mistake" Of Gorbachev 43 4. The Collapse Of Perestroika 46 5. The Explosion In Eastern Europe 51 6. Return To A Difficult Future 54 Chapter Three Collapse No.II: Global Disorder 1. The Danger Of Chaos 56 2. Geopolitical Collapse 61 3. Economic Turbulence 63 4. The New Masters Of The World 65 5. The March Of The Poor 67 6. A Number Of Pessimistic Scenarios 71 Section Two The Fourth Civilisation Chapter Four Theory In The Time Of Crisis 1. Forewarning Of The End Of The Two Theoretical Concepts 74 2. A Return To The Roots Or The Main Thesis 82 3. Main Conclusions And A Message To Alvin Toffler 85 4. A Similar Message To S.Huntington 89 5. The Need For A New Theoretical Synthesis 92 Chapter Five The Fourth Civilisation 1. Why A New Civilisation? 96 2. Some Thoughts On The Transitions Of Civilisations 99 3. The Distinguishing Features Of The Fourth Civilisation 103 4. Inevitability And When It Will Happen 106 Chapter Six The Dimensions of a New Synthesis 1. Socialisation And The Deregulation Of Ownership 108 2. Post-Capitalism 116 3. Post-Communism 120 4. The Approach And The End Of The "Third World" 126 5. Balanced Development 129 Chapter Seven Obstructions 1. The Defenders Of The Third Civilisation 134 2. The Great Threat - Media Imperialism 136 3. Post-Modern Nationalism 139 4. The Egoism Of Politicians 141 5. Militant Religions 143 6. A Cup Of Coffee In Apenzel 144 Section Three Alternatives To The Fourth Civilisation Chapter Eight The New Economic Order 1. The Economic Heart Of The Global World 146 2. New Growth And New Structures 150 3. Who Shall Dominate The World Economy? 154 4. Is There A Need For Global Economic Regulation? 159 5. Vivat Europa And The Death Of The Introverts 163 6. The Levelling Out Of Economies 166 Chapter Nine The Culture Of The Fourth Civilisation 1. The Beatles, Michael Jackson And The Bulgarian Caval. 170 2. The Travelling Peoples 174 3. Man Without Ethnic Origin Or The Rebellion Of Ethnicity 179 4. Global Awareness 183 5. Multiculture And The Global Culture 186 Chapter Ten The New Political Order 1. The Twilight Of The Superpowers 190 2. From Imperialism To Polycentralism 193 3, The Fate Of The Nation State 195 4. After The Crisis Of Political Identity 198 5. The Global Coordinators 200 CONCLUSION THE NATIONS WHICH WILL SUCCEED 202 APPENDICES Bibliography INTRODUCTION At the end of 1989 over a period of just a few months one of the two world systems collapsed. Together with the two world wars this was clearly the third turning point in the history of the twentieth century. For quite some time now researchers and politicians in a number of countries have been attempting to find an explanation for the collapse of the Eastern European totalitarian regimes and the consequences for the world. Thousands of publications and political statements have come to the concluded that "capitalism swallowed up communism" and that "liberalism has conquered the world". Fukoyama even went as far as to declare the end of history and the establishment of a liberal world model. Others see it only as the end of the Bolshevik experiment and the social engineering of a series of political philosophers from Rousseau to Marx. After the victories of the former communist parties in Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria in parliamentary elections in 1993 and 1994, liberal passions grew cold and talk of the new ascension of left wing thought has appeared on the political agenda. What really did happen after 1989? Where is the world heading? To the left or to the right? Towards unified action or to division into new blocs? Towards long-lasting peace or newrisks? Almost everyone - theoreticians, researchers and politicians in both the East and the West were caught unprepared by circumstances. The map of Eastern Europe has changed tragically beyond all recognition. Dozens of bloody conflicts have erupted. Europe is being thwarted at every moment in its attempt to unite peacefully. The United States now without an enemy in the world has felt an increasing need to change its global policies. Germany and Japan have also increased their economic power and their political confidence. In short, the collapse of the Eastern European communist regimes has profoundly affected the present and the future of all nations and has changed the entire world, not just small elements of it. These profound changes have touched contemporary human history in so far as they were a consequence of inexorable global trends. For this reason we have to go back in history to look for more general processes in order to reinterpret the dynamics of modern life. It is time to look beyond than the ideological euphoria of the changes caused and to attempt to define exactly what happened and what we can expect in the future. This is not my first book, but it is the first which I have written in complete freedom, without censorship or self-censorship, without the patronage and supervision of academic councils and "political friends". In this book I have searched for the truth from the point of view not only of the cultural environment which surrounds me but also of the world which revealed itself to me in its inimitable diversity after 1989. The changes which have taken place in Bulgaria can not be seen purely in terms of black and white. We attempted hastily to overcome the absurdities and limitations of our past and now, five years on we are still at the very beginning. The task has proven much more difficult than anyone could have imagined. At the same time much of the dignity which the Bulgarian people managed to preserve until 1989 has been sadly lost. Today in Bulgaria and the other countries of Eastern Europe not only is the value system in a state of chaos but there is also chaos surrounding the interpretations of what has happened and what must happen in the future. Many people are disappointed by the changes and they have rejected by looking back to the system of social guarantees, voting for the past. I can not say that all the votes cast for the former Eastern European communist parties are votes for the past, but most of them are. Hundreds of thousands of people in Bulgaria, Poland and Hungary have said to themselves "Under the former regime, I managed to build a house and bought a car (albeit poor quality). Now, I haven't the slightest chance of doing so." The comparison of the benefits to the majority of the population in the 1970's and 1980's and those of the first five years of emergent democracy, does not favour modern times. In terms of concrete facts and figures, this is indeed the case. However, this is far from the truth if one looks at the situation in the future and tomorrow in terms of the potential possibilities which freedom offers. I remember life in 1989 well, because up until then I had lived for 35 years in a totalitarian society. At first glance everything seemed all right. There was full social security during childhood and guaranteed education. Everyone had a job and a salary. The population was able to live in a society without crime. However despite this, in that world called socialism, we still asked ourselves many questions: Why do we produce less and poorer quality goods than the West? Why are our shops empty more often than not? Why are there chronic shortages of goods? Why do we have money and nothing to buy for it? Why are we forbidden to do things which seemed so natural? I have often observed my daughters' parrots at home. Just as in a totalitarian society, they have everything they could ask for: guaranteed food, security and hygiene. They are "happy", because they have everything which they could ever imagine. But they do not have freedom and for this reason when they are let out of their cage they cannot fly. Without freedom progress is impossible. In his cage, man cannot reveal his enormous creative potential to take the best from the past generations and to give the best of himself to the future. In the old totalitarian system we achieved much, but we lost much more. Sooner or later that world had to change, not only because it was suffering from crisis of its own identity but because the world itself had changed... My first encounter with politics was at the age of 11. I was on holiday with my father in the Rila mountains. In a remote mountain lodge, 2000 metres above sea level, a portrait of Khrushchev was being taken down. They were a few months late doing this and were obviously in a hurry to get rid of it. I asked my father who that man was and why until yesterday his portrait had hung proudly in that spot and today - it was gone. I later learnt that he had been a "revisionist". For a long time this was how I learnt all truths - ready-made and without any commentary. I was taught to believe that I was living in a perfect society and, what was more important was that any problems existing today would certainly be rectified for the future. The formula, "any imperfections are due to the fact that we are as yet in the first stages of communism" must be the most exquisite piece of demagogy and propaganda which I have ever encountered. We believed in the glorious future of communism, just like others believed in life after death. We were unable to compare our daily lives with anyone and with anything because we all watched the same television, listened to the same radio and read the same newspapers in which the truth was written by other people. In the 1960's and 1970's there were many people who did not believe and who heretically opposed the aggression of the regime. However, the majority of the population knew nothing of this. In Bulgaria there had been none of the civil unrest of the Polish workers, the Hungarian uprising and the Prague spring. It was only late in the 1970's that we began to realise that perhaps things were not as they should be and it was possible to live in a different way, that Eastern Europe was not the proponent of supreme human progress. One reason for this was the opening up of Bulgaria to the Western World, the appearance of new audio-visual media and the expansion of scientific and technological exchanges. We were then able to see another model and were able to make comparisons. Another reason was the admission by the existing regime of the need to improve economic mechanisms and their recognition of the importance of primary stimuli. However, even then in the 1970's and 1980's, even during the years of perestroika under Gorbachev, when the entire truth about Stalin became public knowledge, our notions of the future were limited to the idea of convergence. What happened in 1989 and especially what happened subsequently was totally unexpected by everyone, both in the East and the West. I am not afraid to admit this because I know very well that even the best political scientists in the world and the academic centres specialising in Eastern European studies had no idea of the impact and the diversity of the changes which were taking place at the end of the 1980's. Even Gorbachev himself did not expect it. The chain reactions of turbulent demonstrations which took place in the whole of Eastern Europe after perestroika and the mass dellusions that everythong would be just like Switzerland, as well as the obvious geo-political changes - these are all factors which lead me to write this book. The basic question, which I have endeavoured to answer is this: What did really happen at the end of the 1980's and why did the changes which took place in Eastern Europe have global ramifications? Some of my conclusions I date back to as early as 1982. In particular this is my view of the relationship between communalisation (socialisation) and autonomy and of the insubstantiality of statism at the end of the 20[th] century. Other conclusions were formed in the late 1980's after participating in a series of discussions at the congresses of the World Federation for Future Studies which helped me to understand the situations in other countries and to make comparisons with the situation in Eastern Europe and other parts of the world. The third group of conclusions are based on my own political experience as Deputy Prime Minister in the most decisive period of reform processin Bulgaria and as a member of the Bulgarian parliament from 1990-1994. My meetings with dozens of the world's leading politicians during this period were of enormous influence in the formation of the conclusions in this book. I cannot express adequate gratitude to my colleagues from the World Organisation for Future Studies and to my colleagues from the 21[st] Century Foundation in Sofia - a young and promising group of people who helped me greatly with ideas and critical commentary as well as the practical work in preparing the book for publication. At the risk of being paradoxical, there is little in this book which relates directly to Bulgaria, despite the fact that my main motivation in writing it were the problems facing my own country. While working on the book I realised that it is impossible to understand what is going on in Bulgaria if we do not make an attempt to understand what is happening in the world, and what we want to do, to a great extent depends on global processes. Today, no-one can develop in isolation. Such a future would be absurd, if we do not want to go back into our cage. The entire world is bound with common cords which no-one who want to move with progress can ignore. For this reasonI have left my analysis of Bulgaria to a separate book which will be published later. The fourth civilisation is a book about the global transition which is taking place in the world, its basis in history, the consequences of the collapse of the regimes in Eastern Europe, the danger of global disorder and chaos in which we are living today and the future and ways in which we might overcome them There are three possible directions for the world to develop. For the greatest part of the twentieth century the world has followed the path of division on the basis of culture, religion and political blocs, aggression and dramatic conflict. This was the world of the cold war, of confrontations between socialism and capitalism. This was the path of social Utopia, imaginary models and politicalf ormulae. The second path is the path of liberal development, victorious capitalism and the vested interests of the richest social strata. This is the path of domination of people by other people, of countries over other countries and nations over nations. I would call this path, the "path of the jungle", where the strong eat the weak. What these two models of development have in common is that they both belong to the past, they both complement each other and cannot exist without the other. There is a third path which will be discussed in this book. It is not on the immediate horizon, it may be a difficult path, even Utopian. However, it is, in my opinion, inevitable. My conviction is based on the fact that the modern technological revolution is leading to the creation of a different world civilisation. It could be said quite confidently that the end of the twentieth century will mark the end of an era in the development of civilisation. The twentieth century was an era of nation states, aggression and conflict between nations for more living space. It was an era in which the historically dominant countries imposed their cultures with force. The apogee of this anti-humanitarian absurdity came in the form of theories about the superiority of one race over another and of the need for the "lower" races to be destroyed. Today, this is all over, but we are far from a state of affairs where there is no longer any danger from new aggression. Although we could in fact be moving forwards a new, free civilisation there is still the possibility that may just be reproducing recidivists for the next century. We are living in a dangerous world, requiring absolute coordination, where there is no clear order or established principles. The question is the choice which we shall make. The aim of the "Fourth Civilisation" is to be part of the discussion surrounding this choice. We could possibly change the fate of world development in an improbable way. For the first time since man has come into existence, we are able to view our own existence not through the prism of individual tribes, classes or nations, but from the point of view of global perspectives. This is a unique chance, but it is also the responsibility of the era in which we live. Section one The Crisis Chapter One THE BIRTH OF THE GLOBAL WORLD AND THE CRISIS OF MODERNITY 1. INTEGRATION AND THE TRANSITIONS OF CIVILISATION During its centuries-old existence, mankind has passed through many stages. The uncivilised period lasted more than 100,000 years. The civilised period has lasted for between 5-7 thousand years. his is a period which has seen the realisation of the essence of humankind and consists of three major stages. They are three epochs which are synonyms for the progressof humanity. Three civilisations with distinct levels of progress. At the end of the 20[th] century we are living through the final days of the Third civilisation. F rom the first appearance of human society to the present day there has been a constant growth in the mutual dependence of people, nations, their customs and culture. The first manifestations of the human race, of tribes and inter-tribal links, the first city-states show that throughout history, from epoch to epoch mankind has become more and more integrated and the people of the earth have become more and more dependent on each other. I am not in a position to argue with anthropologists about the exact date when human life began and since there are so many different criteria relating to the transition between animals, humanoids and Homo Sapiens I consider this discussion to be of little benefit. Evidently during the palaeolithic period (about 100,000 years ago) man established his domination over the over forms of life and began methodically to conquer nature. At some time between 70 and 40 thousand years B.C. man began to tend animals, to create stone cutting implements and to form social relations which were untypical of other types of animals. In the late palaeolithic period human populations began to resettle from Africa through Asia to the northern parts of America. I am not convinced, however, that civilisation began from only one root disseminated by ambulant migrants or primitive forms of transport. I am more inclined to believe that in the earliest societies the spreading of the seeds of civilisation was of secondary significance to the growth of local civilisations in various regions of the world. The first manifestations of civilisation or limited social relations are not only to be found in Egypt or in Greece, nor are they the fruit of only one root. Between 3000-2000 B.C. not only did the cultures of Egypt and Mesopotamia begin to develop but also the culture of ancient India. During the same period the cultures of the nations of the Andes, South America were also in their ascent. Ancient Greece with its highly developed manufacturing, culture and philosophy also flourished at the same time as India. These phenomena can only be explained with the overall changes in the natural environment and very possibly with the increased radioactivity of the sun. Such a conclusion is very significant since it shows that human civilisation appeared in different parts of the world establishing pluralism and diversity as a natural law. In other words, the human race developed from different natural and cultural roots at the same time and is moving towards integration without destroying its diversity. There is something else which has lead to the constant expansion of communities and for people to seek answers to the problems caused by integration. This something is the connection between the processes of domination of man over nature and the process of integration itself. With the expansion and development of transport, culture, manufacturing and trade, our forebears began to realise that the fate of mankind is indivisible from the processes of its expansion and integration. Over the centuries, mankind dominated more and more new territories, populated more and more regions of the world and subsequently linked these expanded territories into unified systems. There is a certain logic in the development of human life from its earliest manifestations to the present day - that progress is indivisible from the increase in human communities, from the growth in the compactness of populations and the mutual dependence of people. Every historical epoch confirms this conclusion - from the first signs of early civilisation in modern Africa and the development of tribal communities, to the appearance of cooperative grain farming in Eastern Asia and the appearance of the first developed dynasties in Egypt and the Near East and the expansion of art in the ancient world. The development of human integration has passed through many different forms: tribal/warrior alliances and slave owning states, imperial states combining religions and cultures. The overall trend has been constant, each subsequent form of human civilisation is either greater than the previous or more integrated and dependent on the environment in which it exists. There are two phenomena which clearly show this process: The first is the population of the world. From its first appearance to the present day mankind has been growing constantly: about 6,000,000 in 8000 B.C.; about 255 million in 1 A.D.; 460 million in 1500; 1.6 billion in 1900; 2.0 billion in 1930; 3.0 billion in 1960; 4.0 billion in 1975; 5.0 billion in 1987 and over 6 billion in 1994.[(] The second important phenomenon is communications. With the appearance of human civilisation sounds and gestures then language and fire were the main forms of communication. As society developed man began to develop more intensive forms of communication. All the activities of man are directly or indirectly linked with the development of new communications - roads, sea and airways, all manner of forms of transport, postal links, telephones and telegraphs, computers and optical fibres, satellite television. Communications (transport, information exchange and processing) are the most accurate bench mark for the development and progress of civilisation. There is an obvious logic involved in this. Over the centuries people have been building bridges between each other and have been using them to exchange the fruits of their labour and to influence the world in which they live. I consider that from the outset I shall have to draw a very obvious and necessary conclusion: the further human society progresses, the more compact and integrated human society becomes and the more nations and individuals become dependent on each other. This is an incontrovertible law which we can do little to stop. It is also clear that this is an element of the overall development of the Earth and an accompaniment to the entire history of the human race and the overall development of our planet. This, perhaps, gives rise to the question whether economic development and the general development of human civilisation has definable limits or whether there are limits to the growth in world population. Will human progress lead to the disappearance of the primary differences between races and nations? Will mutually dependent human existence lead to new phenomena? Will states disappear to be replaced by international communities? These are questions which will have to be answered. I believe that notwithstanding the cyclical nature of its development, the human race will irreversibly and logically move towards a mutually dependent and integrated existence and from there to constant structural reformation. The main reason for this is that human progress is becoming more and more profoundly dependent on nature and the unity of nature is in its turn influencing the unity of life on earth. The unity of nature has become transformed into a unity of independent social communities. Producing and consuming, harvesting the oceans, the seas and the care of the earth and space, people are beginning to find themselves living in a more integrated community and are becoming dependent on each other. Individual processes of production lead to general pollution. The exploitation of natural resources has caused overall changes to the environment. The development of communications has created a common environment for the transfer of information. It can be stated with confidence that the process of overall world integration is universal. It includes manufacturing, culture and religion and the processes of human thought. This process is directly connected with the universal philosophical problem of the integrity and dialectical nature of nature. There is no doubt that by revealing its diversity nature is becoming more unified. However, any claimsof its absolute unity are as absurd as claims of its extreme fragmentation. When historical processes are in their initial stages and civilisations are still poorly developed, they tend to reflect closely the conditions and the specific nature of the local natural conditions with their climatic, geographical and other particular features. People are born different, live different lives and believe in different gods. In Africa people are born black, in Europe - white, in America "red" and in the East "yellow". Today these differences for the most part are disappearing. Races, cultures, religions and values systems are merging. This is not because nature is being outdone, but that its localisation is being outlived. The closer people become to nature the more their lives, consciousness and behaviour become dependent on the common essence of nature. Individual and specific elements disappear to become merged in the common elements of life. In my opinion this is the meaning and the dialectic of progress. In order to defeat the lions and the wolves, man had to unite and to join forces and ways of thinking, to build on what he has so far achieved in order to make further progress. In this way, year after year, century after century man conquered increasing areas of nature, reached its profound depths, exploited its common natural resources - the earth, the forests, the air and the water. These resources have been exploited for the same reasons - that in order to make greater use of nature, it is necessary to use the combined efforts of individual human resources. The opposite is also true, the more we use nature, the more we become dependent (or place other people in a position of dependence) on it. This is the link between integration and progress, between integration and civilisation. The entire existence of the human race shows that integration is a constant process. Moreover, civilisations as forms of organised social life are an expression and product of integration. When we speak of civilisations, it should be noted that they do not coincide with the five social and economic formations defined by Karl Marx or with the three technological waves of A.Toffler. Marx divided world development into five large "social structures" according to the forms of ownership. This was an undoubted intellectual contribution but an artificial and unilateral approach. The exclusive use of the criteria "forms of ownership" (Marx) or "technology" (Toffler) or the criteria of "spiritual development" (Toynbee) is misleading. The specific nature of the civilisation approach is in its complexity, in the indivisible connection between economics, culture and politics. This approach cannot absolutise either technology or property or any other sphere of human activity. This excludes the possible creation of artificial formations and social constructions in the aims of "progress" being isolated within only one part of human existence. Civilisations cannot be seen merely as branches which reflect one side or another of human life but as a common cultural process. They are distinct in terms of the way of life of the ancient peoples who lived in that part of the world and secondly in terms of the differences in the historical epochs in the development of humanity. Further on I shall return to the second of these aspects of the definition of civilisation. This shall release me from the strictures of the formational approach and the ideologisation of history. Such a method can be used to show the graduality of transitions and to explain the general and individual elements in the development of different parts of the world. To this end I shall define civilisation as: 1. the common and connected levels of human development; 2. the character of this development during the various epochs of human existence. Civilisations are not divided one from another on the basis of revolutionary acts, a change of monarch or president or armed conflicts. "Civilisation", according the great historian A.Toynbee, "is movement rather than condition; sailing and not the harbour."[2]. For this reason, I consider civilisation to be the common essence of human development and its different forms are the stages of its development. How many civilisations are there at the moment? Is it, indeed, correct to speak of a multitude of different civilisations? Civilisation[3] and civilised behaviour are a synonyms for the human essence, something which makes man different from the animal world and the fundamental role of man as a transformer, harmoniser and creator of nature. This role is fundamental to the essence of humanity and also a measure of its development. Civilisation springs from more than one source - in the ancient world there were about 26 initial civilisations[4], or seen in another way, 26 sources of the same civilisation. It is possible that there were direct links between them as well as exchanges of cultural achievements and information. Even if this was the case this was not the most typical feature of their development. The ancient peoples developed in different ways since they were reflections of their different natural environments. They formed the basis for the appearance of a particular natural species and created the preconditions for a unified civilisation while programming its diversity. The more ancient the civilisation, the greater the differences between them. Despite this, the way in which they appeared, their primitive economic relations and their state and political structures speak of common elements. This is why I use the term ancient civilisations or ancient civilisation. The Egyptians, the Assyrians Shumerians, Greeks, Indians, Chinese, Romans, American Indians etc. differ greatly in terms of their daily life, culture, the colour of their skin but have much in common in terms of the level of their development, their means of manufacturing and their state-political structures. The zenith of the ancient civilisations was attained no doubt by the ancient Greek city states and Rome. However, India at the time of the Mura dynasty (322-80 BC) was also very advanced. Together with the achievements of the ancient Chinese, Koreans, Mongolians, Vietnamese and American Indians, they made up the culture of the first civilisation of the first great epoch of human development. To use Marxist criteria, the First civilisation can be divided into two strata: primitive communities and slave owning. I am not convinced that this is useful. First of all for reasons of the semi-human (uncivilised) existence of the primitive community and secondly for reasons of the non-social links within one "social" structure. The first civilisation was replete with a diversity of forms of ownership, cultures and mechanisms of government. These were its specific elements and what made it distinct from subsequent civilisations. In Europe the first civilisation was primarily slave owning, but this was not the case in Asia. Frequently, slave ownership was accompanied by other forms of administrative and economic compulsion. Europe during the first civilisation was mainly patriarchal, while ancient China was until the second millennium B.C. matriarchal. Only the civilisation approach can serve to explain these differences and at the same time determine find the common elements in the lives of our forebears. What the First Civilisation has in common and makes it distinct is the undoubted dependence of the people on primitive production tools, the use of force and the enslavement of some nations by others and the formation of imperial state structures and the maintenance of permanent aggressive armies. The peoples of the First Civilisation left us the first examples of large-scale art which exist today amongsts the ruins of the Cheops pyramid and Mayan towns, in ancient Chinese and ancient Indian architecture. These decorations of human civilisation are at first glance different from one another but they also have a lot in common. The materials, their dependence on the gods and the supernatural, the philosophy of human life with new-found self confidence can be seen everywhere and show once again the common elements of the First civilisation. The First Civilisation can be considered to have begun at some time between 4500 - 3500 B.C. and to have come to an end during the 3[rd] century A.D. It would not be wise to place strict and absolute dividing lines between the civilisations or the era of human development since they tend gradually to merge one into another. Certain peoples at certain times have tended to lag behind during the time of transition but then somehow seem to manage to catch up. During the 5[th] or 6[th] century A.D. the Second Civilisation began as a result of the structural, social and industrial changes taking place first in Asia and then in Europe. The Second Civilisation is frequently linked with the Middle Ages. If the First Civilisation lasted for between 4000 or 5000 years the Second lasted only 1000 years from the 5[th] to the 14[th]/15[th] centuries. Each subsequent civilisation as an era in the development of humanity is shorter than the one which precedes it. This is a consequence of the accelerated rate of progress arising from the accumulated material benefits of previous generations. A very typical feature of the Second Civilisation was the feudal nature of its manufacturing industries. However, as a defining feature this is neither adequate nor sufficiently universal. Another key feature of the Second Civilisation was the huge mass resettlement of peoples and the inter-mingling of diverse cultures. During the First Civilisation the processes of integration were manifested in terms of the concentration of people and power in the city states and empires. These were destroyed by the Second Civilisation which persued a process of integration of cultures through the violent intermixing of ethnic groups, traditions and religions. Between 400 and 900 A.D. new peoples begin to enter the annals of world history. Integration at this time was a byword for aggression. At one and the same time, as if on command, the Ostgoths and Westgoths, Huns and Avars, Tartars and Mongols, Proto-Bulgarians and Slavs, Turks and Arabs began to search for new lands and dominions. Although the intermingling of cultures via war and aggression leading to the resettlement of peoples it was a significant quality of the Second Civilisation, I cannot agree that the Middle Ages were exclusively a period of destruction, plague and Inquisition. It was also a time of the powerful integration of cultures and production, new achievements in learning and art. There are many examples of this, beginning, perhaps, with the magnificent architectural achievements of the Byzantines, e.g. the wondrous cathedral of St.Sofia (532-537) in Istanbul. Other examples can be taken from West European art, which has left us magnificent works from its three most creative periods - pre-Roman, Roman and Gothic: the court cathedral of Charlemagne in Aachen (795-805), the castle of the Gailleurs on the River Seine (12[th] century) and innumerable Gothic cathedrals, including Notre Dame in Paris built between the 12[th] and 13[th] centuries. The Second Civilisation created abundant cultural riches in the Near East and the Middle East, North Africa and Mauritanian Spain, India, China and Japan. The Second Civilisation was a time of the further rapprochement of the nations which had been divided during the First Civilisation. In the 5[th] century, Samarkand was the heartland of a powerful culture and a bridge between the Chinese, Turks and Arabs. The masterpieces of Chinese culture and paper manufacturing technology reached Europe through Iran, Byzantium and Arab dominions. If during the period of the First Civilisation, the Romans, Macedonians and Indian copied technology, arms manufacturing and methods of animal husbandry from each other, then in the Second Civilisation a standard method of measuring time was established. An important event took place in 807 when Charles the Great received a water clock from the Harun al Rashid from Baghdad leading to the subsequent arrival of Chinese and Arab clocks in Europe. People from all over the world learnt to tell the time simultaneously. This lead to the further standardisation of the criteria of life and history. During this period the Chinese Empire further developed the achievements of the Greeks and the Romans while the Arabs and the Europeans built on those of the Chinese and the Japanese. During the Second Civilisation forms of ownership and social relations began to show greater universality. Feudalism began to establish itself over the entire world in very specific forms, especially in China and Japan. To a lesser extent, the Second Civilisation retained definite disparities in the level of the development of its nations. A significant part of the world continued to develop within the parameters of the First Civilisation and even persisted to exist in pre-civilised forms for a number of centuries. The Second Civilisation was a time of numerous conflicts and inevitable crises for reasons of large-scale structural change - the destruction of the traditional city-states and cultures of the First Civilisation and the innumerable religious conflicts. This was also a time of large-scale state and cultural development and the establishment of the pre-conditions for the expansion of nations and nation-states. King Clovis (401-511) at the beginning of the 6[th] century united the Franks, Justinian (572-565) raised the level of state administration, taxation and the application of law. Enormous progress was made in the fields of science, medicine and mathematics in Baghdad, Cordoba and Cairo. In the Arab world, Africa (Ethiopia and Ghana), Japan, China and America, great empires arose. The new level of integration, typical of the Second Civilisation gradually lead to the creation of national states. To be more precise these were not single-nation states but the domination of a single nation or its symbols. During the latter Middle Ages there was a gradual slowing down in the processes of migration of nations and tribes which lead to the stabilisation of populations and states. The intermingling of cultures typical of the entire period of the Second Civilisation was gradually replaced by a period of developing national cultures, national symbols and traditions and struggles for the legacy of the cultural riches of the past. The formation of national states and the gradual advent of the "modern age was the beginning of the end of the Second Civilisation. It was no accident that the Renaissance which was the symbol of this period of transition also incorporated within itself a return to Greek and Roman art and the cult of beauty and earthly passions. Civilisations follow the spiral of development - each new civilisation destroys the previous while at the same time bearing significant resemblances to it. The Third Civilisation can also be referred to as a "Modern Age" - the age of nations states, factories and industrial complexes. It began at sometime during the 13[th] and 14[th] centuries and will come to an end at sometime during the 20[th] century. The entire period of the Third Civilisation was a period of the integration of manufacturing and spiritual life. In a similar way to the First Civilisation, the forces of integration came mainly from the most-developed states resulting from the accumulation of manufacturing and cultural achievements, rather than as a result of the resettlement and intermingling of nations at different stages of development as it was during the Second Civilisation. The transport revolution which began in Europe was of enormous significance during this period. An example of this were the sailing ships with which Magellan circumnavigated the world and which took Christopher Columbus to America and James Cook to Australia. The explorers were followed by the conquerors hungry for plunder and easy riches. Europeans and Arabs followed the Silk Road through Constantinople, Persia and Tibet to China. The world was once more regaining its strength, exploring the limits of the earth. European states begin to develop and consolidate their power and expand their domination over the rest of the world. During the 16[th] and 17[th] centuries Europe, the most powerful of world cultures, began to exert its power over the other relatively less-developed nations. Over a period of three centuries as a result of great geographical discoveries and their subsequent colonisation European culture managed to exert its influence over half of the world. t is far from the truth, however, that the only "heroic" discoverers were Europeans, such as Columbus, Magellan, Vasco da Gama. By allowing ourselves such a subjective attitude, we, Europeans often find ourselves guilty of provincial ignorance. During the same historical period while the European sailors, traders and soldiers were beginning to make their geographical discoveries, a similar process was taking place in the East. Between 1405 and 1433, admiral Cheng Ho with hundreds of Chinese ships reached Zanzibar and Ceylon. In the 15[th] century the population of China was twice the size of that of Europe: 100-120 million in comparison with 50-55 million. Chinese civilisation was also comparable with European civilisation in terms of its lustre, organisation and depth of philosophy. During this period the great discoveries of Siberia and Africa were made. At the end of the 15[th] century the conquest of America began. Arab caravans reached the interior of Africa. Like the First Civilisation, the Third Civilisation also arose from diverse and different roots. The difference is that after the 15[th] century and in particular during the 18[th] and 19[th] centuries, the process of integration had become universal in nature. Nations and cultures discovered each other. The more developed began to impose their domination and culture with violence. At the same time, a gradual process of mutual influence and enrichment began to develop between the various cultures. A typical feature of the Third Civilisation has been the significance of the world integrity. Moreover, in ancient Greece, Theucidides, Aristotle and Plato[5] searched for the common dimensions of life and common rules for state administration amongst familiar nations. The Stoics advocated the idea of moral and political unity of the human race. Some of the thinkers of ancient Rome (Cicero and others) saw the world as a city with the dimensions of the entire human race embracing all other nations and cultures. The Renaissance enrichened this tradition. If the thinkers of the First Civilisation were occupied mainly with the chronicles of warlords and their victories, and the Second Civilisation with the defence of their religious identity, the thinkers of the Third Civilisation undoubtedly rediscovered man and his essence. Religion was of great importance to the process of integration. K.Kautski referring to statistics states that in 98 A.D. there were 42 centres of population containing Christian communities, by 180 this number had grown to 87 and by 352 - there were more than 500[6]. Ten centuries later the majority of the civilised world was united by Christianity. Buddhism and Islam had a similar influence. Over a period of about 1000 years, the major religions united the greater part of humanity within large spiritual communities. The zenith of this process was undoubtedly during the Third Civilisation. The unification of different nations on the basis of value systems and spirituality was of was of great historical significance. This lead to the building of bridges between the different parts of the world at a time when manufacturing and commercial links and communications were unsustainable. By this time the majority of the great geographical discoveries had been made. Transport and communications had made great progress and medieval means of production had been succeeded by the first factories. Commerce was no longer a haphazard accompaniment to life, but an indivisible part of civilisation. Amsterdam had become a large scale cultural and commercial centre. Venice and Genoa had become the major cities of the Mediterranean. Peter the First and his followers had built Saint Petersburg and a number of European cities had populations of more than 100,000 people. The First Civilisation was a time of the great empires. The Second of the fall of empire and unstable states and city states. The Third Civilisation was a period a nation states. The gravitational centres of progress during the First Civilisation were empires, during the Middle Ages city states and during the Third - nation states. Nation states are one of the features of the modern age distinguishing it from the Middle Ages and from what we can now observe at the end of the 20[th] century. They did not develop suddenly but as a consequence of a series of conflicts over many centuries. Certain historians believe that this is one of the reasons for the success of Europe, that it was these conflicts and the liberated spirit of the Renaissance which guaranteed its domination. It is indeed possible. In any event between the 15[th] and 17[th] centuries France, Spain, England and Sweden and a little later Russia, began to increase their power and might to guarantee their strategic advantage for a number of centuries in the future. According to P.Kennedy, between 1470 and 1650, the armies of the major European powers expanded: Spain from 20,000 to 100,000; France from 40,000 to 100,00; England from 25,000 to 70,000 and Sweden from a couple of hundred to 70,000[7]. These figures show not only the rise of the economic power of the emergent major European powers, but also their desire for the re-distribution of the newly discovered territories and the domination of some states by others. The entire history of the period between the 15[th] and the 18[th] centuries is a history of war, battles for inheritance, colonies and riches. Armies and Navies were expanded, military alliances were formed. As a result of wars, trade and new conquests the whole world entered into a new phase of integration. The Third Civilisation developed greater mass phenomenons in all areas of life - transport, manufacturing, international trade and ideas, the spiritual world and the world of ideas and religions. There is one other important criterion which distinguishes the three civilisations - the forms of production. The First was the age of agriculture and animal husbandry, the Second saw the advent of manufacturing and crafts while the Third is the age of industry and industrial giants. I accept A.Toffler's belief that technological revolutions stimulated the progressionfrom onea ge into another, but I do not believe that this is an exhaustive or adequate criterion. There also another difference between us in terms of the periodisation of history: A.Toffler divides history into two eras: agricultural and industrial, while I have looked for the differences in a wider and more civilisational spectrum. Technological changes are a synthetic expression of the changes in forms of ownership. Typical features of the three forms of civilisation were slave ownership, feudalism and capitalism and it would be wrong to ignore them. At the same time I believe that the transition between the various civilisations was not abrupt and cannot be defined on the basis of one event or another. New civilisations develop within a country and grow organically as a number of trends. This usually takes place as a result of a change in the instruments of labour and technology but at the same time as a result of changes in social relations and means of government. This is the case with the Third Civilisation and the period of its greatest prosperity during the industrial revolution of the 19[th] century. Moreover, at the end of the 19[th] century and especially during the 20[th] century, there were a number of processes in world development which bore innovations of the modern age and which were entirely different from the first three civilisations. The most important characteristics of the Third Civilisation - industry, nations, nation states began to change intensively. In practice this meant the beginning of a process of the collapse of the modern age and the Third Civilisation. 2. THE BIRTH OF THE GLOBAL WORLD The industrial revolution in Europe at the beginning of the 19thcentury brought with it a rapid process of economic and political internationalisation. The borders of the nation states - the most distinguishing feature of the Third Civilisation become too limiting for the new manufacturing forces. T here is no doubt that the 19th century was a time of exceptional technological revolution. In the 1850's and 1860's Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany and Austria demonstrated significant increases in the growth of their industrial output. The invention of the steam engine in 1769 by James Watt and the locomotive by George Stephenson were of revolutionary significance for world economic development and accelerated integration. At the end of the 19th century the first experimental flights with an aeroplane were carried out by Langley (1896). Enormous progress was made between 1885 and 1897 in the development of autmobile construction. In 1837 Morse invented his communications code and in 1864 Edison improved methods of electronic transmission. In 1876 Bell gave the world its first telephones. The second half of the 19th century was a time of important discoveries in the areas of transport and weapons systems. Revolutionary developments were made in coal mining, mettalurgy and energy production resulting in the increase of iron and steel production between 1890 and 1913: in the USA from 9.3 million tons to 31.8 million, in Germany from 4.1 to 17.6, in France from 1.9 to 4.6 and in Russia from 0.95 to 4.6 million tons. Energy consumption for the same period rose: in the USA from 147 million tons of coal equivalent to 541 million tons, in Great Britain from 145 million tons to 195 million, in Germany from 71 to 187 million tons, in Germany from 71 to 187 million tons, in France from 36 to 62.5 million tons and in Russia from 10.9 to 54 million tons.[8] Energy and metal became the major factors in the rapid development of railways and armies, predetermining the development of entirely new branches of industry and science. A common feature of this process is that the industrial revolution of the 19th century interlinked the interests of the developing nations in a completely new manner. If until the 19th century, conflicts between nations were of a purely localised nature and on mainly religious or territorial grounds or for reasons of inheritance, after the developments of the industrial revolution the main factors in the emergence of conflicts were disputes for continental or world domination, cheap raw materials and colonies. These facts are perhaps sufficient to support the contention that the Global World was born at the end of the 19th century. I interpret the term "Global World" as meaning the level of development at which the majority of countries and peoples become dependent on each other and, notwithstanding their own national governments, form a common essence. If this is the case, then the end of the 19th century was just the beginning of world globalisation within the framework of the nation states of the Third Civilisation. During the same period the world began an intensive period of establishing common economic (export of capital), technological (transport, communications, science) and cultural links. At some time towards the end of the 19th century the great world powers were already unable to resolve their own conlicts in isolation. Conflicts could no longer be limited to their own borders but to the economic and political divisions already existing in the world. A new world trend began to emerge, that of imperialism. The trend towards imperialism was the first manifestation of the globalisation of the world, a qualitative new level of world integration. I consider imperialism to be a result of the intermingling of two intersecting phenomena: the strong feelings of nationalism which existed everywhere at the end of the 19th century and the objective trend towards integration as a result of the export of capital and aspirations towards the economic division of the world. In the 19th century, globalisation existed only as a direct initiative of the nation state. However, during the second half of the 19th century economic development began to transcend national borders in the form of ambitions and aspirations towards national dominance. Such belligerent nationalism within the conditions of internationalisation gave rise to what J.Hobson, R.Hilferging and V.Lenin defined as imperialism.[9] Looking at the way in which humanity greeted the advent of the twentieth century, one is suprised by their equanimity of spirit. Upon a cursory examination of the major newspapers of France, Germany and Bulgaria published on the 1st of January 1900, I observe a remarkable similarity. Almost everywhere countries greeted the new century with fervent and malcontent nationalism. The new century was seen as a century during which individual states would satisfy their ambitions for new territory and conquer and punish their opponents. The dominant atmosphere was of nationalism and imperial aspirations and against this background, the emergence of socialist ideas. National borders had become too limiting for the expansion of industry. The Germans and the Bulgarians wanted to unite to castigate their neighbours. The British rejoiced in their colonial dominions and dreamed of an even greater Britain. The French reminded the Germans that they would not stand for any more humiliation like that suffered in 1870. Not one of the European nations or the USA are an exception. They were all overcome by some level of imperialist amnbition. This was like a contagious disease brought on by a need for raw materials and control over the railways and the sea routes but it also penetrated political, journalistic and social thought. During this period, Fichte developed his idea of the exclusive role of the Prussian state in the progress of humanity. Fichte was the greatest proponent of the way in which nationalism and the need for internationalisation becomes transformed into imperialism. But France was no different. During the decades after the destruction of the French army in 1870, French nationalism reached unseen heights. Charles Morras defined nationalism as the absolute criterion for every political action. In general at the end of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th European nationalism flourished. In the USA at the end of the 19th century, economic and demographic growth, albeit slower than in Europe also gave rise to a similar explosion of self-confidence and aspirations for a new role for America in the world. The idea of an international society, a common feature of American political thought during this period, was also frequently proclaimed as a right to domination and even war. It could also be said that at the beginning of the 20th century humanity was obsessed by the political paradigm typical of all world empires: nationalism combined with imperial ambitions. In other words, internationalisation and globalisation stem from the ambitions of isolated nationalism and nation states. This was also reflected in the structure of manufacturing, politics and life in general. Over a thirty-year period, between 1880 and 1910 the standing armies of the world powers increased significantly. The Russian army increased from 791,000 to 1,285,000 persons. The French army increased from 543,000 to 769,000. The Germany army increased from 426,000 to 694,000 and the British army from 246,000 to 531,000. The army of the Austro-Hungarian empire increased from 246,000 to 425,000. The Japanese army increased from 71,000 to 271,000 and the army of the United States grew from 34,000 to 127,000[10]. Stockpiles of weapons and huge amounts of human resources were ammassed in the event of war, which was soon to break out. The First World War was the first manifestation of an integrated world, the first major demonstration of world globalisation. It was proof of the growing interdependence of countries which did not allow them, apart from rare exceptions, to stay out of the conflict. Practically the entire world was sucked into the conflicts of the First World War. From this moment on the world began to manifest itself as a mutually dependent system developing within a common cycle. I consider this argument to be of particular significance and I would like to develop it further. The First World War linked the majority of the countries within a common conflict but also formed the beginning of a common economic cycle in the development of the industrial nations. What other explanation can be given for the fact that in the 1920's all the major powers witnessed, to a greater or lesser extent, advances in industrial progress? Taking 1913 as a basis (100%) the indices of industrial output growth between 1921 and 1928 were as follows: in the USA from 98 to 154.5%; Germany - from 74.7% to 118.3; Great Britain from 55.1 to 95.1%; France - from 61.4 to 134.4; Japan from 167 - 300%; Italy from 98.4 to 175.2 and the Soviet Union from 23.3 to 143.5[11]. All the developed nations, as though bound by some common umbilical cord, suffered economic collapse at the beginning of the 1930's. Only those nations such as the USSR who had isolated themselves from the world economy escaped the crisis. In 1937 Germany succumbed. This common feature of world economic development also manifested itself after the Second World War in countries with an open market economy. Despite certain divergence in terms of the stages of development, it is clear that after the 1920's the most industrialised nations of the world began to develop in a more mutually dependent manner. Today at the end of the century, this mutual dependence has attained unseen levels as expressed in the indices of the world stock exchanges and in the unconditional mutual interdependence of exchange rates. During the period between the two world wars a new global essence began to develop entirely independently of national governments. This began with the increasing in the level of mutual interdependence between countries and gradually gained strength from the growth in new technology, commerce and finance, transport and communications, culture and science and armaments etc. Nevertheless, the 20th century witnessed only the birth of the global world. The global revolution still only exists as a possibility. It will take many decades to achieve the gradual and problematic development of global structures within the model of the individual nation states. Globalisation is a level of international integration at which interdependence between nations and cultures exists at a planetary level. Such mutual interdependence is not a matter for one or two or a group of nations but between each individual state and the world as a whole, between individual regions of the world, between all nations and cultures simultaneously. If upon the emergence of human civilisation, the processes of integration affected only a number of individual tribes and was localised and during the Middle Ages it took on regional proportions, then since the beginning of the 20th century, it has existed within the framework of mankind as a whole. All countries and peoples are involved in a common system which is governed in a particular way and on the basis of certain principles. This system arose spontaneously, via struggles for domination, wars and violence. One should take into account the difficulties people encounter in attempting to overcome the boundaries of their own environment, religion and nation. At the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century people were little occupied by thoughts of the world as a whole or the priorities of universal human interests. Of course, there were a number of writers and businessmen, Henry Ford was a prime example, who were exceptions to this rule. However, this was not the case for the large mass of the active inhabitants of our planet, politicians and the influential owners of large amounts of wealth. The culture of the Third Civilisation is above all a culture of national thought and behaviour and the 20th century will remain entirely within its dominion notwithstanding the accelerated processes of world integration. Its militant nationalism and militiary blocs created the first models of the global world based on violence and conflicts and on the familiar struggle for national domination which existed in previous civilisations. 3. THE SEARCH FOR A MODEL FOR THE GLOBAL WORLD The first model of the global world was the colonial system. It was a product of the combination of 19th century nationalism and the acceleration of globalisation. In the middle of the 20thcentury and as a consequence of the two world wars this modelcollapsed to give way to a two-bloc political and economic model. T he first model of the global world was colonialism. During the second half of the 19th century the larger nation states, motivated by desires for empire began gradually to conquer andto divide the world. Geo-politically the world became integrated through the colonial system for the first time into a single unity. By achieving pre-eminence in the seas and oceans and possessing the largest fleet in the world, Great Britain after 1815 turned its attention to the rapid conquest of territories from Africa to India and Hong Kong. Over a period of between 50 and 70 years the British managed to create the greatest colonial empire in the world. From 1815-1865, a further 100,000 square miles was added to the territory of the British Empire. During this period France was the only other country to attempt to compete with Great Britain. It was later to be followed by Germany, Belgium, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Denmark, the USA, Russia and Japan. Starting from the basis of the nation state and moving towards globalisation, the great powers of the time began a process of the domination and re-division of the entire world into a unified world system linked through imperial centres. As can be seen from table 1, during the last quarter of the 19th century, the largest colonial powers expanded their territories by almost 200 million head of population and 2.32 million square kilometres of territory. Between 1900 and the beginning of the First World War this rate decreased as a result of the satiation of the "colonial market" Table 1 Size and population of the colonies (1875-1914) State 1875 1900 1914 sq.km. pop. sq.km. pop. sq.km. pop. Great Britain France Holland Belgium Germany USA 22.5 1.0 2.0 2.3 - 1.5 250 6 25 15 - [*] 32.7 11.0 2.0 2.3 2.6 1.9 370 50 38 15 12 9 32.7 11.0 2.0 2.4 2.9 1.0 350 54 45 12 13 10 All the most prestigious, accessible and wealthy colonies have been conquered by the beginning of the twentieth century, resulting in the establishment of the first model of the emergent global world - the colonial world. The colonial system itself gave rise to the second momentous event in the globalisation of the world. Hardly had the system become firmly established when it began to give rise to a series of almost irresolvable world conflicts: the irreconcilable struggle for the re-division of the world and the First World War in which millions lost their lives. The resulting radicalisation of public opinion in Russia, Germany and to a large extent in other parts of the world stimulated the growth in anti-imperialist attitudes and provided an opportunity for the growth of the radical ideas of socialist revolution. These events in themselves gave rise to the second model of the emergent global world - the model of the two systems which began with the October revolution in 1917 and continued until 1989-91. Almost the entire period of the twentieth century passed within conditions of the two opposing systems and the existence of the bi-polar global model. During this period the existence of the two systems was explained basically as the opposition of two ideologies, the ideologies of the rich and the poor, socialism and capitalism. This was also the view of Marxism-Leninism. After the collapse of the Eastern European political regimes the existence of the communist world was presented as an historical mistake, as the consequence of the profound delusions of huge masses of people and the tyranny of dictatorship etc.. This was of the view put forward by Z.Bzezinski[12], but I find these ideas be simplistic and far too easy. In actual fact the processes were much more complex and contradictory. During the period of its mutually dependent development, the world began to subordinate itself to a greater extent to the principle of equilibrium, a principle which is based on the laws of nature. The lack of social equilibrium leads sooner or later to serious conflicts and delayed development. In the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th within the process of accelerating industrialisation and rising imperialism two global imbalances formed: the first - between the rich metropolitan countries and the second - between the rich, ruling classes of the imperialist bourgeoisie and the enormous masses of the poor proletariate. These large imbalances were particularly developed in the poorer countries and the countries who found themselves on the losing side in the First World War. In general terms, in the 19th century and the first 50-60 years of the twentieth century, class differences became much more marked and the ensuing class struggle was a direct consequence. It was these class conflicts and international disproportions which gave rise to the radical revolutions in Russia, Germany and Hungary and a series of other countries between 1917 and 1923. This also goes some way to explaining the development of dominant political doctrines such as in the USSR, Italy, Germany and a number of other countries. To take the example of the USSR, the guiding aim of the Soviet economy in the 1920's and in particular the 1930's was to overcome its backwardness and to undertake a programme of rapid, accelerated industrialisation and to create a stable armaments industry. Its initial ambition to achieve a balance with the rest of the capitalist world and subsequently to overtake it was the dominant strategy of Stalin in the 1930's and 1940's. This economic policy, while defensible, can in no way justify the violence and historical absurdity of totalitarianism. I am merely attempting to explain its roots. All my academic research and my direct observations of the Soviet totalitarian system show that millions of people were aware of the violence of the system but that they accepted it as something inevitable, as a lesser evil than poverty and misery. The illusions and the crimes perpetrated during the regimes of Stalin, Hitler and Mao and the other violent regimes of the 20th century are indisputable. These crimes were stimulated by the vicissitudes of history, by the ambition to create an alternative model of social progress. Are Robespierre or Danton or the British colonisers, or the Russian conquerors of Central Asia any less culpable? The deeply rooted reasons for these crimes need to be explained before they can be resolved. There is no doubt that at the root of Stalin's violence initially against the rural population and subsequently against the whole of Soviet society after 1929 lay his ambition to achieve rapid industrialisation. The strategy of rapid industrialisation and anti-colonial conflicts in a number of less-developed countries should be viewed as a reaction against emergent global imbalances. That which was considered by many to be the struggle of the repressed nations for the freedom of the proletariate was actually a struggle against economic backwardness, against imperialism and the monopolies of most developed nations and the struggle for national supremacy. In the 20th century, the poorer nations had no other option to defend themselves against colonialism other than to concentrate their force and might through powerful state structures. Slogans such as the "welfare of the proletariate", "care for people" were always associated with the power of the state. Poverty always generates Utopias. Communism was one of them. During the first half of the twentieth century the world had continued to develop on the basis of liberal market doctrines and it persisted in being a world of rich and poor peoples, metropolises and colonies and profound class differences. When markets are free but imbalanced, the strong easily swallow up the weak. Such imbalanced historical development allows those countries with more rapid development to become dominant. Sooner or later this was bound to lead to social revolutions. This, I feel, is the explanation for the division of the world into two opposing blocs as an alternative to the existing colonial model. After the two world wars and the economic crisis of 1929-33, the liberal idea underwent a crisis and opened the way for the radicalisation of the world and its division. By 1925, two countries had yielded to "state socialism" - the USSR and Mongolia - with a total population of over 150 million. 25 years later this political system had spread into more than 20 countries and accounted for more than half the population of the world. After the victory over Germany in 1945 the power and the authority of the USSR grew immensely. Under the auspices of its power the national patriotic forces of a number of countries threw off the colonial domination of Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal, Holland and other countries. At the beginning of the 1960's, with certain exceptions the colonial model ceased to exist and was replaced by the two-polar model. At the end of the 1950's the two world systems embraced populations of about 1-1.5 billion people and possessed military parity. Without achieving full economic parity or high levels of productivity, the USSR managed to undermine the monopoly of the USA in strategic military areas. Two basic centres of power became established in the world - Moscow and Washington accompanied by other satellites with varying degrees of power. Since the Second World War the world has witnessed a number of local conflicts. There have been armed struggles in the Near East, North and Equatorial Africa, Indo-China, India and Pakistan, Chile, Bolivia, Cuba and tens of other regions and countries. All these countries were directly or indirectly linked with the two superpowers and their opposition. On the other hand the achievement of nuclear parity between the USSR and the USA in the 1950's brought an end to the trend towards ultra-imperialism[13] and the possibility of the world becoming subordinated to a single world power centre. Beneath the nuclear umbrellas of the two super powers and carefully balanced between them, the countries of Western Europe, Japan and a number of other Asian and Latin American countries achieved great success. I believe the achievement of nuclear parity to be a phenomenon with key significance for world development. Napoleon with his ambitions for an empire from "Paris to India" , Hitler with his "World Order" and Stalin with his aspirations for the "victory of world communism" all longed for a unified world empire. This was also the view of a number of other politicians and thinkers who seeing a trend towards world integration and the expansion of manufacturing came to the conclusion that a future world would be a world of monopolistic unity, a unified manufactory for workers and peasants (Lenin), ultra-imperialism (Kautski), permanent revolution (Trotski) and so on. To this extent the bi-polar model is a higher level of development than the model of colonial empires. On the other hand, the bi-polar model is only a stage in the formation of the global world and the actual peak of the crisis of the Third Civilisation. I defend the thesis that the two bloc system has to be seen as a transitional stage from the point of view of the development of the global world and the transition between the Third and the Fourth Civilisation. Until the end of the 19th century, researchers analysed world changes through the prism of national thinking and the nation state. After 1917 and especially after the Second World War, the main object of research was the two world systems - socialism (communism) and capitalism, their competition and the struggle for domination. This was a reflection of the realities in a world which had overpowered the minds of billions of people. Henceforth, however, any analysis of the structural changes within the world cannot be based on the confrontational bi-polar model. Only the global, civilisation approach is capable of providing the correct response to questions and to reveal the common and, consequently, the local trends of human development. 4. THE COMMON CRISIS AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE THIRD CIVILISATION The 1970's saw the Suez crisis, the increase in the price of oil (1973-5) and the end of the Brent Woods system[14]. Everyone began to speak of the crisis of world capitalism. At the end of the 1980's everyone began to speak of the crisis of world communism. In actual fact, the entire world had been overcome by a profound crisis. T he ideologues and politicians of the two superpowers always maintained that the system of their opponents was in crisis. In the communist countries students attended lectures about the "common crisis of capitalism" while in the West Kremlinologists talked of the "crisis of world communism". In 1960-2 Nikita Krushchev frequently was heard to say that the "collapse of the colonial system is an historical victory over imperialism". In 1989-90 the victory of world capitalims over communism was declared. Was this really the case? I have come to a different conclusion. I believe that the problem cannot be reduced merely to the collapse of one system and the victory of another. In actual fact during the second half of the twentieth century, it was not only the communist system which was in a state of crisis but the whole of the two bloc political system in the world, the entire structure of the Third Civilisation. Industrial technologies, nation states and their alliances, the culture of violence against the individual and nature suffered serious repercussions. What was the world like before the 1980's? There were two giant groups of nations within which 99% of the weapons of mass destruction and 80% of manufacturing industry were concentrated. Each group was closely connected with military, political and economic alliances (NATO and the EU, the Warsaw Pact and COMECON) with common military and economic infrastructures, with joint institutions and education of personnel. All other countries and peoples were dependent in some way or another on these groups. It is no accident that hundreds of local conflicts during this period were waged with the weapons of one or other of the military blocs and regarded as the continuation of their undeclared war. On the other hand, the two bloc system existed in the conditions of continuing integration and the growing dependence of countries on each other. This was the main reason for the general trends of world development to enter into contradiction with its existing structures. The extent of these contradictions was so great that there are justifiable grounds to speak of the common crisis of the two bloc system and, in broader terms, the crisis of the entire modern age. The first cause which lead to this crisis was the character and structure of world economic growth. After the Second World War, the global economic product of the Earth increased four-fold. The total manufactured output of the period between 1950 and 1990 is equal to the growth of production from the beginning of civilisation to the present day. There had never been such a turbulent period in the development of the manufacturing powers of humankind. Humankind had never witnessed such a period of dynamic processes reliant on mutual cooperation, discoveries, the multiplication of discoveries and their by-products. The other side of the coin was that such economic growth gave rise to enormous deformations. The competition between the two super powers and their allies assisted in the acceleration of progress but also lead to previously unknown levels of unbalanced growth. In the 1980's the average national product per head of population in the industrialised countries was more than 11,000 dollars. In the majority of African countries this figure was between 250-300 dollars. While in the most developed countries of the world post-war development had lead to an enormous abundance of goods and the domination of consumerism, in the Third World more than 1.9 billion people were suffering from malnutrition and disease. The level of consumerism in the developed industrial countries rose to a level 40 to 100 times greater than in the developing countries. This process of world development gave rise to the most unexpected paradoxes. The money spent by today by the French on pet food would be sufficient to feed the starving children of Ethiopia and Somalia. The iniquities in world development have increased during the last couple of decades. Under colonialism, capital was re-directed towards the poorer countries. After the war, however, it began to move in the opposite direction. Large investments began to be made in the USA, Western Europe and Japan. In the 1980's alone, direct investments in the developing countries fell by about one hundred percent - from 25 billion USD in 1982 to 13 billion in 1987. As a result of this the poorer nations began to rely on large amounts of credit in order to be able to feed their people, resulting in the crippling debt burden which exists today. At present the countries of Latin America owe international creditor banks and a number of governments more than 400 billion dollars. Over 100 billion are owed by the Eastern European countries. These statistics are proof not only of enormous deformations but of the profound crisis which is affecting the foundations of the world financial system. While the processes of international integration do not permit the development of a monocentric world, the seven richest nations of the world and the 300-400 wealthiest banks control the lives of the majority of humanity via debt management. On the other hand, the disproportionate economic development resulting from the mad rush to purchase armaments and conflicts led to the economic overloading of the two superpowers. As a direct result of the exisiting two-bloc geo-political structure the USA managed (or some say was obliged) to amass huge internal debts of more than 4 trillion dollars. In the 1970's and 1980's the debts of the USSR increase enormously and delayed the rates of its development. A second characteristic problem of the two-bloc model of develoment was the increase in environmental problems. For the entire period of post-war development, as a result of uncontrolled industrialisation and the blind faith in political and ideological ambitions the world lost practically one fifth of its cultivable land, one fifth of its tropical forests and tens of thousands of species of animal and plant life. During this same period the level of carbon-monoxide in the atmosphere increased more than ten-fold. The level of ozone in the stratoshpere has diminished and humanity is faced with the threat of global warming. Talk is now of a global ecological tragedy. Even today despite the growth in ecological awareness and "green" movements, the world environmental crisis is seen as something of secondary significance as something less important than the struggle for economic growth, military strategic stability or national domination. Global warming as a result of the industrial boom has already had serious, possibly catastrophic, consequences. The reduction of irrigated agricultural land, the increase in the levels of the oceans, the dessication of entire regions which produce the majority of the world's grain - these are just a small part of the possible consequences. Despite the potential serious consequences for the world the leaders of the two systems did not want, nor were they able to take any decisive measures to allocate more funds for the conservation of the environment and to reduce military expenditure or to pass common legislation to guarantee the priorities of human needs. The third and no less important cause of the crisis of the two-bloc system was the fact that in the 1950's mankind surpassed all logical extremes of military growth. The cold war and the opposition of the two world systems lead the two super powers into a ceaseless race for domination. This contest reached such a level that in the mid 1980's the USSR and the USA possessed enough nuclear and strategic warheads to destroy life on earth several times over. The eight most economically powerful nations on the earth - the USA, USSR, China, the UK, France, West Germany, Italy and Japan continually and deliberately increased their military budgets during the entire post-war period. In 1984, world arms export reached record levels of 75 billion dollars, several times greater than the amount of money necessary to buy food and medicines for the hungry and sick in the world and for investment in the poorer countries. As a result of the opposition of the two blocs in the 1980's between 13 and 15 million people were employed in the arms industry. In 1987, the global military budget of the world was more than 1 trillion US dollars. This extreme overarmament lead to the overall deformation of entire world development and distorted the structure of industrial production. It caused enourmous deficits in the budgets of the industrialised nations and created serious pre-conditions for the future of world finance. No less important was the fact that as a result of the constant increase in arms production and nuclear weapons in particular, the level of nuclear security fell to very low levels. The danger of a nuclear Third World War loomed greater than ever. At the end of the 1980's the two super powers - the USSR and the USA had over 12 thousand units of nuclear arms - which from the view point of common humanity was beyond the realms of common sense. Thus, the deformation of economic development, the world environmental crisis, the wealth of the North and the poverty and disease of the South, the demographic booms, overarming - all these factors are the clear symptoms of a profound crisis. It is true that all these critical phenomena have been frequently discussed before and that some of the problems which I have mentioned here have been the subjects of international summit meetings and research groups but it is also true that they have been looking for explanations to these phenomena in the wrong places. In my opinion the most profound reason for the crises in the environment, manufacturing and population growth can be found in the growing inadequacy of the entire two-bloc structure of the world. On the one hand, during this period, following the logic of confrontation and the struggle for domination, the two super powers, their allies and all the remaining smaller countries established structures oriented towards the development of the economic and military power of the bloc to which they belonged. On the other hand, the inter-bloc and inter-state power-struggle created a manufacturing capacity which lead to the internationalisation of the world and caused world problems which until then had been unknown. The contradiction is manifest. Institutions, politics, propaganda, the training of personnel, the links between manufacture and defence were directly dependent on the profound ideologisation of thinking, while the globalisation of humanity lead to the destruction of the confrontational structures of the two blocs. In the 1970's and 1980's the bi-polar world could no longer cope with global and world trends. This contradiction still exists today notwithstanding the collapse of the two world systems. The reason was the impossibility of bringing a sudden halt to the inertia of the past based in the instutitions, upbringing, education and thinking of people. There is no doubt that in the West, and in particular in the East, humanity has taken too long to come to terms with these problems. Moreover, subsequent generations will bear the consequences and will discover new disasters particularly in the environment and as a result of the abnormal military competition between the two world systems. A number of academics and politicians issued warnings in the middle of the century. The scientists' rebellion against atomic weapons in the 1950's, the courage of Sakharov in the USSR, and the actions of Albert Einstein, Bertrand Russel and Jacques Cousteau are just a few examples. However, the conditions of political opposition continue to exert an enormous power of inertia. This inertia comes from the cultures of the existing civilisation, the nationalism of the modern age and the world conflicts of the 20th century. One of the main reasons for the acceleration in the crisis of the two-bloc system and the collapse of the iron curtain was the growth in world communications. In simple terms, the growth of radio, television, computers and satellite dishes destroyed the iron curtain, pierced the armour of the tanks and lead to the formation of a common culture of integration. The revolution in communications which began at the beginning of the 1960's brought about incredible political and spiritual changes throughout the entire world. The Beatles and the Rolling Stones became a world phenomenon not only as a result of their musical talent but also due to the new methods of information transfer. In 1971 I went abroad for the first time, to the German Democratic Republic. I asked my hosts why all the television ariels faced west and he answered "It makes the German people feel united." Television had begun to erode the Berlin wall even then. After the 1960's and the 1970's people felt a new wave of integration and discovered their common humanity. This was, however, in sharp contradiction to the collapse of the world and the structures of the political regimes. The new generations began to grow up in an atmosphere which was no longer dominated by the dogma of ideology but by music and spirituality and the thirst for contact with progressive cultural images. Clearly this was in contradiction with the two-bloc division of the world and the division between capitalism and socialism. On the other hand, computers, communications and new world media began to exert a direct influence on the human conscience and to create the beginnings of a new previously unknown global culture. Together with the globalisation of commerce and financial markets, this raised questions about the basic structures of the third civilisation - nations and nation states. There is no doubt that their borders had begun to change giving rise to the problem of the formation of another world structure and of another political and economic order. In the 1960's when the cold war emerged from the ice age and the peoples from the two sides began to get know each other, the first barriers in their consciousness came down. In the Eastern bloc, intellectual movements and calls for more freedom caught the leaders quite unawares. In Czechoslovakia the Prague Spring blossomed, Hungary began a process of brave economic reforms and in Poland the workers began to fight for their rights. This period produced the indefatiguable spirits of Vladimir Visotskiy in Russia, the "Shturtsi" in Bulgaria and Ceslav Niemen in Poland. Many people in the West also realised that military, political and cultural confrontation was of little benefit. In the 1960's and 1970's in the USA and in particular in Western Europe movements for peace and understanding gained momentum. The demonstrations against the war in Vietnam, the youth movements in 1968, the hippy peace movements and a number of other phenomena were manifestations not only of the political status quo but also of a new emergent culture. The bearers of the new spirituality in the West in the 1960's were born not so much in the academic environments of Eaton and Harvard but in the fields of Woodstock and amongst the millions of fans of John Lennon, Mick Jagger and Ian Gillan. At the beginning of the 1960's the president of the USA, John F.Kennedy was the first American statesman to evaluate the Eastern European nations not merely as the incorporation of evil but recognised that they had attained certain social achievements from which much could be learned. Of particular significance was his attempt to build intellectual bridges with the East and to break the ice of the cold war. Without accepting the violence of the totalitarian regimes, many intellectuals in the West began to perceive more clearly not only the mistakes and errors but also the successes of the Eastern European countries and to propose the application of certain of the benefits of state socialism, particularly in the social field. Year after year the means of global integration - transport, commerce, radio and television lead to to growth in international contact and slowly lead to the blurring of the iron curtain between East and West. With the appearance of the computer and satellite television in daily life and with the intensity of world radio television and cultural exchange the barriers between the two systems became more illusory. New means of communication made the policies of isolation, concealment of truth and global division absurd. The monopoly of information collapsed as a direct result of the revolution in communications which in turn lead to the undermining of the two-polar model. Despite everything which I have mentioned until now, is it still not overstated to speak of the collapse of the Third Civilisation? Am I not attempting to impose original thought in an aggressive way onto the evolution of human development? I am conviced that this is not so. My arguments for speaking of a general change in civilisation will be developed in the subsequent chapters. They involve technological and geo-political structures, ownership and the transition from traditional capitalist and socialist societies and the blurring of the concept of the nation state. Everything which symbolised and represented the modern age - industrial technology, nation states, capitalism and socialism and the bi-polar world - has undergone change. As a result of the explosion of world communications the process of cultural globalisation has begun to accelerate and what emerged has taken on new sharper features. This trend has gradually created more and more adherents of a new world and a new civilisation. Sooner rather than later the two-bloc system of world civilisation was going to collapse. The question was "when?" and "in what way?" Chapter two COLLAPSE I: THE EXPLOSION IN EASTERN EUROPE 1. DECAY AND DEATH Between 1960 and 1990 a noticeable gap began to open up betweenthe socialist countries of Eastern Europe and the industrialisedcountries of Western Europe. At the beginning of the 1980's there was a growing danger that this gap was going to become insurmountable... A lthough the two-bloc structure of the world was entering a period of common crisis its disintegration began not in the West but in the East. The changes in Eastern Europe were revolutionary" while in the West they were seen as "evolutionary". Why? In my opinion the reasons for this can be seen in the greater inadequacies of the Eastern European totalitarian regimes to adapt to the new trends in world development and to adapt themselves to the new technological and economic conditions which appeared in the 1970's and 1980's. The Eastern European totalitarian bloc was the weakest link in the world of the Third Civilisation. As early as the 1950's the Americans, the Japanese and the Western Europeans had begun to look for completely new approaches to the way in which their lives were structured. On the one hand, under pressure from the new external and internal realities which had to be taken into account and on the other hand as a result of competition with the Soviet Union and other countries of the Eastern Bloc, the most developed industrial nations began to improve their systems. Today the economies of the USA, Japan and France have little in common with what they were in the 1920's and 1930's. By preserving free initiative, the industrialised Western countries managed to overcome the danger of monopolism within their economies and extreme social stratification. In this way they did not allow the predictions of Lenin that "imperialism cannot be reformed and will disintegrate under the blows from its own contradictions"[15] to come true. In fact the opposite was true, after the Great Depression of 1929 and during the post-war period the largest Western European states and the USA undertook a series of measures aimed at overcoming the danger of further monopolisation and achieving greater social equality and harmony. Economic and political power were balanced through moderate state regulation, anti-monopoly legislation and the stimulation of medium and small-scale business. The most significant changes undertaken in the USA and Western Europe were in the structure of ownership. After the passing Legislation allowing the transferring of share ownership to employees in 1974 in the USA hundreds of thousands of employees began to acquire stock in the companies in which they worked. Similar trends can be seen in Great Britain, Germany, France and a number of other Wester European countries. They also undertook programmes to stimulate the development of small and medium business. Millions of small companies sprang up in the areas of services, tourism, trade, electrical goods and a number of other branches of the economy. By some accounts these small enterprises account for up to half the working population of Western European countries. At the same time the large family properties in Western Europe and the USA have lost the position of monopoly and importance which they had at the beginning of the century. Today neither Rothschild, nor Dupont, neither Morgan nor Rockerfeller can exert direct influence on questions of national importance as they could have done a hundred years ago. This has allowed Western European societies to halt their deterioration and to stop the growth of class contradictions and gradually to wipe out the gap between the different social groups. Thirty years after the end of the Second World War the nature of employed labour had changed beyond recognition and the proletariate described by Marx dissolved within a entirely new social and technological environment. If now at the end of the 20th century one is to visit the factories of, for example, Zussler near Zurich or American Standard New York, one will see a completely new type of work force with different interests and a different mentality and, more importantly, a workforce which is integrated within the decision making processes. These are no longer the same workers which lead Karl Marx to write "Capital" and who gave rise to mass political and trade union protests at the beginning of the 20th century. In the post-war period and particularly in the 1970's and 1980's a process of change in the nature of property ownership began which continues to the present. This in its turn has had direct ramifications upon the nature of power. This revolution has allowed the USA, Japan and another twenty or so countries to adapt much more quickly and effectively to the needs of the modern scientific and technological revolution and to become global leaders. At the same time the development of the USSR and Eastern Europe has been halted as a result of the totalitarian nature of their regimes. It is true that when it was formed in 1922, the Soviet Union inherited a poorly developed industrial base and a poorly educated population but it is also true that the totalitarian regime established by Stalin at the end of the 1920's had destructive and devastating consequences upon all areas of life. Tens of million of people lost their lives as a result of violence and repression - this was as a dramatic feature of the Stalinist regime as the complete repression of free creativity and private initiative. Centralisation in the decision making process could only provide temporary benefits in military and defence issues but in all other cases it halted intellectual, technical and economic development. From the very outset Stalinism contained within itself the thesis of forced, coercive growth. The initial results did not hide the truth that, given time, coercive development was to become transformed into stagnation and regression. The destruction of private enterprise, the total and coercive collectivisation of agriculture in December 1922, the substitution of market forces with party and subjective criteria and the repression of the intelligentsia could not do anything but leave a profound scar and cause serious consequences for human development. During the period between 1950 and 1960 total nationalisation could still be explained using complex and serious internal reasons, the general radicalisation of European regimes (especially in the 1930's) and the necessity to achieve military parity. However, during subsequent decades the totalitarian regimes became totally bankrupt. Many people in Eastern Europe still believe that the collapse in the Eastern European systems was due to the mistakes made by Mikhail Gorbachev and his programmes of "perestroika". I, personally, believe that the historical role of Gorbachev was a direct result of the overall negative trends in the development of Eastern Europe and the universal economic and political crisis which had gripped this part of the world. This crisis above all manifested itself in terms of the dramatic technological backwardness which began to become apparent as early as the late 1960's and became most marked during the 1980's. Eastern Europe began to lag behind in electronics, bio-technology, communications, environmental facilities and many other fields. Because all these technological fields are so closely linked Eastern Europe began to fall behind in every other possible field from the production of nails to complex aviation technology. The technological advantages of the West affected daily life, the workplace and management. The rate at which the East began to fall behind in the 1980's was so dramatic that certain experts began to speak of a possible "global technological gorge" opening up between the East and the West, or in other words a "self-perpetuating backwardness". With the appearance of micro-electronics, new communications and space technology, the Soviet military, who had up until now played a key role in the political life of the totalitarian state, began to realise more and more clearly that their economic backwardness would sooner or later affect their military and strategic position. This was also understood by those politicians with greater awareness unencumbered by political dogma. Although the USSR had achieved nuclear parity and, in certain areas, superiority, with the USA, its backwardness in the field of micro-electronics and communications at the beginning of the 1980's began to change this trend. The enormous amounts of money expended on military causes undermined the Soviet economy and doomed it to universal inefficiency. In a comparison of figures, it can be seen that while in 1960 the GNP of the USSR was only about $5000 USD less than in the USA, in 1980 this difference had reached $10,000 and in 1990 - $20,000. In 1960 the manufacturing output of the USSR was $1000 per head of population more than in Japan. Only 20 years later Japan was producing goods to the value of $11,864 per head of population in comparison with $6,863 in the USSR. At the beginning of the 1990's the gap had widened to $30,000.[16] A similar process was taking place in comparable smaller European countries. The German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria were experiencing growing difficulties reflected in the drastic increases in their external debt in the 1980's. Without the need for further statistics, I believe, that the most obvious example was the difference between the type of automobiles produced in East and West Germany. Whether we compare Wartburgs with Mercedes or Trabants with Volkswagens it is quite clear that we are dealing with two distinct generations of manufacturing cultures. My example is based on motor vehicles since they reflect the general level of industry as a whole: metallurgy, chemical production, heavy machinery construction, electronics, textiles and so on.. While industry in Western Europe was already using a new generation of production technology, Eastern Europe was still dominated by a generation of production machinery which was physically and morally at least twenty five years out of date. The majority of Eastern Europeans lived in the conditions of information deprivation. They were fed propaganda of constant progress and achievement, the collapse of world capitalism and the greater and greater victories of world socialism. In actual fact the reality was exactly the opposite. Of course, many progressive leaders in Eastern Europe during this period were aware of the problems but none of them were able to release themselves from the common bonds of Eastern European imperialism. This was made clear by the fate of the Hungarian uprising in 1956 and the Prague Spring of 1968, as well as the unrest amongst the Polish workers and the timid attempts at reform made in Bulgaria in 1986[17]. It was quite clear that changes could only take place in the context of global reforms affecting the USSR as well. The negative consequences of technological backwardness were exacerbated by the changes in the world economic situation in the mid 1980's. The collapse in the prices of oil and a number of other raw materials lead to a sharp decline in the ability of the USSR and its allies to function efficiently and to improve the standards of living of its peoples. In the 1980's the member countries of COMECON experienced their greatest difficulties in foreign trade and were obliged to increase their external debts. From the mid 1980's the Soviet Union and its allies lost their most important comparative economic advantages and were obliged to cover their current account deficits with large external loans which even then came to more than 100 billion dollars. The nature of the technological changes of the 1970's and 1980's also raised doubts about economic centralisation. In the 1930's and after the Second World War technological innovation relied heavily on the centralised accumulation and management of funds. Energy production, nuclear technology and chemical production, large irrigation projects, heavy industry and arms production were very strong arguments in favour of the need for centralised planning and the active participation of the state in the economy. On the other hand the technological wave of the 1970's pre-supposed the decentralisation of the decision making process. The production of software and personal computer applications, the appearance of tens of thousands of different types of services and the progress in bio-technology stimulated and continue to stimulate individual creativity. This was in contradiction to the very essence of the Soviet type of system. Consequently the backwardness of Eastern Europe in the 1970's and 1980's was not only a consequence of political and economic conjuncture but had a long-term and objective character. It was connected with the inherent backwardness not only of individual areas of manufacturing but of the primary governmental and economic structures. As a result of the influence of new technologies on the life of societies, the crisis soon spread to the personal lives of the individual Eastern Europeans. In the 1970's and 1980's personal consumption per head of population in Eastern Europe began progressively to fall behind the average consumption figures for Western Europe, the USA and Japan. According to UN statistics for 1960, for every 1000 West Germans there were 78 motor vehicles in comparison with 20 in Czechoslovakia and 17 in the German Democratic Republic. In 1985 this figure had risen to 400 in West Germany in comparison to 180 in East Germany and 163 in Czechoslovakia. In 1960 in the USSR there were 1.6 telephones per hundred people and in Japan - 5.8. In 1984 this figure was 9.8 for the USSR and 53.5 in Japan[18]. In the late 1960's the economic backwardness of the USSR and its allies began to spread to non-manufacturing environments. In 1960 infant mortality per 1000 newly born infants was 26 in the USA, 31 in Japan and 35 in the USSR. In 1985 this figure had changed to 10.4 per thousand in the USA, 5.7 in Japan and 25.1 in the USSR. Similar comparisons can be made in the area of science, education, culture and cultural life in general. It would, of course, be naive and imprudent to ignore the successes which the USSR and its allies achieved in the area of space research, physics, chemistry and molecular biology and in certain other areas of technology. These were, however, rather oases within the overall system rather than its essential features. They did not change the overall picture of backwardness or its deepening character. Clearly, against a background of increasing internationalisation and more and more intensive exchange of information, the backwardness of Eastern Europe began to become transformed into a universal moral and political crisis. In the context of the boom of world communications, radio and television, satellite communications and information transfer, the truth could not be hidden for long. The attempts of the USSR and the other Eastern European countries to propagate lies reached absurd extents to prove that they were at the head of technological and economic progress. For more and more people in Eastern Europe it was becoming clear that the backwardness of their countries in manufacturing and consumerism was a direct result of the vices of the system itself. It should be noted, on the other hand, that right up until their demise the Eastern European regimes retained certain benefits such as full employment, a low crime rate, universal social guarantees and a number of other features. The price of these benefits from the 1960's onwards, however, had begun to manifest itself in the form of empty shops, the lack of basic products, the low standard of living and the lack of personal freedom etc.. Given such a situation, it was more and more difficult to speak of the successes of the Soviet style system against the background not only of a worsening economic situation but also of the moral and political climate. The Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia, the uprisings and protests of the Polish workers, the reforms in Hungary, the dissident movement in the USSR, the mass movement in favour of emigration to the West was a manifestation of the growing level of dissatisfaction or unhappiness with the existing system. In the 1970's the USA and its Western allies managed to impose a new leading ideology: the issue of human rights and the rights and freedoms of all citizens of the world. A number of "capitalist" countries such as Sweden, Austria and others guaranteed more social benefits, including pensions, unemployment benefit for young persons etc.. In general, in the USA, Japan, Western Europe and a number of other smaller countries with a market economy, life become more attractive and more in tune with the growing diversity and increase in human needs. In contrast with this in Eastern Europe and the USSR, there was a sharp increase in crime, drunkenness, apathy and scepticism. This lead to major geo-political consequences. After the collapse of the colonial model, the Soviet Union, despite its concentrated efforts, was unable to impose its system on the newly liberated countries. The majority of them adopted systems and models closer to those of Western countries. Attempts at "socialist revolutions" in Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Ghana, Somalia, Ethiopia and a number of other countries did not produce the expected results. Poverty remained a problem. The promise of a rapid leap into the "paradise of socialism" also remained an illusion. While the USA and Western Europe and later Japan were keen on expanding their influence in the world via investments, cultural influence and education, the Soviet Union in order to expand its geo-political influences concentrated on the support of "revolutionary" regimes, expending colossal amountsof state money in the process. They maintained the point of view that in states with poor economies progress could only be achieved via nationalisation and centralised planning. Life, however, shows that this is not the case. The upshot was that in the 1970's and in particular in the 1980's the Eastern European regimes were in the grips of a universal structural, economic, political and spiritual crisis, both internally and externally. Geo-politically this crisis was expressed in terms of the widening gap between the role of the USSR as a world super power and its real economic abilities. During the entire post-war period the military expenditure of the USSR exceeded all permissible economic levels. Military budgets undermined national development and seriously threatened the future of the system. On the other hand, despite the economic crisis and evident technological backwardness the Eastern European governments continued their policies of universal social guarantees of employment and wages which in the 1980's in particular lead to chronic increases in foreign debt. Consumption was greater than production. Financial commitments to the military, price subsidies and excessive state investments lead to the creation of enormous budget deficits. Essentially the system was consuming itself from within. While Western countries were reforming and adapting to global technological problems, the crisis in Eastern Europe was worsening. It was becoming more clear that without radical reforms, backwardness would lead to death. 2. REFORMS AND ILLUSIONS Attempts by the Eastern European totalitarian regimes to reformwithout damage to the foundations of their systems were illusory. These were merely attempts to prolong the life of a civilisation on the wane. T he collapse of the Third civilisation, or if you prefer, its "reconstruction" could have been an evolutionary process as it was in the West, through economic reforms and the political evolution of the totalitarian states. Since the creation of Soviet Russia in 1917 and most notably during the last decades of its existence numerous attempts at reform had been made. These reforms merit a general examination and can be divided into five periods within the history of the Soviet model system. The first of these was the period between 1917-1929 which I like to refer to as a time of consolidation and the search for a model of development. Notwithstanding the civil war and widespread violence the possibility of returning to some form of democracy still remained. A certain amount of private property, paricularly in agriculture, had been preserved. The NEP programme (New Economic Policy) introduced by Lenin in 1921 provided the opportunity for the use of foreign capital and private initiative. The second stage of "pure socialism" began at the end of the 1930's with the destruction of the remains of the NEP and a total assault on economic, political and cultural life. The coercive formation of the collective farms, the creation of an enormous army of labour camp slaves, forced economic growth based on administrative and political methods and the extermination of millions of political opponents - these were the foundations of the Soviet Stalinist regime. During this period the Soviet system developed as a monolithic hierarchical organisation in which the violence of the party elite and its subordinated security organisations dominated. From 1930 to 1953 every manifestation of private initiative and free thought was punished with prison or death.[19] The third period in the development of the Soviet system began with the death of Stalin in 1953 and the "thaw" of Nikita Khrushchev. Although to some extent contradictory, the policies implemented by Khrushchev during this period were to leave a lasting mark on the further development of the world. For the first time the truth about Stalin's crimes was revealed and both Stalin himself and his system lost their authority as the proponents of social justice and world progress. The fourth period began in 1964 and ended at the beginning of the 1980's. It was justly named by Mikhail Gorbachev as the period of "zastoi" (stagnation). During these years Leonid Brezhnev brought a halt to the "thaw" begun by Khrushchev and began his attempt to immortalise the totalitarian system through a series of internal and external cosmetic changes. It was during this period that the USSR and its allies began to fall behind their Western opponents in the areas of technology and economics. The fifth and final stage was the period of "perestroika" introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev (1985-1991) which was eventually to lead to the collapse of the Eastern European regimes and the USSR itself. My reason for this periodisation is that from the beginning to the end of the Soviet system there were two contradictory political trends: one of which saw totalitarianism as the essence of the utopian communist dream and a second which aspired to more flexible, economic and political models. The second trend appeared directly after the February revolution of 1917 in the ideas of local self-government by workers, the implementation of the NEP by Lenin in 1921 and 1927, the "thaw" of Khrushchev and finally in the policy of "perestroika" of Mikhail Gorbachov. The essence of this second trend was the combination of party and political centralism with relatively greater freedom for the private sector (especially in trade and agriculture) and in the area of art and culture. Its origin can be seen in the traditions of European socialism and social democracy. In the 1920's the proponents of a more flexible and dynamic political line - N.Bukharin, G.Zinoviev, S.Kamenev, A.Rikov and others lost their battle for power, allowing the party bureaucracy to dominate all structures of society. This was the decisive moment for the development of the essence of the Soviet model. The victory of Stalinism transformed the USSR - and a number of other countries after the Second World War - into bureaucratic command societies. During the period between 1954-1956 when N.Khrushchev was fiercely critical of the Stalinist era, he found himself in conflict with the Stalinist system in all sectors of life. As a child of the very same system, Khrushchev was condemning not the system but the style and leadership methods employed by Stalin and the cult of personality. He proposed a reevaluation of the system and mechanisms of its leadership. Khrushchev's illusion was that by changing the leadership and functioning of the system he would make it more effective and resolve its major problems. During the Brezhnev period (1964-1982) a considerable number of "improvements" were made to the leadership. The attempts made to revive the economy by giving greater freedom to industry and a timid embracement of the private sector clashed with the dominant principles of the totalitarian system. There was talk of de-centralisation, collective initiative and new economic mechanisms. However, not a word was said about the party monopoly on power and finances, banks and the market. It would, however, have been impossible to have freedom or private initiative without major changes to the banking system, price liberalisation, reform to the system of investment banking and the removal of large funds from the hands of the party and state elite. It was quite absurd to make changes to the structures of property and administration without changes to the principles of political power or without profound changes to the legislative system and the guarantee of constitutional rights and freedoms of its citizens. History frequently provides us with examples of the combination of heroism and illusion. Frequently the intellect of leaders and the grandeur of their objectives have been let down by the naivety of the way in which they attempted to achieva them. Such was the case with Stalin's opponents in the 1920's and 30's and the policies of Nikita Khrushchev in the 1950's. Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rikov and Bukharin paid for their naivety with their lives since they were up against not only Stalin's will and cruelty but also the interests and power of the party-state apparatus. Khrushchev also paid for his own naivety and was removed from power in October 1964. For the ten years he was in office, Khrushchev wavered between the desire to put an end to the Stalinist repressions and the preservation of the system. The same man who was bold enough to reveal the crimes of Stalin to the whole world allowed cruel acts of repression against Soviet art and culture. The same man who had the fortitude to remove the body of Stalin from the mausoleum in Moscow became a proponent of the super-Utopian idea of the "rapid leap" into the "paradise of communism". The enormous belief that good could be imposed from above and that the system could be revitalised by "the enthusiasm" and privileges of the nomenclature, were naive. Khrushchev was no less a believer in the system of state socialism. By throwing Stalin and Beria onto the scrapheap of history, he deprived the Soviet people of their Divine leader and was obliged to offer them a new Utopia - the rapid advent of communism, industrial dominance over the USA and a high standard of living for the people of the USSR etc.. After Krushchev's removal from power it became more difficult to delude the people with promises of new Utopias and illusions. The myth of the infallible leader in Stalin had been shattered. Khrushchev's programme for entering the era of perfect communism by 1980 had failed. The next utopia in line was Brezhnev's off-the-peg theory of a developed socialist society. Despite all this the logical question arises of why despite its general instability the Soviet totalitarian system survived for such a long time - 74 years? I believe that there are a number of reasons for this. The Soviet totalitarian model arose during a period of general crisis and the large scale transformation of world capitalism, during a period of globalisation and a search for various models of existence in a new inter-dependent world. The 20th century was a time of cataclysm, change and transition and of two world and hundreds of local wars in which more than 150 million people lost their lives. Despite its Utopian nature, the Soviet system was a model for potential progress which emphasised absolute social protection, guaranteed the interests of workers andpeasants and total nationalisation as a condition for concentrating resources and directing them towards new construction. The belief that universal social guarantees were the basis for progress provided temporary historical justification for the centralised type of society. The continuing existence of the Soviet totalitarian system can be explained with the desire and the ambitions of many nations rapidly to overcome poverty and to avoid their possible colonisation by the larger colonial metropolises. For many countries during the 1950's and the 1960's the Soviet Union was a guarantee of protection against colonisation by other countries, despite the fact that "fraternity" with the USSR meant another type of dependence. Was it not the case, however, that the crisis of liberalism and the return to the ideas of nationalisation was also taking place in other parts of the world? Practically everywhere in the world before and after the First World War and especially at the end of the 1920's societes were undergoing radical changes and centralisation. The victory of Hitler in Germany, Mussolini in Italy, the Left in France and Spain was proof of this. The crisis of world capitalism brought about by colonialism, monopolisation, the First World War and the economic crisis of 1929-33 was sufficient motivation and justification for the actions of Stalin as "necessary policies" in the context of forthcoming world conflict. For millions of people the Soviet Union was not so much a country of violent political aggression in which millions of innocent people lost their lives but rather the power which defeated Hitler, saved humanity from the death camps of fascism and gave a chance to many peoples to live their lives in freedom and independence. In 1932 in the introduction to his criticism of socialism, Ludwig von Mizes wrote, "In Europe to the East of the Rhine there are very few non-Marxists and even in Western Europe and the United States his (Marx) supporters are greater in number than his opponents"[20]. If today at the end of the 20th century, socialism is perceived as "something bad in the past", for over half a century - from the 1920's to the 1970's it was seen as the hope for the majority of mankind. This is due to the not insignificant achievements of socialism in the areas of industrialisation, science and technology, culture and art and, most significantly, the social guarantees of labour, wages, a place to live and so on. To disregard or to conceal these achievements would be imprudent, and, indeed, impossible from an historical point of view. Each historical period notwithstanding the nature of political power leaves behind it something positive, guaranteeing the furtherance of human life. The successes of the USSR in industrialisation, transforming it from a country surviving on the remnants of a system of feudal agriculture into a world super-power, guaranteed wages, work and income for the vast masses of its population were for many people sufficient grounds for maintaining the system. I, therefore, do not consider the model of state socialism to be the ravings of a group of mad politicians. Its appearance, existence and dissemination over the whole world from the second half of the 19th century to the end of the 20th was a consequence of huge world transformations and reactions against the imperialist colonial world with its injustices and wars. Despite its illusions and errors it was a conscious attempt to offer protection to the interests of the oppressed and division and class struggles to be replaced with unification and social unity. I realise how difficult it is only a few years after the collapse of the totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe for these words to be uttered. However, we should not be too hasty in our evaluation of history from the point of view of a specific political moment in time. The continued existence of the Soviet type of system and the popularity of the communist idea during the greater part of the 20th century was a consequence of the objective and global processes of transition of the modern world. It was a part of the processes of world integration, but also a part of the crisis of the Third Civilisation. The same factors which provided the opportunities to state socialism also dug its grave. Continuing global integration could no longer tolerate isolationism. Social guarantees led to the demotivation of labour. The growth in personal and group self-confidence were limited by the lack of basic human rights. The reason for the collapse of this system was its tendency to consume more than it produced and to maintain "balance" via the methodical use of aggression upon the personal freedoms of its citizens. The very idea of achieving universal justice and material plenty via coercion and "forced awareness" were Utopian and inhumane. The contradictions arose from the economic essence of the system, from the type of ownership, and not from the style and methods of leadership, as Khrushchev considered. Khrushchev did not attempt to change the system which, in its turn, killed him politically. His illusions were inherited from Bukharin and in the end the system was doomed to failure. However, that which was planted by Khrushchev, the desire for change, eventually gave fruit. On the one hand because the reformers within the Soviet party and state leadership were able to learn from its lessons and on the other since they were all aware that partial and cosmetic changes would not lead to success. Twenty years and four months had passed since Khrushchev was removed from office when on the 11th of March 1985 Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev was elected to the post of General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 3. THE TWO OPTIONS AND THE MISTAKE OF GORBACHEV Gorbachev had two options - to change the system either by liberalising the economy or by changing the political system. The first option would have guaranteed stability and a gradual transition, the second - conflict and chaos. In any event neither he nor his successors had a plan for global action. A t the beginning of 1985 the majority of the Soviet population was ready for change. It was tired of the drawn-out death throes of the Brezhnev leadership, filled with hope when Yuri Andropov came to power, crushed by his death soon after that and his replacement with the aging Brezhnevite Konstantin Chernenko. Soviet society and in particular the intelligentsia during this period were tired of the endless speeches and demagogy, of the discrepancies between words and reality, of the empty shelves and the universal lack of everything which the ordinary member of the public might require. Mikhail Gorbachev found not only fertile ground for change but he indeed became the natural mouthpiece for the expression of all the ambitions and hopes of the majority of Soviet society. During his first year of office Gorbachev made significant changes to the politburo, the government, the leadership of the armed forces and foreign ministry. It was during this period that Edward Shevernadze came to the fore in the Soviet leadership as foreign minister and member of the politburo. A.Yakovlev became the leader of the propaganda section of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Boris Yeltsin became the leader of the Moscow party committee of the CPSU. In practice these were the three political figures who most radically and faithfully supported the political and economic reforms. In 1985 Gorbachev opened up the way for improvements in Soviet and American relations in the areas of arms control policy and the radical reduction in first-strike nuclear weapons. The summit meeting held between Gorbachev and the American president Ronald Reagan in November 1985 in Geneva was the beginning of a turn-around in world nuclear arms policy. In 1986 Gorbachev accelerated personnel changes in the leadership of the communist party and the Soviet state as well as in the mass media and local party apparatus. I believe that these first two years were decisive for Gorbachev's choice of strategy. Undoubtedly, the change which he began were on a much larger scale than those of Khrushchev and affected all areas of life. Despite this in 1985 and 1986 Gorbachev continued to pursue the idea of revitalising the system in the aims of "more socialism". In June 1986 in Habarovsk he formulated the essence of "perestroika" and the need for its advancement. During this period the people of the USSR were allowed much greater spiritual freedom and learnt many truths about their history and the outrages of Stalinism. Now, looking back on the documents and facts of this period, it can be seen that Gorbachev did not have a plan for global action. He had not imagined that perestroika would cause such global transformations. The General Secretary of the CPSU was motivated by the idea of strengthening Soviet society and socialism, rather than overthrowing the culture and system of a waning civilisation. This "provinciality" in his attitude to a global power, such as the USSR was, is quite evident in his thousands of speeches and articles of the time, however, it is also proof of the lack of the global responsibility necessary for the leader of one of the two super powers.[21] Gorbachev had two options. The first of these was to give priority to economic reforms (similar to Hungary and China) with simultaneous guarantees of centralised power followed by the gradual implementation of political reforms. The second option was to introduce political reforms followed by economic reforms. If he had opted for the first option he would have had further opportunities for global influence, but he did not and plunged the USSR into a network of internal conflicts. From the speeches made by Gorbachev between 1985 and 1986 it can be seen that he did not underestimate economic reform and wanted to find a way of implementing reform both in the economy and in politics. It is, however, clear that Gorbachev and his allies were thinking on their feet and that they did not have a clear action plan suitable for universal, global change. The political campaigns began to take a hold but economic reforms tended to falter in their tracks. The simultaneous implementation of economic and political reforms in actual fact gave weight to the latter. As Gorbachev announced the policy of Glasnost and began to reveal the truth about the past, he put the authority of the party apparatus under threat and accepted the enormous challenge of political reforms and the divisive inner-party conflicts. The beginning of "perestroika" through the policy of "glasnost" in essence meant the priority of political reform over economic reform. This fact was of decisive significance for the fate of the USSR and Eastern Europe and the whole world. If Gorbachev had delayed political reform and had placed the accent on the economy, this would not have lead so rapidly to the chaotic collapse of the Eastern European systems and the USSR. Such a transition would not have lead to the explosion of nationalism and dozens of local wars and conflicts. The Eastern European nations would not have become a burden for the developed Western European nations and there would not have been the need for billions of dollars in financial aid. Gorbachev's choice was not the result of a deliberately thought-out plan but rather the result of circumstances. However, having opted for a model of change, sooner rather than later local conflicts and the collapse of Eastern European structures were inevitable. Of the reasons for such a denouement, one is of particular significance. The integrated nature of the totalitarian system was totally reliant on the centralised nature of power. In contrast to market economies where people are linked by an enormous number of horizontal connections independent of the central power, in a totalitarian economy social integration is maintained via central state institutions. This applies not only to economic entities but also to ethnic groups and the structures of information exchange and culture. Rapid reforms to the system of political authority without economic foundations within a totalitarian society by definition pose a risk of the entire system collapsing in chaos. Imagine factories which are accustomed to receiving materials allocated to them by the central planning institutions. The destruction of this institution or change within the political or administrative system allows the factories to sell to whom they want and to ignore whom they want. The result of this is that at one fell swoop thousands and millions of economic bonds are severed and the chaos becomes unimaginable. This was also the case in the area of international relations. Under totalitarianism many national groups were able to co-exist peacefully within the order imposed from above and any conflicts between them were cosmetically concealed. However, these peoples peoples lacked sufficient horizontal economic and cultural bonds as for example is the case with the various nationalities inhabiting Switzerland. After the collapse of the central power, nations which had until the previous day been good neighbours began to divide up territories, power, money and in many cases opened up the way for armed conflict with tanks and weapons. Whether Gorbachev understood the scale of the emerging crisis is a question of some doubt. What is clear, however, is that during this period economic reforms made no progress, whereas political reforms began to give rise to greater and greater conflicts. In January 1987, a little more than a month after the release of Sakharov from internal exile, Mikhail Gorbachev laid before the Central Committee of the CPSU a series of measures aimed at political reform. These included secret ballots with multiple candidates and the election of non-communists to senior state posts, participation of employees in the election of directors at their place of work, the reduction of state ownership in favour of cooperative ownership and so on. This was not only a direct and decisive blow to the party apparatus and its vested interests, but also to the power structure itself. After this plenum feelings of opposition to perestroika began to make themselves felt. The indignation of the party apparatus was total and reactions became more and more overt. However, the inertia of change was too great to be stopped. In 1987 a process of political rehabilitation of intellectuals repressed by Stalin began and the first timid steps were being made towards the opening of private cooperative shops. In the same year, which I consider the zenith of the perestroika, a number of serious problems began to manifest themselves. Most significant of these was the fact that "perestroika" had given practically no positive economic results and had not alleviated the problems faced by ordinary people. The successes which were being achieved in the medium range arms negotiations were having less and less influence on the public opinion. People were more concerned with the lack of goods in the shops. In October 1987 the first nationalist conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaidjan flared up. This was the beginning of the general crisis in national relations within the USSR. At the same time a number of diverse, but well organised, opposition groups began to appear within the Soviet leadership. On the one hand, both within the Central Committee of the CPSU and outside it the opposition to Gorbachev's reforms was becoming more vocal and aimed at the preservation of the status quo of single party power and the totalitarian system. On the other hand, in October 1987, Boris Yeltsin made official accusations against Gorbachev and Ligachev, marking the beginning of a political movement aimed at more radical and liberal reforms. From this moment on Gorbachev was obliged to strike a balance between these two groups which limited his flexibility and making his action seems more contradictory. The General Secretary was neither able to turn back, which would have marked the end of his career and perestroika, nor was he free enough to make sufficient intensive progress. Gorbachev had already surpassed Khrushchev but was not safe from the same fate. In November 1988, Estonia declared its independence and the right of the Supreme Council of Estonia to veto laws passed by the Soviet parliament. Mass independence movements began in Lithuania and Latvia. The ethnic tension between Armenia and Azerbaidjan continued. In this situation, on the 7th of December 1988, Gorbachev announced to the UN that the Soviet army would be reduced by half a million and the pull-out of Soviet troops from Hungary, Czechoslovakia and East Germany began. The Soviet leader called for a new world order. This was his biggest tactical mistake. He realised his global responsibility too late. When Gorbachev finally understood his decisive significance in international reform and in general, as well as the fate of perestroika,he had already lost his power. 4. THE COLLAPSE OF PERESTROIKA The collapse of perestroika in 1991 had been foreseen as early as the end of 1988. With the conflicts which ensued, it will be evaluated by modern historians as a process filled with contradictions. On the other hand, it opened the floodgates to new opportunities for progress and history in the long-term will appreciate as the catalyst for the advent of the new civilisation. I shall take a more detailed look at the changes which took place in Eastern Europe not only because since I lived through them personally but because I am convinced of the fact that the events of 1986--1991 will affect our fate for many years to come. 1989 and 1990 were years of the gradual "fiasco" of perestroika as a line of evolutionary change within the totalitarian system. Its collapse took several forms. Firstly -- the complete failure of economic reforms and, consequently, the reduced support for perestroika on the part of the Soviet people. Secondly -- allowing the local inter-ethnic conflicts to get out of hand and the consequent explosion of ethnic self-confidence and demands. Thirdly -- the collapse of the Eastern European political and military alliances and the severance of ties between the Eastern European nations and Moscow. As early as the beginning of January 1989 the majority of Soviet republics began to pass a series of new laws establishing their own languages as the official language of the republic. In March of the same year in the first free elections for the Congress of the People's Deputies the nationalist movements in the Baltic Republics won the absolute majority. In May, Lithuania and Estonia and in July Latvia, in spite of Moscow's displeasure, passed a law, declaring their independence. The question arose of the fate of the USSR, its integrity and unity and the future of the central leadership. This was, indeed, Gorbachev's most serious ordeal and the precursor of the final collapse of perestroika. The opposition of the neo-communists within the Soviet leadership was a powerful force in favour of preserving the unity of the Soviet Union and hard-line policies. The potential collapse of the Soviet Union was unacceptable for the Moscow elite, mainly for ideological reasons. It is not to be underestimated that for 70 years millions of people in the former USSR were absolutely convinced of the need for its existence and of the idea and meaning of the Soviet system. No less important is the fact that the collapse of the USSR was de facto to signify the demise of all the higher leadership posts. In 1990 and 1991 such a possibility instilled feelings of insecurity in the Soviet elite. Tens of thousands of senior civil servants, amongst them leading figures in the Moscow government, were threatened with losing their jobs. There is another side to the question which has to be considered. The majority of the world political elite considered the potential collapse of the USSR as a complex and possibly dangerous issue. From my direct personal conversations with senior politicians in the USA, France, Germany and Austria and other countries and from indirect political analyses, I have the impression that in 1990 and 1991 only the minority of them were in favour of a collapse of the USSR. The world was concerned about the appearance of new nuclear powers such as the Ukraine and Kazakhstan and the potential of large-scale military conflict with the possible use of nuclear arms. The insecurity of this super power was a matter of concern for all. This insecurity could also be felt in Moscow. It coincided with increased criticism of the economic and social policies of the CPSU. The leaders of the other Eastern European states, members of the Warsaw Pact, were amongst those who were becoming vocal in their criticism. The most significant factor which was to sound the death knell for perestroika was the explosion of ethnic and nationalist tension within the USSR itself. IN January 1990, thousands of Azeris protested near to the Soviet border with Iran. A few days later the Lithuanian communist party ratified Lithuania's independence. On the 11th of January, Armenia exercised its right to veto Soviet legislation, following the example of the Baltic states. The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaidjan over Nagorni Karabakh continues to escalate. Protests and tension began to make themselves felt in Moldova and Tadzhikistan. These were clearly not individual phenomena but symptoms of the general collapse of the USSR. On the 7th of February 1990, the Central Committee of the CPSU accepted in essence the idea of a multi-party political system as the basis for the creation of democratic socialism. In February and March during the local government elections the established nomenclature lost many senior positions in favour of independent and largely unknown new leaders. A little later, V.Landsbergis was elected as the first non-communist president of a Soviet republic. From this moment on the process of collapse began to accelerate. Gorbachev had clearly begun to lose control of events. After 1989 the rate of change was no longer being dictated by Gorbachev or his entourage. On the other hand it must be appreciated that Gorbachev did not give in to the temptations or the suggestions to halt the reform process with the help of the army.[22] By the middle of 1990 it was already evident that the three Baltic republics would achieve full independence. The next great challenge came from Kiev where the Ukraine, on the 16th February, also declared its independence. In August another group of Soviet republics declared their independence. Gorbachev was left the with the only alternative of proposing a new union of independent republics. His suggestion to reorganise his cabinet to include the leaders of all 15 republics showed that even as late as November 1990 the central Soviet leadership was unaware of the real pace of the reform processes and their real scale and power. In December Kirgizia, the last remaining 15th republic declared its independence. During the period (November--December 1990) the opposition against Gorbachev had begun to increase and he was forced to make compromises. In December 1990 he was forced to dismiss some of his most loyal allies and supporters of the reform process. On the 2nd of December the Minister of the Interior was replaced by Boris Pugo and on the 26th of December Gorbachev put forward Genadiy Yanaev for the post of Vice-President of the Union. I do not believe that it would be a contravention of political ethics I if were to share my personal impressions from the meeting I had with Genadiy Yanaev the day after he was elected to the post of the Vice-President of the USSR. From my conversation with him it soon became clear that the election of Yanaev was a return of those forces which desired the stabilisation of the situation, the preservation of the USSR, more hard-line politics and a desire to use the position of Gorbachev to achieve these aims. In the same month, December 1990, the head of the KGB, V.Kriuchkov began to become more vocal and to increase the authority of his position by officially proclaiming the time-worn slogans of the danger posed by the CIA and that the KGB was prepared to fight against any anti-communist forces. On the other hand, one must not forget the exceptional foresight and shrewdness of the foreign minister of the time, Edward Shevardnadze, who warned of the imminent possibility of dictatorship. During the entire period of 1991 Gorbachev was forced to manoeuvre between these influences, hoping to preserve the Soviet Union and to continue his line of paced reform within the ideology of perestroika, albeit in an new form. When I look back and analyse the events of those days, I find it impossible not to believe that the conflict which took place at the end of 1990 was impossible for two major factors: on the one hand, the increased rate of the disintegration of the Soviet state via the development of democratic and completely independent movements in all the former Soviet republics while on the other -- the threats to the interests of the ruling elite and the increased activity of the majority of the Soviet leadership aimed at the preservation of the status quo. And so we arrive at the attempted coup of the 19th of August 1991. One question begs to be answered: Did Gorbachev and other proponents of perestroika know of the imminent coup and its scale? I do not believe so, at least in terms of specifics. They could not have failed to have seen the storm on the horizon or have felt the potential danger, but nothing more. On the 16th of August A.Yakovliev warned that a coup was being prepared in Russia, but this was more of a political conclusion than information based on specific facts. A month later, on the 15[th] of September I had a long conversation in Moscow with Yakovliev and Shevernadze. My profound conviction from these talks is that they had both had a foreboding of the events but had not believed that it could take place so quickly. I feel that Gorbachev was of the same opinion. They had not believed for example that the minister of defence, D. Yazov, could be involved in such a plot. They had not believed that the entire council of ministers of the USSR would be so willing to reject the new Treaty of Union to replace to the USSR with a Confederation of Independent States. Of course, there were many inexplicable occurrences during the course of the attempted coup, but that is the way of politics. Large-scale change is often connected with many inexplicable events when the momentary psychological or physical conditions of an individual or group of individuals can be of decisive significance for events. The intention of the leaders of the coup was to carry replace Gorbachev quietly, or at least to put him out of the way in reserve. Yanaev, Kriuchkov, Pavlov[23] and others had evidently been in favour of the maximum flexibility in the change of power with the eventual gradual restoration of the Soviet regime. Gorbachev had to be convinced to withdraw for reasons of illness or nervous exhaustion or to come into line with the leaders of the coup and to "cure" himself of his illusions. There were clear analogies with the coup of August 1991 and the removal of Khrushchev from power in October 1964 -- a statement regarding the illness of the leader, putting the troops on alert along with a declaration that they would not be used as an elementary attempted to pacify the people and international society. There were, however, enormous differences between 1991 and 1964. Underestimating these differences was one of the biggest mistakes the leaders of the coup made. In August 1991 the Russian nation and in particular the Russian intelligentsia were of a completely different state of mind. Their thirst for and their experiences of freedom were stronger than any more primitive feelings for preserving the status quo. Notwithstanding economic difficulties, masses of the Soviet people had experienced the taste of free life. Although perestroika in terms of strategy and tactics was already bankrupt, it had lead to profound changes in the way of thinking of wide ranging social groups. The 19th of August was the litmus test which in reality showed what had been achieved by Gorbachev. Perestroika had not only unleashed the will of the people but had also given it the self-confidence not to heed what was said to them "from above". Shortly after the attempted coup the rock group, "The Scorpions" released their hit "The Winds of Change", dedicated to those who had thwarted the coup. Indeed, this wind came from the heart of the reformed Soviet society, from the new spirit cultivated by perestroika. On the day after the coup, on the 20th of August, several hundred thousand demonstrators protested against it in St.Petersburg, thousands surrounded the White House. Huge demonstrations were organised in the larger towns of Russia. Major sections of the Russian army refused to carry out the orders of leaders of the coup or take any decisive actions. On the evening of the 20th of August it was already becoming apparent that the self-proclaimed "Committee of salvation" had lost control over the situation. At that moment the leaders of the coup had two choices: either to declare a bloody civil war with no predictable outcome or to sound the retreat. In the final outcome, the coup was thwarted by the decisive actions of Boris Yeltsin and his supporters, but also by the millions of ordinary Russian people who were unwilling to make compromises with their consciences, the generals and officers whose thoughts and deeds were not limited by party interests and remained loyal to their exalted mission. I will never forget my telephone conversation at that time with Edward Shevernadze. At the time of the conversation the outcome of the conflict was far from clear. Despite this I felt in him not only his decisiveness to engage in the struggle, but also a clear feeling of responsibility to avoid the unthinkable -- to avoid a civil war or a large-scale thermo-nuclear war. I feel tempted to write that not only in the USSR but in other countries as well the driving forces of change were the standard bearers of the emergent new civilisation. Many of them, perhaps still unconsciously, other, thinking with the criteria of world progress, and yet others since they had just had enough of thinking the way other people wanted them to think. The 19th of August 1991 was the real date of the end of perestroika and the start of new beginnings in the process of economic and political reforms in the USSR. The collapse of the coup meant, in practice, the collapse of the major forces which were holding up the reform process. It meant something else as well: together with the ban on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the dismissal of the Council of Ministers, the arrest of the conspirators the main it resulted in the removal of the main institutions of power which until that moment had held the USSR together. Making the most of this moment, in the days following the failed coup, the former Soviet republics confirmed their announcements of independence. The new union treaty of which the leaders of the coup had been so frightened and which would have saved the Union was forgotten. The new directly elected president of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, began a series of direct contacts with the leaders of the former Soviet republics and with only a few months withdrew the prerogatives of the centralised Soviet ministries. This in reality meant the collapse of the USSR and the passing of its basic rights and obligations into the domain of the Russian republic. After coming to terms with the huge public support for the actions of Boris Yeltsin, Mikhail Gorbachev resigned in 1991.[24] This was the end of a significant period in the history of the nations of the former USSR. As paradoxical as it may seem, this period also marked the beginning of a new era in the development of the world. The collapse of one of the two superpowers meant in practice the collapse of the bi-polar world and together with this the structures which were typical of the Third Civilisation. 5. THE EXPLOSION IN EASTERN EUROPE The radical changes within Eastern Europe during the period between 1989 and 1990 were the first part of the universal political restructuring of the world order. These changes began as a huge emotional outpouring soon to be followed by enormous problems and disappointments. A number of experts on the subject believe that the changes in the Eastern Europe were the result of understandings reached by Gorbachev and Reagan at their numerous meetings, in particular in Malta. My personal opinion is that these processes could not have come about as the result of any agreement. The changes were a result of the growth in self-confidence of the Eastern European peoples as a consequence of perestroika, of the confidence in the influence of the democratic movements and the feeling that Gorbachev and his entourage were losing control over power. The extent of the influence of the reforms which took place in the USSR after 1985 on the countries in Eastern Europe was enormous. In Bulgaria, for example, whose language is very close to Russian, the most popular newspapers between 1986 and 1989 were not Bulgarian but Soviet. The spirit of perestroika, the revelations of truths about the past, the constant reminders that the Utopias of the totalitarian regimes were bankrupt lead to enormous changes in people's attitudes and prepared the way for the beginning of the explosion. Despite differences in scale and methods, all the "socialist" countries of Eastern Europe began to give birth to new civil movements and the growth in free expression and the desire for profound reforms. On the 6th of March 1989 the speaker of the Soviet foreign ministry, Gerasimov, announced that the future of every Eastern European country lay in its own hands. In this way he officially dismissed the Brezhnev doctrine which guaranteed the control of Moscow over all its Eastern European satellites. There is no doubt that Gorbachev had given prior notice of this announcement to his Western partners. From this moment on, events unfolded at an unbelievable pace. In May 1989 the Hungarian government dominated by reformist communists opened its border with Austria and allowed thousands of citizens from the former German Democratic Republic to travel to West Germany. A little later the Polish trade union "Solidarity" achieved a decisive victory in the elections to the Senate and part of the lower chamber of the Polish Sejm. Moscow accepted these events calmly, thus proving that it had indeed accepted a new policy towards Eastern Europe. On the 7th of July at a summit meeting of the Warsaw pact countries in Bucharest, Gorbachev declared that all the members of the pact were at liberty to chose their own paths. What was the objective of the Soviet leadership in relation to its former allies? Analysing the experience of Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and a number of other Eastern European countries of this period, I believe that between the spring and summer of 1989 Gorbachev had begun to apply a policy based on two main theses: first of all -- the rejection of the "Brezhnev doctrine" on the limitation of sovereignty and allowing greater freedom to the governments of the relevant countries; secondly -- the replacement of the old leaderships with new, more pragmatic leaders and the preservation of the Soviet zone of influence on the basis on new alliances and treaties. This, however, involved the same theoretical and practical problem as in the Soviet Union. On the one hand, Gorbachev wanted to give greater freedom and to support the reform processes within the Eastern European communist parties. On the other hand, he could or would not comprehend the scale of the explosion, the fuse of which he had lighted himself. The reform processes resembled an uncorked bottle of champagne rather than a well-thought out scheme. After liberation of their spirits, the people would no longer accept leaders imposed upon them from above and pouring out onto the streets and squares they demonstrated new power and self-confidence. After the summit meeting in Bucharest in July 1989 events unfolded like a chain reaction. On the 7th of October Gorbachev directly influenced the beginning of reforms in the DDR and on the 18th of October Erik Honneker was replaced by Egon Krenz. A few days later the Berlin wall came down. On the 10th of November the Bulgarian communist leader, Todor Zhivkov, was replaced by Petar Mladenov, who was favoured by the Soviet leadership. At the end of November and the beginning of December after mass unrest in Prague, a new government was formed consisting mainly of non-communists and on the 29th of December Vaclav Havel became the first non-communist president from more that 40 years. During the last few days of December the Rumanian dictator and his wife were killed after a military coup and a hastily improvised trial. From the point of view of the history of the Eastern European nations these changes had enormous significance. They followed the logic of the analogous changes which were taking place within the USSR, but rapidly overtook them in terms of their speed and depth. Apart from the universal elements of the crisis within the USSR there were the additional factors of the struggle and aspirations of the smaller Eastern European nations for complete sovereignty and independence. This also helps to explain the more radical nature of the changes which took place within them. From a global point of view the explosion in Eastern Europe was the first phase of the larger geo-political changes and the creation of a new world order. The changes in Moscow, Berlin, Sofia, Prague, Budapest and Bucharest, together with the collapse of the USSR can be determined as the beginning of the collapse of the Third Civilisation. The military and political alliances of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON were rendered pointless. The political map of Europe had changed beyond recognition. The democratic changes in Eastern Europe could have taken place in a different way but they could not have been avoided. The changes were a consequence of the crisis of the totalitarian regimes, their inability to adapt to the large technological and political changes in the world and the requirements of the new age. The administrative coercion of the one-party system and the repression of private economic initiative were shown to be historical mistakes. Only history will decide what would have been best for the world -- either the "Chinese" model of reform by placing priority on economic reform, or the "velvet revolutions" which in reality took place. I have to say personally, that not only in Bulgaria but in most of the other Eastern European countries very few people believed in the rapid demise of the USSR before 1989. No-one could believe that a super power such as the USSR could allow itself to reject its global privileges or that the leader of such a super power would voluntarily "concede" his "conquests" without wanting anything in return. And now, looking back to the facts of 5--6 years ago, I can see for myself yet again, that the changes in Eastern Europe were not thought out beforehand, not were they carried out effectively from a regional or global point of view. The West was carried away with the "ideological" ecstasy that communism was on its way out. In the Eastern European countries themselves the nature of the changes was motivated mainly by internal conflicts and clashes. In some Eastern European countries restorationalists got the upper hand, with aspirations to restore to themselves the pre-war rights they had lost. Radical change from strong state regulation to radical liberalism had its destructive consequences. It was clear that in this way the Eastern European countries would undergo a long period of instability and a slow adaptation to the European Community. From a positive point of view, the most important consequences of the changes in Eastern Europe were the destruction of internal obstructions to world integration and the creation of the new structures of the global world. At the same time the discovery of new virgin territory for world globalisation was far from promising world harmony. Realisation was soon to come in the West that the belief in the final victory of world capitalism was wrong. In the East internal conflicts continued. New solutions had to be found while the common crisis persisted... 6. RETURN TO A DIFFICULT FUTURE Was the return to power of the former Eastern European socialist parties a logical stage in development? There is a common reason for this. It was a confirmation of the thesis that the political process is not a series of happenstances but is rather governed by a definite logical process. A fter the series of mainly "gentle" revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1989 and 1990 and the changes which took place later in the USSR, the period between 1993 and 1995 was marked by a series of elections in which the former communist parties (or their political successors) were returned to power. In Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and Slovakia the former communists won categorical victories at the polls. In December this was repeated in Russia by the communist party lead by G.Zuganov. In Rumania and Yugoslavia the former communists never actually left power. This gave rise to the question which is not uppermost in the minds of modern thinkers and politicians: was this return to power of the ex-communist parties a logical stage in development? I have to admit that during the five or six years of the reform process many of these parties did undergo profound changes. They accepted the values of democracy and pluralism and changed their platforms. In contrast to the newly-formed parties of anti-communists, democrats and liberals they had well organised party structures and people faithful to them in all sectors of economic power. Some of these parties together with the structures of the former state security organisations had been preparing themselves for pluralism and opposition politics as early as the period of perestroika. Economic domination, the creation of their own "loyal" dissident and political circles, the infiltration of trusted members into the newly-formed anti-communist parties - all this was undoubtedly well planned and had a strong influence on the political situation. The most important reason for the return of the ex-communist parties to power, in my opinion, can be found in the nature of the totalitarian system and the logical stages in its change. What I referred to earlier as the "mistake" of Gorbachev was also decisive here. The new democratic, radical and liberal forces came to the forefront riding high on the wave of political reform. E.Gaidar and A.Chubais in Russia, L.Balzerovic in Polish and Y.Antal in Hungary all became symbols of the reform. All the reformers, however, were faced with the same problem - while political changes could be carried out radically and quickly, economic reform required time, trained specialists and techniques specifically designed for the transition from extreme centralism to a market economy. The "phased" discrepancies between economic and political changes caused economic difficulties, serious political clashes and crime. The explosion of emotions and anti-communism of the autumn of 1989 and during the period between 1990-1991 succeeded in alienating the former administrative and economic elite from the new democrats. Their more or less forced removal from ministries and state factories provided them with significant opportunities in the private sector where they acted in close cooperation with tens of thousands of well-trained experts from the former state security organisations. The only way for the new democratic forces to control the economic forces was to get them on their side, as happened in the Czech republic. Elsewhere where pragmatism was replaced with virulent anti-communism, the new political forces were unable to control the economic sector sufficiently to carry out large-scale reforms. The economic forces, banks, factories and the private sector, in general remained in the hands of people trained by the former totalitarian regime. The second important reason was the disappointment of the population. One group of the population had benefitted from a series of social privileges and guarantees under the totalitarian regime. By supporting the reforms between 1989 and 1990 many of these people expected a rapid solution to the problems which they were experiencing and not the chaos, crime and fall in living standards and production which in reality ensued. Unfortunately, as a result of the delays in economic reform during the period of perestroika and the clashes with the harsh reality of the open world economy these hopes remain unfulfilled. Bulgaria did not become a Balkan Switzerland, as some of its leaders promised, nor did Rumania become France. Quite the contrary, the populations of the Eastern European countries had to come to terms with the unwelcome news that they produced little, consumed much more and had to reverse this ratio by 180 percent. For these reasons in 1992 almost all the Eastern European countries experienced a profound change in social attitudes. The political elite who had been in power from 1989-1990 were forced to realise in terror that their sleepless nights, the titanic struggle and reforms were now considered by many as mistaken. Of course, it should be added that many of the new democrats did in fact make many mistakes. In the long run the radical nature of the economic reforms in the period between 1989 and 1990 and the delay in implementing economic reforms led to the political equilibrium being upset. Sooner or later it had to be restored. A significant percentage of the population in Eastern Europe had become impoverished and disappointed. They preferred to vote for the former communist parties seeing in them hope for the restoration of the social benefits which they had lost. However, can the reformed communists live up to these expectations? The answer is a conditional "no", or a partial "no". The condition is that they undertake a flexible policy of reform aimed at the widest possible social strata of society. Due to the legislative changes which have been undertaken, any return to the past is unlikely, although to a certain extent still possible, mainly in Russia. There still remains the difficult path of peaceful reforms needed to achieve successful economic policies. For this reason the return of the ex-communist parties is a return to a difficult future. It will not halt the global processes of integration, nor will it delay the processes of moving towards new, civilising social relations. After the battle of Waterloo at the beginning of the 19th century, the processes of restoration in France looked inexorable and many believed in it. However, it was to be seen that once the seeds of revolutionary ideas had been sown, it was to be very difficult to destroy them, the freedoms that had been won could not be taken away. Such is the case with the return of the ex-communist parties to power. They will either have to adapt to the new civilising realities or they will thrown onto the scrapheap of history. For the ex-communist parties of Hungary and Poland this will be easier, their ideological reformation began a long time before they came back to power. For the Bulgarian Socialist Party or the Party of Social Democracy in Rumania this will be more difficult. Whatever the outcome, the reflected processes of global transition in Eastern Europe will not be smooth. As a reaction to the errors and the collapse of perestroika politics went too far to the right and then turned sharply to the left. The realities of life will put the former socialist parties to the test. Some of them will rise to the challenge and some will fall victim to the contradiction of their own ideological contradictions, while still others will collapse under the pressure of vested interests. Whether the New Civilisation will accept them is a matter that the future will show us. Chapter Three COLLAPSE II: GLOBAL DISORDER 1. THE DANGER OF CHAOS Ever change of epoch takes place in the context of conflict and disorder. The crisis in the East is just the first phase of the changes in the present global political order. The second phase will take place in the West and Far East... T he universal processes of globalisation and the collapse of the Eastern European regimes have given rise to a whole series of unfamiliar phenomena. Humanity has entered a new phase of development marked by the huge and growing level of mutual interdependence between people, nations and cultures. The global order based on the principles of bi-polarism of two super powers and which had dominated since the Second World War has been destroyed. To a large extent the way in which the Eastern European regimes collapsed lead to this state of chaos firstly in their own countries and later in international economic and political relations. I define chaos as a universal crisis of the spiritual and value systems, the rejection of certain standards of global intercourse and the instability of others, as a period of relative disorder leading to change in the world order. The first phase of this chaos began in 1989--1900 with the collapse of the Eastern European regimes and the economic and military organisations in this part of the world. The dissolution of COMECON and the Warsaw Pact in the space of a few months led to chaos in economic relations within Eastern Europe. The mutual export of goods between the former members of these organisations fell sharply. Almost all the countries in the region lost their markets and the stability of their industrial structures was all but destroyed. Later this was followed by the collapse of Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia. A number of ethnic conflicts flared up, some of which developed into full-scale wars. For the three years between 1990--1993 the region was in absolute chaos. I believe that this first stage will be followed by a second, very important stage of changes. This second stage, which has already begun is affecting the larger Western powers and their mutual relations, with new roles and positions being assumed by the Asian states and the acceptance of new principles in international economic and cultural relations and with formation of new institutions for the regulations of global processes etc.. Some of them will want to preserve the status quo and their position of dominance, while others will want to prove old theories. However, there is only one truth: the post-war global order has lost a number of its main foundations. Humanity has entered a transitionary period from the bi-polar model to a new, unfamiliar global structure. The universal crisis of the post-war political model had caused and continues to cause the general collapse of contacts and relations wwhich will be of great significance for further development. There are two interrelated factors which are of influence on the processes which are taking place: globalisation as a fundamental and continuous phenomenon and the crisis in Eastern Europe which was provoked by globalisation and which at the same time has accelerated its pace. The problem, however, is that no-one, or almost no-one was prepared for what happened - neither the collapse of the iron curtain, nor the consequences of the new drive towards globalisation and its side effects. I want to speak of the dangers posed by chaos and general disorder mainly because after the collapse of the Eastern European regimes not one of the factors which caused the universal crisis of contemporary civilisation has dissappeared entirely.The deformations of economic growth remain and global ecological problems have yet to be solved. After the renewal of nuclear tests, albeit tactical, by France in September 1995 no-one any longer believes that disarmament is irreversible. In the context of the bi-polar model the world was governed by two super powers and a group of nations dependent on them. Today the level of direct government has sharply declined. After the collapse of the USSR a number of new pretenders to world leadership have appeared and before our very eyes the roles and relations of former allies have changed radically. Politics is no longer two-dimensional but an equation with hundreds of unknowns. A clear example of the ontradictions between the great powers can be seen in the war in the former Yugoslavia. The vested interests of certain states, in assisting various leaders and arming different armies demonstrate that the old political tradition, the tradition of the bi-polar world has long since passed away. Or let us take Europe. The unification of the two Germanies did not only impose a series of new responsibilities on West Germany but has created complex problems for pan-European processes. Germany transferred part of the burden of unification on to its European partners via the mechanisms of international financial relations. The integration of the two German states has changed the structure of Europe and the relations of the states within it. The granting ofassociate membership status to the Eastern European countries within the structures of the EU seemed in 1989-1991 a relatively easy task but was soon delayed almost indefinitely. This was to a certain extent because of the unwillingness of Russia to allow itself to be encircled by a new "iron" or other type of curtain. The place and role of Russia itself in the global community are still unclear. In the global aspect the collapse of the Eastern European regimes has had even greater consequences. The collapse of the Soviet Union and its economic potential to all intents and purposes removed one of the two main super powers from the geo-political map. Only the USA remains. A number of years have passed and there are already voices which proclaim that the super powers are no longer necessary. France has offered to extend its nuclear umbrella over Germany. Germany and Japan have demonstrated their desires to become permanent members of the Security Council.Russia has officially requested membership of the group of the most developed nations. The collapse of the Eastern European economic and political structures has opened up a hole in world economic relations with consequences for the world economic order. A not insignificant number of investments have flowed into Eastern Europe. West Germany's great commitments to its new Eastern provinces have resulted in a deterioration in the condition of the European exchange rate system. Without the burdens of such problems, Japan and a number of other countries in the Far East have continued to develop their potential and to exert more and more influence on the world economic processes. China has demonstrated high levels of growth and a flourishing economy. The changes in South Africa and the forthcoming transition in Hong Kong have encouraged high levels of investment and movement of funds. In 1992 and 1993 while delivering lectures in Switzerland and the USA I emphasised on several occasions that geo-political turbulence will affect the world financial systems. Even today few people really believe in this although the facts are there for all to see. In the winter and spring of 1995 the American dollar began to tumble against the Japanese yen. The world financial markets became very worried and the most prominent financial experts explained it away with the American budget deficit, the crisis of the Mexican peso or ambitions to increase American export. What really happened demonstrates the reduced abilities of governments and central banks to exercise effective control over international economic relations. Certain "invisible" private forces are already in control of the world economy and are rarely affected by governmental influence. Moreover, the first symptoms of uncotrollability appeared directly after the collapse of the Brenton Woods system at the beginning of the 1970's when in March 1973 Richard Nixon allowed the dollar to float. For almost a quarter of a century the dollar has been trying to find its levels via floating exchange rates and now we are on the eve of a new governmental vacuum. The reason for this is the constant increase in the role of the private banks and unidentified financial funds in global economics, the growth in the role of centrifugal effects in the world financial systems. In the spring of 1995 the director of the International Monetary Fund, M.Cammedessu, declared that in the near future and with its present structures the IMF would not be able to continue to fulfil its functions. "We are living in a dangerous world" were the words of Cammedessu. His trepidations were emphasised by the constant growth in unregulated funds of money as well as by the growing mountain of state and private debts etc.. Neither the present international financial system nor the entire world economic and political order will be able to prevent any possible crises. The chaos has affected the spiritual relations, thinking and value systems of people. The world communist movement underwent a catastrophe with negative repercussion for a number of other socialist and social democratic movements. On the other hand, the unpreparedness of the West to act quickly and the clear inadequacy of liberal doctrines to stop the crisis showed that they are unable to offer a miracle treatment. Many politicians in attempts to avoid divergence between reality and ideas have stated that it is no longer political programmes or ideologies which are important but pragmatic action. As in other similar historical transitional periods a large number of people are confused and prefer to take refuge in local pragmatism and finding solutions only to current problems. The lack of a common view about how one should approach the new situation has opened the door to nationalism, ethnic ambitions and xenophobia. A significant number of world politicians have been compelled to turn their attention to current problem solving and to ignore global and regional problems. It is becoming more and more evident that there is a need for a global analysis on what is taking place, its consequences and a search for a solution to the chaos which is ensuing. Today there is no doctrine or common theory about the future of the world, or how to solve our common problems: the global economic order, the environment, poverty, religious tolerance, stabilisation of growth etc.. This is one of the reasons why nationalism often comes to the fore in the search for solutions to global problems. The attitudes of the younger generations is a very important indication of the spiritual crisis. I often speak to my colleagues who are lecturers in various institutions of higher education in the industrialised countries of the world. In the less developed countries the situation is less clear. The young people in these countries want to achieve the material prosperity of the richest nations which is in itself strong motivation. In the USA, Japan, France, Great Britain, Canada and Germany, however, for quite a long time now, students and young people have no overall idea about their future. The ambition of achieving a certain level of material prosperity, a large bank account, one's own business, to travel abroad and so on, are largely manifestations of tradition rather than anything else. But what does this mean? Healthy interests and the stability of the system? Or, rather, a spiritual crisis in a vacuum expressed by the new generations in the most developed countries drowning in luxury and spiritual consumerism. World history has witnessed other periods of chaos and disorder of global structures: some longer some shorter. The problem is that the changes which are taking place today are not as the result of wars in which the victor imposes his will with force. The globalisation of the world has led to a universal crisis of the current world order. This is a crisis of the entire world system, of national and regional thinking and consequently everything else which typifies the Third Civilisation. Within global relations there is a new spiritual, economic and political vacuum. If these vacuums are not filled with adequate changes to world structures, there may be indescribable consequences. Why has there been such an explosion of religious sects in recent years? Why has terrorism become a global problem and is more and more uncompromising and violent in its forms? Why are people becoming more alienated from politics? Why has fundamentalism spread into new territories? Why has international crime grown so much? The reason is that the current world order is not adequate to respond to the new realities. NATO and the USA alone are not capable of resolving world conflicts. This may even lead to a reaction from Russia or China and new divisions within the world. The UN does not have the strength to stop conflicts. It is becoming apparent that many elements of the current world system are outdated and its major mechanisms have to be changed and repaired. The manifold lack of clarity in international political and economic relations are an expression of an inadequately low level of agreement between countries and the expectation that everything will resolve itself. The disorder is on such a large scale that it requires common action on the basis of universally accepted principles. Of course, the world today is much more integrated. This should not be seen so much as an advantage but as a condition for overcoming the chaos more rapidly and for allowing integration to develop. This will also require some form of world coordination, of mutually acceptable decisions and the growth in the role of organisations such as the UN. It would, however, be imprudent to suppose that the problems with which we are faced will be resolved quickly and conclusively. This will require a relatively longer period. The new world order will develop gradually, based on mutually agreeable action .This conclusion is based on the fact that the real world powers are still acting from their position as nation states and their national responsibilities and will only change the international rules of the game within that context. This is logical but it also carries a risk. Given a variety of events and varying conditions any one country with a more dominant global role by changing its internal order runs the risk of causing a universal cataclysm. Globalisation and its progeny - the global world, will lead to a crisis not only of traditional international relations but also of the political systems of national societies. The interests of more and more people stretch beyond the bounds of a single state and depend less and less on the decisions of a single government. Everywhere in the developed world there is a decline in trust for traditional political systems and a need for new decisions. Thus: 1. The lack of a mechanism for reliable international, economic and political regulations; 2. The contradiction between the unlimited global power of world corporations and the limited power of governmental decisions; 3. The reactions of 2.5-3 billion poor people in the unification of humanity into a single mutually dependent whole; 4. The danger of new nationalism and the restoration the division of the world into blocs; 5. The possibility of the bi-polar model being exchanged for a mono-centric world structure and the domination of one or a group of rich states; 6. The destruction of small cultures and the dilution of national traditions and values; 7. The limitation of the private life of the individual and his transformation into a "manipulated animal" by the new media; 8. The crisis of traditional political systems; 9. Terrorism and international crime; All this factors are expressions of the disorder and danger of chaos - an expression of the crisis of the borders between the two epochs. 2. GEOPOLITICAL COLLAPSE One of the most important consequences of the collapse of the Eastern European totalitarian regimes was the change in geo-political structures. The bi-polar world seems to have collapsed irreversibly. T he "modern" age which has occupied the last five centuries in the development of humanity has been a time of the creation and consolidation of nation states, of the formation of alliances and opposing political blocs. After the collapse of the Berlin wall a series of global processes began which were to lead to gradual but irreversible changes in the world political order. Directly after the fall of the"totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe the majority of political commentators and researchers considered that the problem would be limited to the collapse of the USSR and a number of smaller Eastern European states and thereafter their inclusion in the structures of the developed nations of NATO and the EU. Such one-sided views continue to predominate today, despite the fact that most people are aware of their inadequacies. The problem is that after the explosion in Eastern Europe a slow but unstoppable process of universal geopolitical change began. I refer to this process as "geo-political collapse", since it affected the political structures typical of the entire twentieth century and in a broader context, the entire Third Civilisation. What is clear is that the map of Europe is being reshaped. However, let us look at the rest of the world. Despite the strong influence of Russia in Central Asia there is a growing conflict of interests between a number of Islamic states and China. The unification of Germany has changed the proportionality of power in central Europe. There is no need for detailed forecasts in this area although there are certain clear trends emerging which seem to herald the end of the old world order. The first wave of the geo-political collapse clearly took place in Eastern Europe and most significantly in the USSR. The second will be connected with the increase in the political importance of Europe (above all Germany) and Japan. he role of the USA, the only remaining super power, will be to provide a balance with all the consequences which that entails. The third wave will be a consequence of the increase in the economic and the political importance of a number of smaller countries in South Eastern Europe, Asia and Latin America. At the beginning of the 1990's we were witnesses not only to the collapse of the Eastern European political structures but also to the potential of profound changes within the West. There is no doubt that the borders of the European community will move towards the East and that the role of Germany in this process will be extremely significant. The consolidation of the European Union and the creation of a single European currency which appears to have strong political support[25] presuppose a number of changes in trans-Atlantic cooperation. I do not believe that trans-Atlantic ties will weaken but I do believe that the creation of a common European currency will bring about many changes in their nature, scale and direction. It is true that a large number of lesser developed states still do not have the self-confidence and strength to undertake independent activities. Even if this were to happen, such ideas would develop in isolation rather than as a part of a logical process. For the moment the countries outside the Group of 25 are strongly dependent on the most developed nations. Amongst them, however, there are a number of nations with growing ambitions for more economic and political influence. Which will be stronger? Integration or an eruption of ambitions and the struggle for new influence? The question is whether the struggle for free economic and political relations will begin in Asia, Africa or Latin America? Will this not be stronger than the processes of global integration? In any event one thing is clear - the old world order created between the 18th and 19th centuries by a group of advanced European states and the two super powers which emerged in the 20th century is now a thing of the past. The old geo-political world is collapsing before our eyes and not only as a consequence of the collapse of the USSR. In the autumn of 1995 the voters in Quebec very nearly voted for secession from Canada which could have lead to the real collapse of the Canadian state. Almost daily, politicians and civil servants in the European capital of Brussels reiterate the view that the USA should no longer play the role of a super power. In Paris the views are even more categorical. The state of chaos is due to the fact that the world is undergoing transition. There are many processes and situations within this transition as well as many unpredictable deviations. 3. ECONOMIC TURBULENCE Colossal disproportions have accumulated within the financial systems of the world. Until now they have not lead to any great crises because of the regulatory role played by the world political order. However, after its total collapse are we not bound to feel the cold embrace of instability and chaos? O n the 1st of September 1995 the world news agencies reported an emerging financial crisis in the most prosperous of post-war economies - Japan. Thousands of investors withdrew their deposits from the Kisu Credit Union in Osaka and the Hiogo bank in Kobe which were then closed to all kinds of banking operations. Their clients wanted to withdraw over 3 billion US dollars or almost 1/4 of the total deposits of the union. The bankruptcies of a number of Japanese credit unions and the unprecedented problems they caused for a number of large banks cast huge doubts about the stability of the banking system in Japan. The reason for such shocks is the huge amount of debt accumulated in the 1980's when stock exchange prices were very high and suddenly fell as a result of the global recession. The problem, however, is more complex. More and more people are becoming aware of the fact that the debts accumulated by governments and individual financial structures will not be repaid. The enormous debt of the American government and the increased indebtedness of other developed countries pose a question about the efficacy of the world financial system. It is true that in contrast to the Great Depression of the 1939, the banks and national governments now have much greater reserves and experience in avoiding financial crises. However, it is also true that such colossal debts are possible in the conditions of guaranteed political economic regulation and a clear and stable political order. The trust in the major currencies is based not only on their real condition but on their established monopoly of the world markets. It is not difficult to comprehend that if the geo-political restructuring does take place then political and military factors will lose their influence and the problem with debt will prove catastrophic. There is a direct link between the changes in world political structures and stability of the existing financial systems. Neither of them are adequate for the conditions of the epoch which we are now entering. Of course, the world economy will continue for a certain length of time to develop positively. The reasons for this are the newly opened markets of Eastern Europe, Russia and South East Asia in particular. Countries which had until now been culturally and politically isolated are now attractive to foreign investors. Care will have to be taken that this growth does not give rise to further "economic turbulence". For reasons of cheap labour in the East many manufacturers in Western Europe and America are turning towards Asia. In 1995 this caused much unrest amongst the German trade unions and was one of the main factors for concern voiced at the congress of German Social Democrats in Manheim in autumn of the same year. There is no doubt that with the democratic development of China and the smaller dragons within South Eastern Asia and with the opening of the Eastern European and Russian markets world economic structures will undergo significant changes. I am almost convinced that many governmental and private structures will not be able to resist the temptation and will answer the primitive instincts of competition and profit. This will have two consequences with serious repercussions in the near future. The first is that the world economic structures which have existed up to now will have to undergo significant changes. Secondly, there will be an increased danger of uncontrollable economic shocks. Jacques Atalie in his marvellous book "The Millennium" recalls that the Dutch cities which contributed so much to modern civilisation in the 15th and 16th centuries declined because of the temptation to spend more than they earned and to accumulate more debts than they could bear. Is this not, however, the illness of all modern governments, from the USA to Europe, Russia and Japan and the horrific debt problems of Brasil, Argentina and Mexico? Is this not a warning of the potential collapse of the entire financial system or at least of its entire lack of correspondence to modern day needs? Of course, these debts and the mountains of bad debts are not distributed evenly between all states. The USA and France face huge problems, Germany and Japan much less and least of all, and practically non-existent - such countries as China, Indonesia and Southern Korea whose economies are at the beginning of an undoubted period of ascendency. This divergence in the positions of countries and nations in the context of global economic transformations will alter their place and their role in the world economy. The whole of the 21st century will be a time of economic levelling if, of course, the world turns its back on the old order and successfully enters the new civilisation. This process of levelling-out will at the same time be in conflict with cultural and industrial traditions, differences in social welfare, macro-economic criteria and standards etc.. The fundamental elements of the plan put forward by the French Prime Minister, Alain Jupe, in the autumn of 1995 were targetted at France joining the European Monetary Union and reaching a position level with the other European states. We can all remember the huge reaction and the large-scale protests in responce to the threat of losing social benefits and privileges. Such shocks will be caused with every integration and this is one of the most fundamental elements of global economic reform. Large scale structural reforms will take place with the implementation of the common European currency. The difficulties related to the integration into the EU of Eastern European countries will be even more difficult. The integration of Russia will be slow and painful and even more so in the case of the poorly developed Asian and African states. However, there is no reasonable alternative. The processes of integration will continue to developed and will lead eventually to a large-scale global renewal. For this reason, in my opinion, the change in the economic roles of the various countries and nations, the globalisation of financial and commodities markets, the opening of millions of niche markets in Eastern Europe and Asia, the inadequacy of the world financial system, the mountain of debts and the re-solution of economic imbalance must be considered as the collapse of the old and the beginning of the new economic order. It has taken many nations five hundred years to establish their national economies. Today they are becoming integrated and this in its wake will bring about the enormous integration of labour, knowledge and abilities. 4. THE NEW MASTERS OF THE WORLD The globalisation of the world has lead to the appearance of new groups of leaders whose influence and power is many times greater than that of the majority of politicians. They are not always well-known but they control a huge portion of the world economy and finances, the global media and communications and their power is not subject to any serious regulation. E very day billions of television viewers watch the leading world news stories. Almost every day somewhere in the world there are elections or other important political events. The politicians are presented or present themselves as the most important decision makers. This was the case in the 20th century. With the demise of many monarchies politicians have become the heroes and the undisputed leaders of the world. Is this still really the case today? Yes, but only superficially. Since with the consolidation of the global world, the opening-up of societies and the embracing of the international market there are new territories for world domination. Someone had to come in to take control of international, economic, cultural and media business. Someone who would not be limited by national boundaries and who had to have enough money. These were the global businessmen. At the beginning of the century, the trans-national businessmen were mainly colonisers. Today they are legally in control of 80% of world trade, about the same amount of technology and about 1/3 of world manufacturing. The number and the influence of the transnational corporations is constantly on the increase. Their leaders account for the major part of the new economic elite of the world whose power is now unequalled. Who can predict in what part of the world it is most profitable to manufacture a certain type of item? Who can invest enormous sums into science and technology in the aims of breaking into a market? Who can transfer billions of dollars from one end of the world to the other in a matter of hours? Only they can - the newly emerging leaders of the modern world. Almost no-one stands above the international business leaders. They control international technological and information exchange. They own the majority of the satellites used for relaying television programmes. They also own the global information and television networks. What is more important, the leaders of the trans-national corporations are constantly expanding their power. Now they want free, open markets, the removal of all state limitations and the implementation of neo-liberal policies. On the other hand the world economic leaders want more dialogue with each other. How can they devide their spheres of influence? Where will they direct their investment resources? Where and what markets and what to aim for? The common objective uniting these new leaders is the removal of all state barriers to their eventual domination of the world. If they persist at their present rate to expand the international and industrial corporations within 20-30 years they will have succeeded in dominating practically the entire area of international trade, and they will have achieved a monopoly of world communications and distribution of technology. Ted Turner and CNN, Rupert Murdoch and his media empire and even the smaller press magnates such as M.Ringer in Switzerland today have much greater influence over people than the presidents of the majority of countries in the world. While in the context of individual national states it is possible to speak of anti-monopoly legislation, in international business "everything is permitted". If things continue to develop as they have been doing up to now, within 15-20 years we will be faced with extremely complex problems. The media are little concerned with the new leaders of the world. Only a handful of the great financial players find their way into the television studios: owners of banks and financial companies who control the movements of tens or hundreds of billions of dollars. Quietly but unerringly they are creating a power, more powerful than any government and which creates its own rules of its own game. The leaders of the world financial capital can influence exchange rates and pour in funds from all corners of the earth. Very often they are so influential in world economics that they can compel national governments, including the great powers, to play along with them and take the relevant decisions. This is so incongruous! These new integrational economic structures appear completely to lack any form of political regulation or at the best have only some sort of political facade. This is one of the reasons why global relations have been so undeviatingly infiltrated by the mafia with enormous sums of money from drugs, prostitution, currency speculation and so on. This is also why the citizens of the world are becoming more and more dependent on the transnational economic elite, rather than the politicians they have elected. If rules are not brought into this international game, if the world does not establish institutions for their regulation and control, if policies towards the poorly developed nations are not changed, then very soon the world financial elite will begin to rule world development alone. This is the greatest contradiction used by the hidden leaders - while economic and cultural life is becoming more and more internationalised and globalised, governments are remaining nationally limited. People see them as weak and helpless in the face of events. I am far from the thought that the leaders of the world corporations are bad people or that they ought to be proclaimed enemies and proponents of imperialism. The world cannot develop without them but if things remain as they are, the positive role of the transnational companies as the driving force in the world might be undermined. When I speak of chaos and disorder and the unsatisfactory regulation of the world, I mean categorically the inadequacy of the international economic infrastructure and the lack of of sufficient international political and legal regulatory bodies. Such a situation hides many dangers for humanity: unregulated financial operations, unregulated monopolisation, international mafia, the danger of periodical crises. What is more important: the greater the share of transnational companies in world production the more countries will open up to one another, the longer there is an absence of global rules to the game, the greater will be the danger of an increase in serious crises. 5 THE MARCH OF THE POOR During the blazing summer of the 1985 in Hungary, a tanker lorry was stopped on a motorway. The tanker was filled with the corpses of Asians travelling secretly to Western Europe. They had died of suffocation and heat exhaustion in their flight from poverty to salvation. Every year millions of citizens from the poorly developed countries set their sights on the rich countries of the West, using all possible legal and illegal means. Their march continues... T he politicians and their supporters in the most developed nations of the world can recline in complete, blissful peace. They have complete information on the condition of the poor, but they have neither experienced their problems, not demonstrate any particular desire to help them. It is difficult, very difficult, when you live in Zurich, Cannes, Barcelona or Salzburg to believe that at the moment when you are giving a piece of meat to your dog, somewhere in the world tens of thousands of children are suffering from hunger and illnesses connected with hunger. One of my friends, a member of the French parliament, told me recently, "There has always been inequality between nations and humanity is used to it." I do not agree. Despite the eternal inequalities between the developed and underdeveloped, during the past 20 or 30 years something has taken place which has radically changed and will continually the position of the under-developed nations. Thanks to world media and, in particular, to television for the first time they have become aware of how really poor they are. 20 or 30 or even 50 years ago the citizens of India, Bangladesh, Congo or Ruanda were really unaware of the huge difference in the living standards between their countries and the most developed nations of the world. If they did know, this was not common knowledge. The situation was more or less similar in Eastern Europe and Russia where poverty and the reaction of the poor led to the acceptance of social utopias and their elevation into official state religions. Globalisation brings peoples closer but also gives rise to new concerns about inequalities. Via the medium of television and other means of communication, people around the whole world have become aware of the enormous differences in ways of life and the enormous injustices existing in the world. This is a new phenomenon and if it persist then it will give rise to a wave of reactions from the poorer nations. New means of communications unite us, make us look at the world as a global village, but this openness runs the risk of creating new conflicts arising from imbalance. The largest and most compact populations of poor people (according to the criteria of the UN on poverty) exist in Southern Asia - about 550 million people. 130-140 million poor people live in Eastern Asia and no fewer than 220-230 million in the Middle East and North Africa. About 260 million live in sub-Saharan Africa and about 100 million in Latin America. In addition, there are about 200 million poor people in the industrialised countries. The gap between the rich and the poor is dismaying. The twenty richest nations in the world produce a GNP per head of population of between 16,600 (Australia) and 33,500 (Switzerland) USD. The twenty poorest nations, according to the same criteria, vary between 72 USD (Mozambique) and 261 (Ruanda)[26]. This enormous difference cannot be resolved using conventional methods. Nevertheless, if we are to take the market and international corporation as the only means of salvation, this would mean that the technological, financial and social gap between the poor and the rich countries would become even wider. This has been seen in the last 30-40 years. Even now the gap between the poor and the rich countries and people is self-perpetuating. This is one of the most convincing signs of the crisis of modern world structures. Humanity undoubtedly is to blame for such a state in Mozambique, Tanzania, Bangladesh, Laos, Vietnam, Ethiopia and other less developed countries. They were all until recently former colonies of the most developed nations and many of their priceless historical and cultural artifacts can be seen in museums and private collections in Paris, London, New York and Geneva. They have all experienced bitter armed struggles and periods of instability. Measures taken by the UN and other world organisations to assist the poor have been mainly cosmetic. If these trends persist and if liberal market illusions are not substituted with something else, then the hidden dangers may become apparent for all to see. In the most general terms I refer to this danger as the march of the poor. One of the most significant manifestations of this condition is the migration of the poor to the larger towns. Tens of millions of people in Asia, Africa and South America have left their places of birth to migrate to the cities, transforming what until were recently small towns into megapolises consisting of shanty towns and primitive suburbs with multi-million populations. Despite the efforts of the national governments this process continues. It has transformed Mexico city, Rio de Janeiro, Calcutta, Bombay and tens of other cities into places with an enormous, unmanageable poor population. The poor come to the large cities in search of food, work and a chance for their children. Perhaps, the most important reason for this is the desire to reap the benefits of the familiar values of civilisation. The images on the television screen and mass advertising campaigns are the most powerful of all magnets, compelling the poor to flee from their traditional way of life. In all corners of the world where poverty is a typical phenomenon, this process is continuing. This is particularly the case in those places where there is no private land ownership or where land ownership does not bring satisfaction of sufficient economic results. The second logical consequence of the march of the poor is emigration to the most developed countries of the world. In recent decades the 25 most developed nations have been the object of mass immigration for foreigners. They enter their "Eldorado" with the help of relatives, false documents, locked in goods containers and lorries. The liberal dream of the open society will result in the increase of the flow of the poor looking for work and peace of mind in the rich countries. In this way the liberalism of openness will backfire. Given the present world economic order the richest countries will have to create stronger barriers to emigration and to build new Iron, Stone and Wooden curtains between their countries and the rest of the world. I do not want to be a prophet of doom but such divisions would drag humanity into a dangerous dimension for human development. Forecasts show that the situation in the European community will become particulary complex. At the moment in Germany there are about 4.4 million immigrants, in France - 2.4, in Great Britain - 1.2 and in Holland about 0.6. In the EU in total there are over 10 million immigrants. According to some calculations if the flow of immigrants is not limited within the next 5-7 years this number could double. This march of the poor could have explosive consequences in the developed countries and at the same time result in a "brain drain" from the poorer, limiting their chances of improving the standard of living. There is also the danger of the rich western countries reacting by closing their borders and isolating themselves. According to the agreement reached in Schengen which limited the possibilities of many nations to travel within Western Europe there has been a stream of reactions and disappointment which is difficult to describe. Many Eastern Europeans are convinced that they have been deceived by the West and that the Berlin Wall has been reconstructed by western politicians. The pressure for free access to the rich West will continue and no administrative barriers appear to be able to stop it. When speaking of the march of the poor, I also have in mind their growing tendency towards self-protection and resistance. I am quite sure that if they do not receive the opportunity to make changes the poor of the world will unite in search of a new universal ideology. The same reasons which led to the October revolution in Russia and transformed communism into the greatest utopia of the 20th century might also create new or re-create old social views. Poverty has always given birth and will continue to give birth to utopian views and dreams of a rapid leap into wealth. The great leap promised by Mao Tse Tung, the promises made by Khrushchev about the communist paradise and even Hitler's Third Reich were part of the illusory belief in the supernatural force of power, human will and violence. The 20th century was a time of competing utopias. In the new era it will be much more difficult to achieve similar unity simply because of the influence of the mass media and economic dependence. However, these means of indirect control might themselves be powerless. It is unlikely that the poor will look back to communism. It is more likely that they will look for salvation in nationalism and in particular in religious fundamentalism and new totalitarian doctrines. The great danger for the world in the post-cold-war period may come from the combination of economic problems and the struggle for cultural survival. If the present world economic order is preserved, in the next 10-15 years we shall undergo a series of strong economic and social shocks which will come from the poorer regions. They may take the form of local wars, the political influence of fundamentalist unions, protest movements of immigrants in the industrial countries etc.. The other side of the coin is a possible xenophobic reaction. Xenophobia in the richest nations and fundamentalism in the poorer are the two extremes, two major products of the emerging crisis. They are the catalysts for other conflicts between cultures and religions and between the ethnic groups in search of a unifying force. Many researchers believe xenophobia a transitional stage. I, however, believe that it will periodically re-occur in direct connection with the level of cultural conflicts within the open world. Those who are aware of their poverty will aspire to overcome their problems and to identify their own fate with common ideas, common religions or new idols and leaders. Today the situation is still transitional. The poor are desperate rather than unified in a common awareness, but this will change. The reaction of the poor contributed to the success of the Islamic fundamentalists in Algeria, the high level of support for the fundamentalist party in Turkey at the local elections in 1994 and the parliamentary elections in 1996 and to the consolidation of the regime of the Ayatollahs in Iran. The march of the poor is a fact and a product simultaneously of globalisation and the world order which is still inadequate to meet its demands. If we accept liberal ideas as sufficient in modern times, this will lead to a new division of the world, to the appearance of new leaders as well as Utopias offering protection to the poor of the world. The way in which we can avoid such a potential outcome lies in world integration, in the establishment of a new world political and economic order and an entirely new kind of global society. This is the task which faces us, which faces the new generation of politicians above all in the industrialised countries. Such a task cannot be resolved at summit meetings, like the one in Copenhagen in March 1995. It is not general discussion or promises of new charity but profound structural reforms in the world economy which will help to resolve the problems. This includes specific programmes for the stimulation of investments in the least developed nations, an increase in the role of the UN and the restructuring of the activities of the IMF and the World Bank etc.. Fundamentalism and terrorism, the danger of reestablishing opposition between political blocs, the appearance of new utopias are all dangers which express the crisis of the transition to a new world. No-one will be spared: not the Europeans bathed in the luxury of social welfare, nor the dynamic USA, nor the over-ambitious Japanese. Realisation of poverty is one of the most important phenomena which the opening of the world and new communications has caused. It may lead to more and more violent reactions, alienation and a hatred for the rich countries and their elites. Did anyone believe that we would become witness to such senseless acts of terrorism as the bomb attack in Oklahama city or the Tokyo Metro in 1995. The bomb attacks in Paris and Lyons carried out by unknown extremists caused grave concern throughout Europe. These will hardly be the last. This is how it was in past civilisations when different cultures and different levels of wealth clashed. The other possibility is a rapid and coordinated change in the world economic order. The most developed nations and their governments will have to make a choice between global concern and responsibility or growing instability for all. 6. A NUMBER OF PESSIMISTIC SCENARIOS Periods of transition in human development resemble a tunnel with a number of exits. You can take the most direct route to thelight or enter a side tunnel with a dead-end and fluster around in the dark, turn around and return to where you started from. T his book is not meant to be either optimistic or pessimistic. It does not make categorical forecasts but outlines the possibilities. For the world in which we are living, this approach is particularly important. Our world is in a state of transition between two epochs and is instable.The question is which direction will modern humanity take? Summing up the conclusions to this chapter, I believe that the dangers which I have mentioned can be grouped into three pessimistic scenarios. I refer to the first of them as the scenario of "long-term indeterminacy", or perhaps the scenario of "continuing chaos". This would be an extended 20 or 30 year period (perhaps even longer) of geo-political instability and attempts to expand the positions of the great political powers. France and Germany would want to establish for themselves a leading role in Europe, independent of the USA and Russia. The Euro-Atlantic partnership, the keystone of world politics in the last 50 years might be threatened. Russia, threatened with the possibilities of becoming isolated as a result of the expansion of NATO might look to the East to form alliances. Very soon China might begin to have global ambitions and Japan will turn its economic power into political ambitions. Given this scenario the transitional companies will be compelled to play a greater "national patriotic" role rather than the role of a globalising force. Perhaps, you do not believe that this is possible. Take a look at Bosnia, crippled children, dead and wounded civilians and raped women. Why did the USA support the Muslims, Germany the Croats and Russia the Serbs? Why at the end of the 20th century can we not put a stop to a senseless letting of blood. Was it differences between three ethnic groups in this long-suffering country which lead to the differences between the great powers or was it the other way around? There will be a constant series of conflicts on the periphery of the entire post-Soviet system, in the border regions between Islam and Christianity and in the regions of great poverty. Let us hope that they will not be as bloody. The greatest danger in this scenario is the wave of national, regional, cultural and religious egoism which it contains. The "period of long-term indeterminacy" will not end before the advent of the 21st century. This period might also be called a time of "chaotic policentralism". Where there will not be a single super power. There will be no clear international political or financial order. We will be witness to a slow, contradictory and conflicting accumulation of aspirations, roles and egoisms and of the grudging recognition of the rights of others. In the 1970's and 1980's a number of American politicians declared almost half of the planet a zone of vital American interests. Today this is being done by a number of Russian, Greek, Turkish, French and even Japanese politicians. The problem is that in the majority of cases these zones coincide or overlap. The Balkans is a typical example of an area which Europeans, Americans and Russians consider an important region for their interests. Chaotic policentralism is a state in which there are many centres of power, but the poles of power change as a result of conflict. This disorder existed at the beginning of the Second Civilisation albeit in different historical conditions. Unfortunately, global thinking is at such a low level that the danger of conflict cannot be avoided. This scenario will be dominated by local conflicts. International crime will flourish and there will be an increase in the wealth of a small group of international rulers. My second pessimistic scenario could be called "Back to the bi-polar world". In actual fact we are still partially in it. Psychologically a large number of politicians, senior figures in the armies and security forces, retired officers and a number of others still live in the bi-polar world. Older people whose whole lives have been connected with the struggle against the class enemy (communism or American imperialism) dream of a return to the period of strong-arm politics. There are those in the East who consider Gorbachev a traitor or an agent of the CIA and dream of the restoration of the Warsaw Pact and the super power status of Russia. In the West there are others who advocate the idea of a single world super power in the USA and the transformation of NATO into a dominant world military force and the casting out of Russia and China into the back-yard of international relations. It would be very easy for these people and their ideas to become dominant in world politics: for example, the conflict in Bosnia and the bombing of Serbian targets in September 1995; or the results of the parliamentary elections in Russia in the same year and the presidential elections in 1996. Despite perestroika and other great changes and despite changes of attitude towards Russia, the trust which exists between politicians in the East and West is still extremely fragile. It is quite possible that the "bi-polar" model of the world could be restored as a consequence of the conflicts for the fate of Eastern Europe. On the one hand, Russia wants to preserve its influence in this region, not to be isolated from Europe and to have guarantees for its future. On the other hand, in the West there is an increase in the influence of those who desire the expansion of NATO to the borders of Russia. The Eastern European countries themselves, with the only possible exception of the socialist government in Bulgaria, want to enter NATO and to guarantee its security and existence within Europe. In this event, every incautious step, each hasty move without considering the global consequences could turn the clock back centuries and extend the life of the Third Civilisation artificially. It is a complete illusion to consider Russia a weak country, engrossed in its own problems. An influential American state department official told me in 1994 that "now Russia is weak, this is best time to teach it where it belongs". I replied that such an idea was imprudent and belonged to the vocabulary of cold-war talk. Russia possesses a huge military might and huge resources. And such a suggestion would be sufficient for confrontation to reassert itself. Whether it is caused by nationalist forces within Russia or naive politicians in Western Europe, isolation of Russia, in my opinion, does not have any long-term prospects and hides great dangers. The question of "whither Eastern Europe?": whether it should enter the structures of NATO or not, hides a potential danger for the restoration of the bi-polar world. However, this will not resolve the matter of the proportionality of world forces. I believe that if Russia is alienated from the European processes and in particular from mainstream world politics, it will seek its revenge in Eastern Europe, the Balkans in particular, and in Asia. The new Eastern bloc may include Russia, its former Asian republics and China which very soon will be in a position to increase its world political role. The fact that a new bi-polar world will be based on a new combination of states will not alter its inadequacies. Such a scenario would only slow down the processes of world integration, exacerbate the universal crisis of the Third Civilisation and cause unhappiness for hundreds of millions of people. It would also result in a new spiral of armaments, new ecological dramas and new even greater poverty for Africans and Asians. The third pessimistic scenario is the "revolution scenario". This is the least likely of the three, but should not be ignored. It is a revolution of the poor, socially deprived nations and states, who have gained access to powerful strategic weapons and nuclear weapons. Another variation on this scenario is that put forward by the American researcher Samuel Huntington, that the 21st century will be a century of wars between civilisations. I shall later reject his theory since I believe that he is mistaken about the common future of mankind. However, as a scenario for the transition from one civilisation to another, as a temporary or local delay to the processes of global reform over a period of about 20 or 30 years, this is entirely possible. In each of these three "pessimistic" scenarios I can see the possibility of an increase in terrorism and individual or group uprisings of isolated and deprived peoples. The danger is that these uprisings might find support and unifying influences within Islam, fundamentalist regimes or new utopian doctrines. There is also the real possibility that these three scenarios might appear in combination. None of them can contribute anything positive to mankind. One should not forget that it was the idiotic ambitions of dictators and global messiahs in the 20th century which killed hundreds of millions of lives. There is a way of avoiding these pessimistic solutions but it cannot be achieved by conventional means. The traditional solutions with which we are familiar from recent decades will not help. The big question is whether we are going back to the Third civilisation of forward to a new civilisation? Back to the restoration of old contradictions or forwards to their resolution and the formation of new global structures. It will in no way be easy to change the stereotypes of thought and to break the mould of the bi-polar world, protective nationalism and all the theories and doctrines which supported and continue to support the waning Third human civilisation. If the new communication systems and world corporations are the bridge to new forms of imperialism, this will undoubtedly create a new wave of protective nationalism and regional egoism based on ethnic or economic factors. This will consequently lead to the danger of new conflicts and struggles typical of the 20th century - the century of violent, uncomprehended and savage globalisation, the century of imperialism and world wars. Section two The Fourth Civilisation Chapter Four THEORY IN THE TIME OF CRISIS 1. FOREWARNING OF THE END OF TWO THEORETICAL CONCEPTS Every change of epoch is a change of views of the world. The Third civilisation not only gave birth to but was also served by theories which are rapidly becoming a thing of the past. Today it is clear to all of us that the changes which are taking place in the world can not be explained by traditional doctrines. The crisis is evident... T he 19th and 20th centuries were a time of intellectual supremacy of certain theoretical concepts and their numerous variations and metamorphoses. One of them conquered the minds of the activists of the French revolution, became enshrined in the American constitution and filled the hearts of several generations of world intellectuals. The 19th century was the century of liberalism. Its ideas still form the dream of the free and the wealthy. The second was the theoretical system of Marxism which appeared as the defender of the deprived and the poor and was a chance of hope for those who had no property or education. Or course, the 19th and the 20th centuries did not belong solely to these two doctrines. The 19th century in varying countries and at varying times was dominated by restorationism, enlightened absolutism, conservatism or just reactionary monarchism. On the border between the two centuries a period of belligerent nationalism and imperialism broke out. The period between the two world wars saw the strong development of radical ideologies - communism and fascism and a whole range of statist and semi-statist doctrines. After the Second World War ideas of the social state (L.Erchard) and the mixed economy (P.Samuelson) and the national democratic state (Khrushchev) became popular. At the same time Marxism as the ideological basis of communism, state socialism and liberalism as the banner of individual freedoms and capitalism became the two most powerful driving forces in the world and survived right up to the present day. Even the "softening" of their ideological systems as a result of "democratic socialism" and "state capitalism" or their "hardening" in the forms of communism or fascism did not reduce their significance as the fundamental ideologies of the Third Civilisation. Perhaps, I should mention here why I have not included another important ideological movement - that of conservatism. The conservatives have always made a cult out of their loyalty to the traditional structures of life. The conservative values of "hierarchy, order, authority and loyalty" have not stood up to the test of time and new realities. Communism and fascism appear to have been conclusively rejected. Monarchism is only viable as a cultural tradition. Radical and revolutionary theories have lost their power. Of the old political doctrines, only liberalism and Marxism in its totalitarian version managed to retain any of their power, at least until the end of the 1980's. To what extent, however, can they benefit from the transition between epochs? Do they answer the needs of the new global realities? Is it sufficient to say, that liberalism has become a dominant and eternal global theory, or that Marxism has been reborn in the form of democratic socialism? Let us look at the first of these. The ideas of liberalism have a long history going back to the awakening of civil societies, private ownership and the rights of man. This is its huge historical significance. Hobbs, Spinosa and Locke in different ways contributed to the creation of liberal ideas. The geniuses of the Enlightenment gave it a more systematic form and value system. However, the driving force behind the development of liberalism was Adam Smith. He saw the state and state control as the main obstacles to the development of the society in which we live. He was in favour of the free movement of the work force, the abolition of semi-feudal remnants and the regulation of industry and foreign trade. He was in favour of the complete removal of all limitations on trade with land and goods. A.Smith, D.Riccardo and A.Ferguson as well as all their followers advocated the limitation of the role of the state to the functions of a "night watchman" whose job it is to safeguard the freedom of the owners of property and the means of production. "Anarchy plus a constable, freedom with security" was the ambition of the first major liberals. At the end of the 18th century and the 19th century, liberalism was already playing a progressive anti-feudal role, destroying the feudal remnants and opening the way to civil rights. For the liberals freedom alone was the basis of social stability. Following the traditions of A.Smith and considering himself a devout follower, Jean Battiste Sei idealised the system of free enterprise in the conviction that the market alone was sufficient to form balance. According to Sei's well-known law the crises of over-production are temporary and economic balance is equivalent to the existence of free market relations. All classical economic doctrines were developed on the basis of such fundamental conclusions. A century after the appearance of the economic views of Adam Smith (1776), the basis of the liberal idea - the very idea of free competition - was consigned to the graveyard. At the end of the 19th century with the appearance of large monopolies and the worsening crisis of capitalism, liberal doctrines began to lose their prestige and influence. Two world wars in the 20th century and the success of more radical and totalitarian regimes further limited their influence. Of course, during the first half of the 20th century, liberal ideas were still exerting influence on many thinkers and politicians. Some of them followed in the footsteps of William Jevens explaining all phenomena on the basis of the laws of subjective logic. Others by default became elementary apologists of the dominant bourgeois views and yet others became advocates of the views of Menger and Von Viser. All of them, however, were obliged to recognise that ideas of the automatic self-regulating and stabilising nature of the free market were mistaken. The world wars, colonial conflicts, imperialistic conflicts and totalitarianism dealt heavy body blows to the ideas of liberalism which lost much of its influence for a long time. Limited, reduced in influence and almost underground, the tradition of liberal thought continued into the 20th century. This was mainly due to the hard work of two "long-distance runners" of theoretical liberalism: Ludwig von Mizes and Friedrich von Haiek. Von Mizes in his "Human Activities" offers a series of ideas which contribute to the consolidation of the idea of individualism and individual freedoms. For Mizes the freedom of choice is at the basis of social development. He believes that economic theory and structure are entirely subjective. Every expansion of the structure of the state was regarded by Mizes and Hajek as an anomaly. In the opinion of Mizes the protection of the rights of hired labour limits freedom and in the long-term - the natural development of society. He was very critical of communism and in his work "Socialism" he brilliantly predicted many of the imperfections of the "socialist experiment". In the 19th century Liberalism was a strongly progressive science. It destroyed the foundations of absolutism and opened the way to civil and political freedoms. It was the theoretical crown of laurels of the modern age and an expression of the Third Civilisation. Liberalism was the hope of the ordinary citizen, the bourgeois, the craftsman, the small and medium scale land owner. It was the ideology of the struggle against the "unjustified privileges" of the aristocrats and monarchs, the ideology of those who guarantee the power of the bourgeois above the other members of society. There is no doubt that in the 19th century one particular rule was valid - the more widespread the ideas of liberalism, the greater the authority of the bourgeois class. Liberalism was a victim of its own success and gave birth to its own antipathy - Marxism. Someone had to defend the interests of hired labour. Someone had to bring attention to the plight of a new repressed class with its own role and problems in society. The freedom of some had turned into the lack of freedom of others. This was the law of the Third Civilisation, of the level of progress that had been reached at that moment in the development of mankind. The collapse of the feudal societies had given birth to the bourgeoisie and the proletariate and the ideological doctrines which corresponded to their interests. Marxism developed as a new wave of intellectual thought but soon turned into a class doctrine. It was based on the idea of the value manufacturing output and the capitalist accumulation of wealth which arises from it. Marx was an undisputed theoretician and thinker. He not only developed the ideas of Smith but turned them in a completely new direction. While J.B. Sei and John Stuart Mill absolutised the idea of free enterprise and "Laissez Faire" economics, Marx took things in a new direction. He looked for the contradictions inherent in the free market and "proved" that sooner or later they would lead to monopolism, class conflicts and the objective transformation of private ownership into public ownership. While Sei and his followers promoted the capitalism of the 19th century and considered it as an eternal and balanced system, Marx, on the other hand, described its vices and called for the replacement of this society with a more just system. At the root of the theory of the value of labour, he emphasised that one part of society unjustly exploited the other part in contradiction with the natural rights of man. The struggle for added value, in the opinion of Marx, was at the root of class division between the bourgeoisie and the proletariate. Here Marx is in his role as a theoretician and political revolutionary. He undoubtedly believed that at some time during the process of capitalist accumulation, the "Laissez Faire" formula would collapse since competition would lead to centralisation, monopolisation and eventually, political and class conflicts. Marx, and later Lenin, frequently reiterated that monopolisation was a logical consequence of competition. These conclusions by Marx were indisputedy true of the 19th century and a significant part of the 20th. In Chapter 23 of the first volume of "Das Kapital", Marx comes to his most significant theoretical conclusion. For years to come it was to serve the interests of Lenin and later Stalin as the keystone of "state socialism". He believed that the processes of natural accumulation of industrial capital would not only lead to high levels of concentration but also objective and inevitable centralisation which would kill the ideas of "Laissez Faire" and would set preconditions for the transfer of private ownership to the state. "In a given area", writes Marx, "centralisation will attain its extreme limit when all the capital invested in it merge into a single capital. In a given society, this limit will be attained only when the entire social capital is united in the hands of a single, individual capitalist or a single group of capitalists."[27] This leads to the basis thesis which was to be further developed by Lenin - historical development and progress gradually lead to the increase in the level of socialisation, in the concentration and centralisation of production. This conclusion and the conclusion on the historical role of the working class and its rights to added value (logically - to the sum of social wealth) are the keystones of Marxist theory. The main conclusion was that private ownership would be destroyed in order to concede its place to public ownership. Later on the followers of Marx were to become divided over this issue. Kaustski considered that the priority of Marxist thought was that the capitalist society would reform itself and that parliamentary democracy would stimulate such a process. At the other extreme Lenin and his followers, motivated by the dramatic situation in semi-feudal Russia were to raise the flag of the revolutionary struggle for the rights of the poor in the belief that before capitalism could be transformed into anything else, inter-imperialistic conflicts would lead to its death and the inevitable world victory of the proletariate. This was the main reason why the Marxist tradition divided at the beginning of the 20th century into two major movements - social democracy and communism. In both cases, however, they share the same political doctrines and common theoretical views. Both communism and world social democracy in the 20th century placed the emphasis on the protection of the rights of the workers and the socially weak strata of the population and at the same time the strong regulatory role of the state. Under communism the role was taken to absurd extreme via the total nationalisation of production. In social-democracy the role of the state was reduced to its "natural" dimensions defined by the need for it to protect the interests of the socially weak. In 1989-1991 with the collapse of the Eastern European totalitarian structures Marxism suffered a terrible blow. Of course, it is hardly possible to identify Eastern European totalitarianism with Marxism, Marxism with Stalinism, Maoism or Potism. Marx was complex and occasionally even contradictory but his name will remain forever in the annals of the history of economic and social disciplines. His conclusions canbe disputed, and only some of them are valid for the period in which he lived. Others arouse our admiration even today. Amongst the latter, I would cite his philosophical ideas of dialecticism and analyses of market prices and competition. Toffler is correct when he says that to ignore the writings of Marx today is tantamount to being semi-literate. In my book, I do not reject Marx as a thinker, but I do reject the practical implementation of his ideas and their politicisation and transformation into dogma. The globalisation of the world, the universal crisis of the two bloc system and the appearance of new technology struck Marxist political practice a blow to the heart. The total nationalisation of society was in fact in divergence with the realities of world development. The idea that capitalist accumulation would lead to a unified, centralised society, to a single system of production for all workers and to a global proletarian state were mistaken. The first reason for this was because the consolidation of the proletarian state as a rule was achieved via violence and secondly, because such views lead to the repression of individual rights and freedoms and the limitation of human creativity. The Marxist intellectual tradition lost its influence to new technologies and social developments in the 1970's and 1980's which were at odds with the structures of state property. The West had begun to overcome class contradictions and they had reached entirely new levels of social development. Modern generations are now witnessing the disappearance of the traditional working class, the appearance of new social groups and new social structures. In actual fact both the politically charged "intellectual discoveries" of Karl Marx - the theory of added value and the universal law on capitalist accumulation - have been overtaken by history. Neither his views on expropriation by expropriators, nor the struggles of the world proletariate correspond to what is happening in the world at the moment. This does not mean that the Marxist intellectual tradition has to be forgotten or rejected. It has played an essential role in the development of the world during a long period of its development. Marx correctly predicted that the period of free competition would not last long and that it would lead to imperialism and the increase in inter-imperialist conflicts. Marxism became a powerful gravitational force for many people during the second half of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th since it offered a true reflection of the tragic position of workers during this period and defended their interests. "State socialism" as it was called was the transitional type of social progress combined with exalted utopian views and violent methods for attaining them. On the other hand state socialism guaranteed social security (work, wages and a basic standard of living) for millions of people. There is no other reasonable way to describe the popularity of these teachings and its influence throughout a large part of the world's populations in the 19th and 20th century. The Western European social democratic version of Marxism played a role as a balancing force, a bridge between the different classes. In Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa it was a series of generally unsuccessful experiments. The total nationalisation of Stalin in the 1930's, reformed by Khrushchev and supported by Brezhnev, the "great leap forward" of Mao Tse Tung at the end of the 1950's and the senseless purges of Pol Pot were all justified under the banner of Marxist ideas and the struggle for a global communist future. The historical fate of Marxism reveals one important truth. When a teaching imposes itself mechanically on different cultures and traditions or when it used simply as a banner, it automatically turns into dogma. Every attempt at reform in the 1970's and 1980's in Eastern Europe was justified with quotes from Marx and Lenin and supporting quotations from the works of the great leaders could always be found even in the most contradictory situation. This was absurd. We were obliged at every turn to refer to the classic works. Marxism lost its authority and was turned into an compulsory state religion. At first glance with the collapse of the totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe liberalism seemed to remain the only gravitational force for the development of mankind, with no recognition of gratitude to Marx or Lenin. The semi-statism of the world's social democrats is in crisis, neo-Keynesianism is under pressure from market expansion in the open world and modern communications seem to be whispering, "less state intervention, more freedom". The followers of Mizes and Von Hajek hastily declared after the death of Marxism that there is nothing left but liberalism. This illusory triumph found its fullest expression in the work of F.Fukoyama, "The End of History". In the style of Sei's eternal doctrines of the "eternal" market balancing force, Fukoyama declared the intransigent superiority of liberal ideas and subsequently the end of history. He seems to believe that the market, individualism and the private entrepreneur are the only quantifiable categories. For Hegel and now Fukoyama, the "end of history" is the fear of the unfathomable great future, something which needs to be defined now, despite the fact that by rights it belongs to future generations. Hegel's long-dreamed-of modern world will appear at the end of history in the same way as Fukoyama asserts that the most perfect system is liberal democracy and that it will bring with it the "last man" and the "end of history". What I cannot accept in these concepts is that history and its philosophy have a perceivable end and that social schemes and doctrines can be written in stone for eternity. I prefer to believe that history is cyclical and that its follows the laws of the great natural systems of the universe. We still know too little, to be able to give an adequate answer to this question. We know so little about our own planet and about the galaxies which surround it and especially the connection between this and the history of mankind. Despite the poverty of human knowledge it is clear that there is no proof of the inevitable end of mankind and earthly nature. The explanation seems to suggest that the end of history will be accompanied by the universal domination of liberalism. The modern world is colourful and diverse enough to support the belief that a traditional ideology can transform itself in a dominant philosophy. Even the elementary claims that after the collapse of Eastern European totalitarianism and "a short, sharp shock" liberal doctrines would win the hearts and minds of Russians, Bulgarians, Poles or Slovaks were hasty. This did not take place and because of the inherited economic and cultural realities clearly will not. However, are the Eastern countries of Japan, South Korea or China symbols of liberal democracies? Will the countries of Latin America, Asia and Africa be able to develop in this way? The trends prevalent at the moment in Western Europe and the USA give no grounds for such "liberal" optimism. Modern liberal doctrines do not correspond to the most significant modern processes of globalisation, socialisation or the opening-up of countries and the mutual interaction of different cultures. The very nature of private property has changed. It is more socialised and integrated than at any other time. Humanity is faced with completely new problems which fall outside the domain of liberalism. Today's global world is disproportionately developed and traditional liberalism will hardly be able to change this. If we apply its traditional ideology universally, the world economy will mutate even further. The wealthy countries will become even more wealthy and the poor even poorer. The God of wealth for some will be at the same time the God of poverty for others, leading to a renewal of liberalism and a revitalisation of some new form of Marxism and defender of the socially weak. Today practically no-one has any doubts that classical liberal thought is part of the glorious past. There is, however, another hypothesis that after the collapse of totalitarian socialism liberalism will be born again. Some modern liberals assert that Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher with their typically liberal policies brought about the collapse of communism.[28] Others consider that neo-liberalism is but a rationalist deviation in the era of violence, typical of this century. "However, if there is any kind of hope for the future of freedom", wrote John Grey in 1986, " then it is hidden in the fact that towards the end of century of political insanity, we are becoming witnesses of a return to the wisdom of the great theorists of liberalism."[29] With respect for these views, I would, all the same, like to express my view that history never repeats itself. We must accept the market, human rights, individual freedom and so on, but will this alone solve the problems of the modern world or provide a solution to the challenges with which we are faced? On their own these liberal doctrines are inadequate for the processes of globalisation. They will as a matter of course lead to the development of a number of social conflicts for a relatively long time to come. They will lead to a deformation of world development and a consolidation of the division of humanity into the rich and the poor. This will create a new reaction in the poorer countries and the appearance of new utopias and local wars. A century ago liberalism very rapidly changed from a doctrine of spiritual freedom into a doctrine of the rich. Today it is hardly able to return freedom to the poor, or the freedom taken away by the electronic media. In the context of the global world liberal doctrines are rather a refuge for those who want to expand their historical advantages and the historical lead they have over the others and to dominate the world. The greatest danger in the context of the global world is that liberalism will be transformed into a bridge for the domination of cultures leading to the disappearance of national traditions and entire peoples. In combination with globalisation market liberalism might easily mutate into cultural elitism. If we follow the ideological concept of liberalism in the context of the global world we will be faced with the dangers mentioned in the previous chapter - chaos and disorder, nationalist and ethnic crises, the reactions of the poor and all the manifestations of the universal crisis of the Third Civilisation. Both historically and currently the idea of liberalism is different from the present state of the world. The worst thing is that with such ideas we will primitivise world development and we will turn globalisation into a bridge for the mechanical imposition of one culture onto another. In practice this means the Americanisation of Russia, the Germanisation of the Czech Republic and Hungary and China and India simultaneously to imitate the United States and the United Kingdom and so on. Least of all we want to resemble ourselves. The world can only lose out and become ashamed of itself. Of course, it would be absurd and superfluous to ignore the strengths of liberal theories. Freedom, human rights, private initiative and property are things which we have inherited through the centuries and which we will take with us into the future. The problem is, however, that in the modern world this is far from enough. Neither liberalism nor Marxism-Leninism can explain the modern processes of world integration, the reduction of the role of national states, the appearance and the principles of the global world, mutual interaction of cultures in the context of internationalisation. These two doctrines appeared during the industrial era, in the conditions of strong class division and inequality. They served the needs of the Third Civilisation with their inherent structures - nations and nation states. Their basic laws and categories were connected to the problems faced by mankind during the 19th and 20th century. Today, however, all this has changed as a result of modern technological processes, as a result of modern social structures and the evolution of ownership. Marx's working class does not exist, there is no class hegemony, proletarian revolutions are senseless. At the same time the ideal private owner in the conditions of the intermingling of millions of private activities and the increase in the dependence of each individual does not exist. Just like the new technologies did not find their place within the shell of state bureaucratic "socialist" governments, in the same way the socialisation of private property and the globalisation of the world have destroyed the basic values of liberalism. It is true that each of these doctrines can adapt and take on board new ideas. However, this would be a perpetration ofviolence against history and academic morals. Such attempts are being carried out at the moment stemming from the political ambitions and inherited from the past but as a rule they serve only to delay the reform process. Their hypocrycy will be quickly perceived. In the early period of my academic research I also allowed myself to indulge in such illusions attempting to imagine the ideas of sweeping reform in Eastern Europe as the revitalisation of socialism. At that time this was about as far as we were allowed to go. Today, when we are relatively free it would much more honest to confess that the time of ready-made ideas has long since passed. New generations have the right to their own ideas and the logical progress of history does not mean the acceptance of old cliches. Neither Marxism-Leninism can be successfully adapted to individualism, the market or private enterprise, nor can liberalism accept within its own systems the international and internal associations created by new communications. It is equally absurd to believe that ideological doctrines can be based on a priori class status - theories about capitalists, theories about workers and peasants. This approach was suitable in the 19th and 20th centuries when the integration of society was at a much lower level and social stratification was much more acute and significant. I expect political liberals and "socialist" movements to begin to adapt to the new realities. It is sometimes amusing that those who call themselves socialist may carry out anti-socialist politics in support of the major monopolies. There may even be liberals and conservatives who preach politics in the name of the people and social economic ideas. The comedy of make-up and disguise will continue for another 10-15 years and maybe more. We will hear more and more frequently that the changes have only served to confirm the ideas of Karl Marx and L.Von Mizes. This is, however, to insult these two great thinkers. This is why I cannot announce the end of Marxism or liberalism, but can only give forewarning that the end will come - about that there can be no doubt. History teaches us that new eras give rise to new ideas. We are now entering such an era. 2 A RETURN TO THE ROOTS OR THE MAIN THESIS The theory and the practice of liberalism stresses the absolutism of the individual and private property and hence the monopoly of power of the strong over the weak. Marxism-Leninism created the total monopoly of the state by absolutising socialisation and state ownership. I have come to the conclusion that neither socialisation not autonomisation can be achieved individually or absolutely... I n 1982 when I was writing my doctoral dissertation, I wanted to find an answer to the question, "Does state socialism justifiably exist?" Why were its ideas dominant at that time in a number of countries including Bulgaria? According to Lenin, "State socialism is based on the socialisation of capitalist production."[30] By the world "socialisation" Marx, Engels and Lenin meant the development of the social character of autonomous social processes. In their opinion humanity was progressing logically from individual to larger mass forms of production, passing through the stages of primitive labour to slave owning and feudal manufacturing processes, the development of the factory eventually to reach the large scale monopolies. Subsequently Marxism-Leninism states that the next step in socialisation after monopolies is the creation of social ownership or property controlled by the state itself. At first glance, this might appear logical: in the stages of its progress, humanity passes from primitive individual production to enormous factories and eventually state control within the framework of the entire society. Marx and Lenin frequently come back to this emphasising that private property is too limiting for the new productive forces and that it gives rise to wars and violence subsequently conceding its position to state control. There is no difference in principle here between Marx, Lenin, Stalin, Trotski or Mao Tse Tung. They all saw socialisation as a global process, the basis and pre-condition for the establishment of a world communist society, of a "single factory for all workers and peasants" (Lenin). Taking this as the basis and putting to one side (briefly) the Marxist thesis of the decay of the state, the pioneer politicians of state socialism unified life and put up barriers to motivation and the progress of people. In order to analyse this process, we can take the most simple example - the example of natural organisms. Organic cells do not only grow when they develop (unless they are cancerous) but divide and become autonomous. If they separate from the main body of cells they die. If larger natural systems attack their independent development, the cells die or cease to exist in the same form. All growth of organisms in nature is associated with autonomous development. The other option is decay and inevitable death. Similarly, if socialisation and centralisation are viewed as a unilateral process, they (like cancer cells) will automatically lead to the mutation of the system. It is true that each subsequent stage of human development leads to the greater homogeneity of human civilisation. However, if this thesis is not further developed, it become transformed into a rejection of its own self. For Stalin and his followers, for Mao and Pol Pot progress meant socialisation, equal to unification, military discipline and universal obedience to superiors. This was the very basis for the doctrine of state socialism and the gradual unification of society. In the 1920's and 1930's the USSR and in the 1950's the countries of Eastern Europe underwent the total nationalisation of their industry and agriculture. There was a belief in the theory that via state regulated homogeneity the differences between village and town, intellectual and physical work and classes would disappear and that this would be the basis for subsequent "social homogeneity" and "nationalisation". This was the model for state socialism. It meant death for individual activities, creativity and motivation. To a lesser extent it suffocated the diversity of social life. Naturally it also delayed and in certain circumstances halted social development. The most important element in my understanding of this matter is that integration (socialisation) and autonomation are not mutually exclusive but a pair of categories which develop in parallel and are mutually conditioned. The same can also be said of other pairs of processes such as globalisation and localisation, integration and disintegration, collectivisation and individualisation, massification and demassification etc.. However paradoxical this might appear at first glance, I believe that these pairs of processes have developed in parallel and not to the detriment of one another. Of course, the phases of socialisation and autonomation, unification and collapse cannot appear simultaneously. At each stage in the development of human history the socialisation of production replaces a particular level of autonomy and in its turn gives way to another. The slave owning state socialised the labour of thousands of slaves and gradually within the very heart of the system new centres of autonomy began to appear setting the preconditions for the appearances of colonies and the early stages of feudalism. Capitalism destroyed the feudal divisions but in its place a new type of autonomy appeared. However hard it tried to suppress autonomy, the totalitarian regimes could not destroy the autonomy of social groups and individual people were eventually to destroy the monopoly of power. Let us take the elementary example of the single division of labour. The idea of the socialisation of labour is based on the fact that the individual units of labour complement each other within the processes of the creation of a final product. Craftsmen are divided from the agricultural worker, the trader from the craftsman etc.. On the one hand they all are dependent on each other but on the other (and this is particulary important) they achieve greater professional autonomy and greater freedom of action. Similar processes develop in relation to the forms of unified labour - certain economic units are absorbed up by others while at the same time in the process of capital accumulation yet others become more powerful and more independent. At a certain stage in their development they divide into individual autonomous structures. Large companies as General Motors for example transfer a number of their activities to smaller independent companies. Each larger production unit is then obliged to autonomise its internal departments. Moreover, the more developed and bigger the unit is, the greater the autonomy of its component parts. This process is confirmed by the decentralisation of management in transnational corporations. In general the growth of the whole cannot help but bring with it the growth of its individual parts. The increased process of integration will at a certain stage in its development lead to division and a certain level of autonomisation. Thus, the growth in socialisation does not lead to the death of autonomisation but to its reproduction and change in its forms. The growth in integration leads to another type of disintegration, globalisation and another type of localisation etc.. Each human activity is a form of accumulation. On the one hand the process of accumulation as both a material and spiritual process leads simultaneously to two effects: firstly, it concentrates the material and social forces in one area making them socially and naturally more independent and autonomous, secondly, this accumulation leads to millions of new types of manufacturing, economic and social links between human communities, countries and continents. If we take the level of autonomy of individual structural units, then in certain cases their levels of autonomy increase, others decrease and disappear while yet others appear and continue to develop. In general terms the socialisation and autonomisation of structures are linked by a complex series of relations which complement each other at the same time. The main element is that during the development of the historical processes they follow a common line of development and growth. Moreover, it is clear that neither individualism nor collectivism can of their own accounts express the richness of human interdependence. Separated from one another, these categories create deformation. Pure individualism without any idea of the community is antipathetical to the idea of the objective integrational processes while forced collectivism kills diversity and initiative. By the same logic, the state socialist collective societies limit individualism and creativity and delay progress. I am convinced that history will lead us to a combination of the elements of the individual and the social: the integration of human activities unify a series of autonomous production processes, countries and peoples making the world more united and more mutually dependent. At the same time there will be growth in the social role of the individual, autonomous groups and ethnic communities. Material accumulation and the growth in wealth available to civilisations makes man wealthier better informed and consequently freer and more independent. The more humanity develops the more this trend will continue. It will be more difficult to "entrap" such a person within the monopolistic structures of managed societies. I, therefore, believe that in global terms it is possible to speak of the disintegration of historical distances between the individual (private relations) and the collective (public relations). History has indisputedly shown that objective integrational processes are ineffective without some form of administrative compulsion. The higher the level of civilisation within society the greater the harmony between the individual and society. 3 MAIN CONCLUSIONS AND A MESSAGE TO A.TOFFLER Since the 1960's the technological basis of world manufacturing has changed out of all recognition. So much new technology has entered every day life that social relations have also changed. One of the best modern philosophers, A.Toffler, maintains that new technology leads to the emassification of production. My belief is that the effect is somewhat different. I believe that it gives rise to the parallel processes of integration and disintegration, massification and demassification and that it is this dual effect which has influenced the world in this extraordinary way. T he existence of a dialectic link between integration anddisintegration, globalisation and localisation can be summed upin three basic conclusions. The first conclusion is that these pairs of categories of historical development are not antipathies but develop in parallel and are mutually conditioned. This concept is equivalent to the rejection of utopian liberal theories of absolute independence and the "purity" of private ownership. However, this is also a rejection of the notions of a future society as a world without individualism, internal autonomy, local characteristics and without economic, political and cultural diversity. The second conclusion is that socialisation, or integration is not the same is nationalisation or centralisation. If this was a unilateral process (the persistent unification of autonomous units) then this concentration would lead to centralisation and would lead to the growth in nationalisation. The view that autonomisation goes hand in hand with socialisation means that socialisation is above all a "horizontal" process based on man, the market and private property. Consequently centralisation has certain permissible limits beyond which it is ineffective and provokes reactionary processes. The theoretical conception of the state in the modern world has changed significantly. It is clear that in modern conditions the borders of the state have undergone considerable changes. The greater the level of development on the one hand, the more civic society will be absorbed up by the state - and vice versa. My third conclusion[31] is that from an international point of view, socialisation (integration) gives rise to new phenomena connected firstly with globalisation and secondly with the appearance of increased local autonomy and localisation. On the one hand, new communications unite humanity, on the other hand they create national and ethnic self-confidence leading to the struggle for the survival of nations and cultures as a reaction to cultural imperialism. Liberalism and Marxism-Leninism are unable to provide explanations for the new realities. Liberal doctrines emphasise individualism, personal freedom, while Marxism places the emphasis on class and collectivism. When liberalism and Marxism appeared on the historical stage, their one dimensional nature was to a certain extent entirely understandable. The liberals defended the rights of free, private entrepreneurs while the Marxists defended the working class and the poor. The level of stratification within civilised societies was so clear and so developed that such doctrines were inevitable. They were a historical necessity and their mark in history. It will be interesting to see whether these conclusions will be confirmed by the modern technological revolution which is apparently taking shape at the moment and which will continue to shape the face of the world for some time to come. In a number of his books the famous American philosopher and futurologist, A.Toffler, concludes that new technologies lead to the demassification of production. "At the present moment", he writes, "We are passing from an economy of mass production and mass consumption to what I would call "the demassed economy".[32]" In the opinion of the great American futurologist, large scale mass production will be replaced by individualised or small scale production. Identical components will be assembled in more and more individualised end products. I wanted to draw attention to this thesis not because it is original but rather that it has lead to the revival of the illusion that liberalism and free trade will triumph. The basic idea of Toffler is that the modern technological revolution will return the demassification of production as the leading form of economic relations which will in turn mean the collapse of the large trans-nationals corporations or at least the reduction of their role, the domination of the small and medium scale sector and the rebirth of free competition. This thesis refutes my own, or to look at it from another point of view, my theory refutes his. If what I believe is true, that integration and disintegration and related categories are developing in parallel, this means that demassification will not replace mass production. It will simply lead to new types of mass production and new types of demassed activities. There is no doubt that new computer technology has created work for hundreds of thousands of people in their homes. The computer revolution had individualised a huge number of social activities and has elevated the role of the intellect. However, these technologies have also created millions of new, direct links which stimulate mass production. At the end of the 1970's and 1980's many specialists believed that small and medium enterprises would eventually become the keystone of world manufacturing. The basis for such a presumption was the growth in their relative share of the market. "The entire economy", writes Toffler, "is becoming demassed."[33] He gives examples of the thousands of small and medium enterprises in Kiusu, Southern Japan and in Quebec, Canada. Only one thing is true in these statements: that with the advent of the computer age and biotechnology and their practical and universal applications a large number of small and medium independent companies have been created. With the use of a computer it has become possible for many activities to be carried out individually. The same reasons, however, have provided stimuli for the large scale manufacturers. Over the past 10-15 years, the mass bankruptcies and collapses of trusts and companies which many people expected, have not taken place. On the contrary, as can be seen from the annual American rank listings in the magazine "Fortune", the leading companies in the world have increased their sales and have strengthened their positions in the world economy. Over the past ten years they have increased their position in world trade, manufacturing and particularly in the area of new technology.[34] Without doubt the majority of them have changed their structures by diversifying and delegating their activities to subsidiary companies and internally autonomous systems. Nevertheless, mass production has not disappeared. It has simply changed its form. One reason for this is globalisation and the opening up of new markets for the leading world companies. Another reason is the production of myriad new forms of communication - mobile telephones, telephone exchanges, satellites, new audio and video technology, cable systems etc.. This new technology has reached unsuspected levels with made enormous profits for their owners. A similar boom has been experienced by transport manufacturers and providers - cars, aeroplanes, ships and helicopters etc.. People have begun to travel more. Together with the construction of the necessary infrastructure, transport and communications will be the most dynamic growth sectors over the next 10-20 years. Who can produce such goods? The small or the medium companies, the "demassed" producer? On the contrary. This is only within the power of the large companies, capable of allocating large amounts of money for science, research and development and personnel training. The globalisation of the world economy has allowed these companies to maximalise their profits and to spread their experience and influence to many countries in the world. Even in the cases, when a large company subcontracts to thousands and tens of thousands smaller companies, their labour is united in a single end product. It is difficult to accept the statement that the mass production line will disappear and that the world is entering into a period of industrial manufacturing and individualised products. Indeed, modern machinery - computers, cars, planes, trains, ships requires the use of non-standard and individualised creativity. However, they all use more and more standard products - microchips, microcircuits, electronic and mechanical elements whose manufacturing requires unified labour and unified means of production. The greatest developments in the last 20 years have not lead to the demassification of production but have autonomised and socialised it. In other words, from an organisational point of view, these manufacturing processes have become more autonomous but in social terms they have linked many more people within new national and international communities. Even when they are juridically independent, small and medium scale enterprises have become incorporated into larger companies via a system of industrial cooperation. While the technology of the Third Civilisation lead to mass production and large open workshops, new technology has produced a completely different type of mass production. The integrating effect comes from the use of goods or services, from the repeated application of identical manufacturing or financial operations over the entire world. Let us take for example the fast-food chain of "MacDonalds" or "Kentucky Fried Chicken" or the American software company "Microsoft", these are symbols of success. The majority of their products are produced individually or by a small groups of highly qualified specialists. There is hardly a more individualised profession in the world than the creation of software programmes. On the other hand, look at the enormous "mass" effect. For the past ten years the profits of Microsoft have increased annually by 62%. In the USA alone more than 50 million people use Microsoft products. Today the company has sales offices in 31 countries around the world and is essentially a global company.[35] New technology allows for more autonomy for the individual worker requiring more individualism and intellect. At the same time, labour becomes more socialised, more integrated into a more general and large scale national and, frequently, global society. To this extent, more and more people are becoming dependent on the labour of the individual person and company but at the same time the level of national and social labour integration is also developing rapidly. Whatever example we look at - the manufacture of modern transport, communications, packaging, commerce, banking, the effect is the same. The modernisation of these branches requires the parallel growth of individualism and socialisation. My general conclusion is that the modern technological revolution has demonstrated the parallel action of both these processes: autonomisation and integration (socialisation). One of these processes leads to the demassification of certain types of human activity and their individualisation, while the other links the manufacturers of different countries within new types of relations, making them more "massive" and more international. Demassification appears through the growth in the role of individual creative activity, regional and ethnic economic communities, the growth in the number of small and medium companies and the application of individually produced and consumed products and services etc.. Massification takes place through new communication and transport infrastructures, mass consumption of standardised products, the interdependence of common energy and ecosystems, through the use of common resources, banks, funds and stock exchanges, the mutual interaction of currencies, fashion and culture. My message to A.Toffler is not intended to show that modernity does not provide us with a limitless number of examples of demassification, but to show that this phenomenon is only a part of the process. It is not isolated from the globalisation and massification of world production, or the mass participation of millions of new producers in mutual economic and ecological dependence. Massification and demassification, globalisation and localisation, integration and disintegration are paired concepts. Their modern interdependence is one of the most important pre-conditions for us to recognise the character of the emerging new civilisation and its political and economic structures. 4. A SIMILAR MESSAGE TO S.HUNTINGTON If Toffler believes that the new era will lead to the demassification of production, then another American - Samuel Huntington, has predicted that the new era will cause conflicts between civilisations. Are the pogroms of Sarajevo or the wars in the Caucuses proof of his conclusion? T he processes of integration and autonomisation are taking place on an international scale. Moreover, international and internal integration are indivisibly linked processes. The major question is what is the nature of the world which we are about to enter? Will it be dominated by Western Cultures, divided into new cultural communities or something else? What will triumph? Integration or autonomisation, modernisation or specific national values? In response to these problems, S.Huntington in 1993, laid the foundations for a new, rather pretentious line of discussion. In his opinion, the "major foundations of conflict in the modern world are not in the main ideological or economic." They are based on culture and civilisation. "The clash of civilisations", in the opinion of Huntington," will be the last phase in the development of world conflicts"[36]. Although these ideas are controversial and many writers have rejected them, they should not be ignored completely. In 1995 the East-West Research Group organised a discussion on the theme, "Europe in the 21st Century" at which the former Prime Minister of Poland, Yan Belietski defended just such a thesis. Many politicians, intellectuals and journalists throughout the world have similar views. S.Huntington believes that the conflicts of the future will result from the divisions between Islam, Eastern Orthodoxy, Western culture, Confucianism, Japanese, Hindu, Latin American and a number of other cultures. In Russia, Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece there a number of leaders who are determined to struggle for the authority of Orthodoxy. Europe is divided between Catholicism and Orthodoxy. The East-West border of the united Europe separates Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and the three Baltic states from the Orthodox nations. Similar borders divide Islam and Christianity and Confucianism and Hinduism etc.. If we recall the theoretical approach which was mentioned earlier, then we shall have to reject the view of Huntington and his followers. In general terms, modern academic research after the end of the cold war has been dominated by two common approaches, each of which either absolutises integration or autonomy and separatism. 1. Immediately after the collapse of the communist regime, it was generally accepted that Western culture had triumphed. Western, or to be more precise, American culture, in the opinion of the editor of the Wall Street Journal, R.L.Bartley, for better or worse is spreading over the entire world.[37] The integration of the world, in the opinion of many researchers is based on Western culture. They believe that it will assume dominance of the world and provide as proof the popularity of football in Japan, Madonna and Michael Jackson in Thailand and the fact that the crowned heads of state from the East are being educated in Harvard and Berkley. 2. The second point of view belongs to S.Huntington himself. Integration in his opinion is of no value when faced with the boom of civilisations. The disappearance of the violence of the bi-polar model led to a revival of primal cultural identity. Cultural differences and cultural autonomy instead of ideology became the basis for conflicts. Thus, Huntington provides explanations for the collapse of Yugoslavia and the USSR and predicts a similar future for the rest of the world. By following the logic of the entire book and of my basic theoretical approach, I believe that both these views are extreme and belong to types of thought which were typical of the period between the 17th and 20th centuries. In my opinion neither Western Culture will be able to dominate the world categorically, nor will the world become divided into a number of indigenous cultural civilisations. There is little doubt that after the collapse of the Berlin wall the old ideologies lost much of their former significance. Here Huntington is right, although this will hardly revive the threat of new cold wars, a return to the former state is not entirely impossible and the world agenda will have new geo-political structures. Directly after the removal of ideological interdependency, and taking the lid off long-suppressed accumulated national energy, the explosion was inevitable. In certain cases this was a manifestation of crushed national pride, in others this was a struggle for cultural survival, while in yet other cases this was simply the search for a spiritual foundation for something to replace totalitarian ideology. How, for example, could the communists have remained influential after 1989, except by exploiting nationalism and the struggle against Western influence? Was it not completely natural for the Tadzhiks, Armenians, Azeris or the Slovaks and Slovenes to engage in emotional expressions of their long-suppressed national identities? To this extent all the conflicts along the borders of the former Eastern Bloc were reactions against the limitations, insults and repression of cultural identity. It is also the same with the insoluble problems of ethnic and religious self-identification in Northern Ireland, Kurdistan (Turkey and Iraq) and Quebec as well as many other places in the world. Nevertheless, Huntington is not correct in his view that modern ethnic conflicts are the seeds of large-scale conflicts between civilisations. He absolutises autonomy and ignores the global processes of integration. The parallel action of integrational and autonomising processes mean that such conflicts are rather a feature of immaturity and backwardness rather than of the future. If we accept the thesis of S.Huntington, then we have to accept that during the entire 21st century we will continue to find ourselves in a situation of transition between old and new civilisations, in a state of chaos and disorder. I tend to believe that the enormous bodies of governments and peoples will choose progress, new technology and open market societies to seek confirmation of their cultural identity. On the other hand, what will happen with the transnational corporations, global electronic media and world financial markets? The dividing lines between the civilisations predicted by Huntington mean the collapse, no more and no less, of the world economy, the establishment of new walls in place of international highways, barriers to communications, the flow of transport, goods and millions of people. This was possible in the 19th and 20th century but it is absurd for the future. I believe that the conflicts in Bosnia, Nagorni Karabakh, Georgia and Tadzhikistan are temporary and will fade with the integration of these countries into the world economy. In a similar way, the pretensions and extremism of the catholics and the French-speaking minority in Quebec will also fade. Their origins are not in the collapse of the totalitarian regimes but in the reduction of the role of the nation state and in their struggle for identity. When I say that cultural contradictions will "fade", I do not mean that they will disappear. When I reject the "autonomist", Huntington, I also reject the "Western integrationalist", R.Bartley. The world will neither disintegrate into separate civilisations, since this would be to deny 6000 years of integration, nor will it be dominated by mass American culture which would be to reject the self-perpetuating nature of cultural autonomy. If immediately after the collapse of the Berlin wall American cultural influence did indeed grow in leaps and bounds, then, I believe, this process will soon be compensated by the cultural progress of Japan, Europe, Russia and other countries. American culture itself has been subjected to the serious influence of Latin American, African, Asian and European cultural products and has become pluralistic rather than purely American. The cultural identity of each people and ethnic group can be defended in two ways in the modern world: the first of these is via isolation from the world -- the second is via the processes of modernisation and the "forced" promotion of cultural identity. The experience of countries which have isolated themselves from the world is lamentable. In modern conditions this is impermissible. The only positive experience which remains is that of those nations who are the standard bearers of progress. I believe that the future will be defined by three parallel processes directly linked to the mutual relationship between integration and autonomy. The first of these is the globalisation of world culture the constituent elements of which will be defined not by a single or group of larger nations but by a more universal process. The second is self-identification and the rebirth of a large number, about 50--60, of local cultures which will become part of the process of global change. They will find their niches and will complement global cultural intergration. The third process is perhaps most important -- that of the hitherto unseen intensive processes of cultural mixing between revitalised national cultures and global culture as a whole. Some of these concepts will be examined in greater detail at a later stage and I will provide further evidence. What, however, remains of the newly reborn "civilisations" of Huntington? Nothing. They will be subjected to the same structural changes (integrational and autonomising) to which them entire modern civilisation has been subjected. Some of these will flourish in global relations, others will complement the existing global culture. Is it really possible to compare two Islamic countries such as Morocco or Iran and would they possible cooperate in the event of a future cultural conflict? Hardly. I am also convinced that the Eastern Orthodox countries will become integrated into Europe rather than form their own independent cultural and political community. All the civilisations described by Huntington are in actual fact cultural and religious communities involved in common integrational processes. Integration is no stronger than autonomy but is no weaker either. It is stronger, however, than isolationism and confrontational cultures and religions. Of the cultural characteristics of Huntington's civilisations the only thing which will remain will be that which can adapt itself to the global processes of integration. It will be an addition and continuation of a new global culture which I predict will be the spiritual conduit of the new civilisation. 5. THE NEED FOR A NEW THEORETICAL SYNTHESIS Liberalism is based on private property. Marxism rejects its significance and absolutises collectivism and integration based on state coercion. The main conclusions of these great teachings have not stood up to the test of time and there is now a need for a new ideological and theoretical synthesis. M arxism-Leninism, Maoism, Trotskiyism, albeit in different ways emphasised the abolition of private ownership and coercive nationalism. The experiment was unsuccessful and retrospectively is seen in negative terms. On the other hand, however, liberalism supported private property but underestimated the role of socialisation and integration. Despite its attempts to triumph over the corpse of Marxism, the liberal idea is unable to provide adequate explinations for the modern era. For almost two centuries, humanity has vacillated between these two approaches to social thought. Neither Marxism, however, nor Liberalism were sufficiently convincing. Marxism-Leninism aimed to give social guarantees to all but destroyed and limited in the process all freedom of private initiative and progress. Liberalism and capitalism were based on the absolutism of "private" ownership which did not bring harmony or equilibrium but divided the world into the eternally poor and the eternally rich. No-one today denies the need for the protection of human rights or the right of all to organise private production: Neither the Chinese communists who have lead the reform process in China guaranting long-term economic growth, nor the Russian communists now in senior management positions in private banks and companies. No-one would dispute the need for the opening-up of societies and free competition between companies from different countries. Who, on the other hand, would oppose the idea of the social state, the struggles of the poor and the deprived for a better life or the battles of the enviromentalists to halt the production of environmental pollutants? When 120 years ago the representatives of the classical bourgeoisie and Marxist political economics first crossed swords, the English cotton mill workers and Silesian miners were working 16 hours a day while their employers lived in resplendent luxury. The profound social gaps, the inter-imperialist wars and conflicts not only divided people but also the theoreticians and politicians who defended their interests. What were the reasons for the divisions between liberal and conservative doctrines and the social democrat and communists? Above all this was the question of private ownership, the exploitation of hired labour, the origin of value and market equilibrium etc.. The gap between ideological views was widened further by the ambitions of leaders and politicians and reaching its height during the fifty years of the 20th century when political radicalism appeared on a hitherto unknown scale. Communism and fascism became the extreme forms of class opposition and world wars - the bloody result of radicalism and totalitarianism. After the Second World War, perhaps, frightened by the extent of the destruction, politicians began to search for ways to mitigate extremism. Despite the cold war, a process of gradual and sometimes contradictory rapprochement began to take place. Khrushchev accepted the principle of peaceful co-existence and began to speak of the replacement of the dictatorship of the proletariate with the national-democratic state. In 1948 Tito and in 1968 Kadar in Hungary breathed life into the processes of "socialist" private property while retaining the single-party system. All the Eastern European countries began to search for the possibilities of change. In the West, first of all L.Erchard and then a number of other leaders accepted the idea of the social state and guaranteed significant benefits for their workers and employers. The anti-monopoly legislation in the USA and Western Europe allowed millions of small and medium producers to prosper. One of the most effective areas of new legislation was that which allowed for the participation of workers in the management and ownership of the factories in which they worked. The West began to speak of "peoples' capitalism" and the East spoke of "socialist self-management": ideas which were much more close to each other than the class and political foundations from which they originated. This gradual rapprochement came not only from the insight of a number of politicians and researchers but above all the changes in the technological base of production and the mutual influence of the two blocs. Of course, as I mentioned a little earlier the adaptation to the new realities was much stronger and effective in the West than in the East where it was more cosmetic and superficial. The slow rapprochement of ideological concepts was also an expression of the common crisis engulfing the world and which was a crisis of the values and ideas which had dominated over the past two centuries. If one looks at the evolution of the parties within the Socialist International, one loses all concept of the traditional left. The Italian party of the Democratic Left (the former Communist Party of Italy) declared itself in 1995 in favour of a movement towards liberalism. The Japanese Socialist Party made a similar declaration. The Spanish and French Socialists underwent a similar ideological evolution as did the British Labour Party. Similarly the wave of new programmes and declarations made by the conservative and liberal politicians calling for more social guarantees and assistance for the poor is also deceptive. It is no secret that during the last 20 or 30 years both the left and the right have begun to resemble one another. In 1995 Jacques Chirac lead his presidential campaign with promises of social involvement while at the same time the leader of the British Labour Party, Tony Blair, called for a rejection of the ideas of nationalisation. After a painful rapprochement of the basic ideas over the past 30 years and "great compromises", there is a clear need today for a new theoretical synthesis. With the large-scale economic and geopolitical changes of recent years the world has entered a new era which offers not only new ideological concepts but a new synthesis of academic thought. When I speak of synthesis, I mean the mechanical fusion of existing doctrines which has been already in progress over the past 2 or 3 decades, leading to a new basis from which new doctrines on the social and political development of the world will be born. The synthesis which will produce new political ideas does not require the rejection or the justification of either the qualities of liberal or socialist ideas. Human rights, private property, the civic society, market economics - these are the undisputed achievements of liberalism. Social harmony and justice, solidarity, the dialectics of development, the aspirations for social balance on the other hand are rooted in the different variations of Marxism. These are all forms of our modern existence which are of major significance for the future of mankind. This should also include the more specific issues of social benefits, for example. Such an ideological synthesis, however, should in no way mean the unification of socialist and liberal ideas. In my opinion it is incorrect to speak of social-liberal theory, or of some mechanical unification of parts of Marxism and other parts of liberalism. The synthesis I am speaking of does not come from the unification of political and academic views but from the objective processes which affect humanity as a whole. They relate to new realities which are formed on the basis of new social phenomena and processes. Above all, this raises to the question of the character of the present transition, the crisis of the Third Civilisation and its historical fate. There is no doubt that modern mankind is faced with an entirely new set of problems essentially different from those of the doctrines of the 19th and 20th centuries. The entire basis upon which we have to formulate our views, notions and ideas has changed. The new world economic order, global ecological problems, the intermingling of cultures, changes in the role and the position of the nation state, new social and professional groups, require another type of thinking and other types of ideological connections and systems. In what way will the globalisation of the world take place - via new forms of imperialism or via a new world order? What will this order be? Neither liberalism nor Marxism, nor any other theory can provide an exhaustive answer to these questions. Firstly, because these theories were constructed on the social problems of the 19th century and secondly, because all theories which have attempted to explain the world over the past 300 years began their life based on the culture of individual nation states and individual classes. The new theoretical synthesis of which I am speaking will have a global character. It will have be based not only on those liberal and social ideas of the 19th and 20th centuries which have stood the test of time but also on those which have come from other ideological influences. It is no longer possible to ignore the achievements of Japan, South Korea or Thailand in the organisation of labour. We cannot ignore the historical legacy and economic and philosophical achievements of these countries as well as a number of countries in Asia and Latin America. Thus, this new theoretical synthesis cannot be purely social-liberal nor purely Marxist or Euro-Atlantic. It will be global, multicultural and will appear gradually in the coming decades. Today, a number of avant-garde researchers are looking for projections of this synthesis. Some of them involuntarily fall under its influence while others have simply realised that all the traditional notions of man and society are inadequate and outdated. Any interpretation of contemporary life requires new methodology, concepts and categories. The new theoretical synthesis is far from being a formulation of a unified global theory for the future of the world and much less is it a single doctrine of a social model which will lead to the "glowing future of communism" or the even more "glowing future of the capitalist future". This is to look back to the situation of the 17th-19th century when the advent of the modern age and the renaissance of the human spirit raised about 25-30 cardinal questions and stimulated the development of social theory. At that time a number of generalisations were made, firstly at a philosophical level and then on an economic and political level which led to a principle change in the evaluation of history and world development. After Kant, Hegel, Hobbs and Smith came Marx, Sei, Mill, Bernstein, Lenin, Trotskiy, Von Mizes, Stalin and many others. Despite their arguments and mutual refutation they were all theories from the era of the Third Civilisation. They followed the laws of the emerging processes of industrialisation and the domination of the world by a small number of states. The theoretical synthesis of this period was limited to "the domestic problems of individual countries and regions" which were then related to the common geo-political regions. The problems of freedom and private property, exploitation and the rights of the proletariate, value and market price were resolved in the context of groups, national or class interests. Today such an approach would resolve nothing. For the first time it is clear that without a global view, without a global approach, the questions of the modern era will remain unanswered. The next few years will see the gradual formation of a new theoretical foundation as a result of the world entering a new period of its development. This synthesis is closely linked with the new problems which the world is facing today and attempts to find new solutions for existing and emerging problems. When I mention the global approach, I mean problems such as global warming and the condition of the oceans and the seas etc.. I also mean the way in which global life is organised, the general principles of its formation at a moment when no single country or people can be isolated from on another. The new theoretical synthesis will pose the question of the world economic order in a new way and will re-examine the concept of "private ownership" and its place in the system of human relations. It will also raise the question of an entirely new notion of the limits of the nation state and its relationship with local and global power structures and new approaches to the problem of the rights of man and the protection of his privacy. In other words, the new theoretical synthesis will at one and the same time raise new problems and new views. This will not mean severing links with the past, nor separation from the theoretical legacy of the 19th and 20th centuries. However, this will mean the renewal and restructuring of systems of academic categories and the laws which provide explanations to the further processes of human development. A number of new theories will appear out of these new theories. There will be those who will want to protect different national, regional and cultural interests. There will no doubt be those who will want to defend the interests of the new world elites and those parts of the world population which are in crisis. It would be wonderful if the new theoretical synthesis could lead to the establishment of general principles of human development while at the same time avoiding mass ideologisation. At the end of the 18th century the French bourgeois revolution thrust Europe along the path of liberalism. At the end of the 19th century free competition was replaced by militant imperialism and opposed by socialism. At the end of the 20th century we are witnessing the end of an entirely new era and the aspirations of humanity to take a decisive step in the direction of something new and better. We are living in a time of new movements towards a renewal which requires new theories. New ideas are born at times of crisis and change such as the industrial revolution in England at the beginning of the 19th century, or immediately after the First World War. Each social and world crisis stimulates the birth of new ideas. During the plague in the Middle Ages there was an increased interest in music. Perhaps this was an attempt to prove the triumph of life over death. Today at a time of cataclysm and economic chaos, of cruel pragmatism and the murderous processes of consumerism, new ideas might be the equivalent of spiritual rebirth. These ideas will not appear out of the blue and from one single source. It is important, however, that they are able to interpret the new realities, to predict the risks and the dangers with which we are faced and to continue the traditions of renewal of the human spirit. Let us then look at the dimensions of the new theoretical synthesis and apply it in an examination of the most important contemporary phenomena. Chapter Five THE FOURTH CIVILISATION 1. WHY A NEW CIVILISATION? "If we begin now, we and our children will be able to participate in the exciting reconstruction not only of out-dated politicalstructures but also of civilisation itself." Alvin Toffler T here is no doubt that the changes in Eastern Europe and the subsequent geopolitical crisis are the greatest historical events at the end of the 20th century. Some academics have even compared these events with a re-examination of the results of the Second World War. Indeed the end of the cold war overturned the results of Yalta and Potsdam. Even so, I feel that such an evaluation is insufficient. I believe that the collapse of Eastern European state socialism was an essential sign of the beginning of the end of one era and the beginning of another in the development of civilisation. Of course, these two eras cannot be defined on the basis of one particular event. These two eras are not divided by revolutions but a series of qualitative changes. Am I exaggerating? Have I succumbed to the influence of A.Toffler and his technological waves or J.Lukac who maintains that after five centuries of democratic aspirations we are experiencing the end of the modern age? I want to be careful not to allow my imagination to run wild with facts and events. I have examined them and re-examined time after time and I am convinced that the changes which we have witnessed are not local but historical. This is not only the end of the cold war and not only a technological revolution, it is something more. Could we have avoided these changes? If Gorbachev had not begun the reform processes of perestroika, the changes in the USSR might have been delayed a little longer. If Gorbachev had used a different tactic, the world might have followed the path of reasonable convergence rather then chaos and local wars. Nevertheless the replacement of the two-bloc system was inevitable and sooner or later it would have happened. The changes at the end of this century are not only industrial, political or spiritual but a combination of factors affecting not only one or another state. They are universal. Let us look are technology. A.Toffler, albeit extreme in a number of cases, is correct here. He was the first to describe the comprehensive and epoch-making consequences of the emergence of new electronic communications and bio-technology. In the same way as the industrial revolution in England in the 17th and 18th centuries led to a chain reaction throughout the entire world, today this is being done by the microchip and the robot, the satellite dish and cable television. As a consequence of computers and avant-garde communications technology not only have production processes changed radically, but also the nature of labour itself. Knowledge and information are undoubtedly substituting physical labour and revolutionising all social relations. The processes of technological renewal have lead to profound changes in the social and class structure of society. It has reduced and is continuing to reduce the number of traditional workers throughout the world. We have become witnesses to a combination of changes in the social structure not only of Europe and America but also such countries as South Korea, Thailand, Brazil, Australia and New Zealand. The changes in the social and class structure have been caused by evolutions in the type of ownership. This series of related processes: new technologies, property, social and class structures has revolutionised all social relations and has prepared the transition from the Third Civilisation to the New Era. The geo-political renewal is profound and universal. In the space of just a few years one of the two world systems has ceased to exist. The flagship of this system, the USSR has broken up, followed by the collapse of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. A series of local wars erupted. The unification of Germany put an end to the sad years of post-war reality and turned it into the largest European economy. Both Germany and Japan now find themselves in new situations with much greater opportunities than before. All the most significant political and economic alliances of the world, including the USA, Canada, the EU, China and India are faced with new realities. Perhaps some people regard these changes as a temporary phenomenon with perhaps a dulation of perhaps 2 or 3 years and that the processes ended with the collapse of COMECON and the Warsaw Pact. These are mere illusions. In 1989-1991, we experienced only the beginning of the reform processes arising from the common crisis of the two-bloc system. After the first phase of rapid reform, 1989-1991 the world will experience to a greater or lesser extent a period of global disorder, tormented "equilibrium" and only after this - the complex process of the formation of a new world order as an alternative to the two-bloc model. At the end of the 20th century humanity has not only destroyed the iron curtain but has also built new bridges in order to live on the basis of new principles and standards. At the same time, humanity has rejected Utopias and the theoretical dogma upon which it has been developing for more than a century. After the collapse of the Berlin wall, politicians, philosophers and economists found themselves in a theoretical vacuum. Concepts became confused, traditional doctrines were beginning to lose their grasp of the new realities. In some cases extreme pragmatism limited the possibilities for development allowing only momentary personal benefits and egoism. In other cases all manner of religious and semi-religious sects tried to fulfil the vacuum. We have clearly consigned to the past not only the era of the traditional industrial technologies and related lifestyles but also the two-bloc world dominated by state socialism and traditional capitalism. After technology, social class and geopolitical factors, the modern spiritual and ideological crisis is the third main reason for us to claim that at the end of the 20th century an entire civilisation is disappearing. Perhaps the most significant new reality is the globalisation of the world and the birth of an entire series of new world phenomena: from changes in the role of the national state to the internationalisation of culture, sport and daily life. The entire Third Civilisation after the 16th and 17th centuries has been a time of war and violence. The period of international integration and later globalisation in the 19th and 20th centuries took place as a result of the violent imposition of particular cultures and authority over others. For a century and a half the struggle between the classes has been the uppermost. Today, however, this is at an end. Because of the nature of arms and the senselessness of wars, violence is becoming ineffective. At the same time the imposition of specific cultures, nations, races and power over others will give way to entirely new types of relations. Many people find it hard to believe that the changes will be on such a large scale and universal. Toffler calls this fear "the shock of the future"[38] Such people should take a look at the consequences of new technologies in factories, around them, in their homes and the way in which their lives have changed as well as the information which surrounds them. These epoch-making changes which have taken place in the short space of a few years are affecting, above all, the countries who are the main proponents of progress, but with the globalisation of markets they will soon spread throughout the entire world. Thus: - The end of the era of nation states and the appearance of the global world; - The end of the two-bloc system and the end of centuries of violence, international and inter-imperialist conflicts; - The end of the domination of the major ideological and political doctrines which characterised the political and social life of the 19th and 20th centuries; - The end of the traditional industrial manufacturing processes and the advent of new technology; - The end of the class divisions of labour typical of the past 200-300 years; - The end of traditional private property and its socialisation; - The end of the domination of certain cultures and the appearance of global culture and multicultural formations All this does indeed mark the end of one and the beginning of another civilisation within human development. These processes affect the whole of human development as a consequence of the hitherto unseen levels of mutual interdependence of countries and peoples and the overall processes of forthcoming change. But why a New Civilisation? Why after the era of huge slave-owning states, medieval wars and migration, after the crisis and collapse of the modern age is the world entering a period of change in technology and manufacturing, economic and political order, culture and education. The main feature of the Third Civilisation - national self-awareness and the appearance of nation states is changing. After the three major periods in human development, a fourth period is now beginning whose characteristics are still to be revealed and examined. 2. SOME THOUGHTS ON THE TRANSITIONS OF CIVILISATIONS From an historical point of view civilisations cannot be separated by revolutionary dates and events. They tend to merge with one another as an embodiment of the character of human progress. The process is smooth rather than rapid, humanist and natural rather than subjective and coercive. T o a large extent the existing processes of human development have been interpreted as the transition from one system to another, from one social structure to another. History has been "divided" into various types of social and political structures, models and formations. William Rostow in his search for an alternative defined the various stages of economic development. Alvin Toffler in a more moderate form expressed the changes in world development on the basis of three large scale technological waves and the relevant social relations. Up to now the dominant aspect of world social and political thought has been the division of societies into separate models and systems. Capitalist, communist, fascist, socialist and other models have been the vehicles for the expression of the passions of nations, parties and politicians for a particular type of social development. To a large extent this tradition was conditioned by the imbalanced nature of world development and the fact that the great thinkers of the 18th century to the present have based their conclusions only on European culture. For a long time, world development was interpreted only on the basis of the traditions of one small part of the globe. European civilisation paid little attention to the achievements of the Asian peoples and in the rare cases when their achievements were recognised their assesments were permeated with European provincialism. The accepted feeling was that civilisation included only Europe and the European way of life. Over the last two centuries more attention has been paid to the Asian methods of manufacturing but European writers still viewed them as inferior to European methods. I am not extolling the virtues of the Chinese or the Japanese, nor am I exaggerating the achievements of the Indians, Persians or American Indians. I just consider that globalisation requires us to change our approach to research and to look at the world through the prism of universality and the mutual dependence of the various world cultures. In modern times the tradition of dividing society into separate formations and models is becoming less and less adequate. It restricts thinking and ideologises life. It presupposes the coercive implantation of ideologies and idols. Such violent forms were used to impose catholicism, Islam, capitalism and state socialism. One king, one idea, one leader, one formation, one belief - this is the beginning of coercion and spiritual debilitation. The unconditional belief in ideological systems has always evolved into a type of slavery and overt or covert violence. When in accordance with Marxist doctrine many nations were called upon to build communism, this in practice meant the coercion of millions of people and subsequent generations to follow one idea. As the rejection of the injustices of capitalism, these ideas inspired many people. Later, when these ideas became state policy and a compulsory credo, they gradually became transformed into a yoke placed upon free thought and the freedom of the individual. The Bulgarian people have a marvellous saying, "Who does not work, shall not eat!" I shall never forget at the end of the 1970's a Bulgarian communist leader paraphrasing this saying, "Who does not believe, shall not eat!" Belief and convictions had been converted into a monopoly and condition for existence. Those who advocate the system of capitalism and who consider the fall of the Eastern European regimes to be a conclusive triumph for world capitalism are in a similar situation. They are also slaves to tradition, to redundant systems and the belief that Eastern Europe has undergone a revolution from socialism to capitalism. This is just not the case. What has happened is something completely different: the releasing of the forces of the new civilisation, the new world order and new relations between nations. During periods of transition in world development only the civilisation approach can save us from new illusions, the inventions of artificial social models and their forced imposition. In practice this means a gradual and evolutionary approach to reform and the slow coalescence of the future with the present. No-one can deny the role of revolutions in history but at the same time one must take into account the sad experience of the violence and destruction which they bring with them. The more radical the revolution the greater the probability that it will lead to "restorationism" or that it will consume itself. The extremes and the violence of the French Jacobites allowed Napoleon to become Emperor, dictator and aggressor. The extremes, violence and Civil War in Russia after the October Revolution transformed Stalin into the most loved leader and teacher of the world proletariate. For a number of reasons revolutions have become anachronistic: the rising level of integration of peoples and societies at the end of the 20th century, the colossal opportunities for the ideological enslavement of people via the media and for reasons of complex technological and market relations. Rapid change, revolutionary leaps and sudden U-turns in the modern world are inevitably destructive in nature. This has happened in a number of Eastern European countries which have thrown themselves headfirst into attempts to restore capitalism and the total rejection of their past. All they succeeded in doing was to destroy half of their economies. Today we are witnessing huge levels of dynamic social change which have been hitherto unknown. Given the dynamic nature of these changes, each new forced imposition of the civilisation approach to change leads to a usurping and constriction of ideas, renders social relations inadequate and deprives emerging new generations of freedom of choice. Hitler's unified world Reich and the single world factory for workers and peasants promised by Stalin lead to the loss of enormous human potential and tens of millions of human lives. Today we are constantly barraged with ideas about eternal and unchanging models with standard views of the "glorious future", of capitalist and socialist ideals as the only salvation for the world. These ideas seek to provide coming generations with outlines and definitions of what they will have to do, what their truth will have to be and what their faith will have to be. Such advocacy of a model of development denies the right of the free creativity of coming generations. This is not only undemocratic but dangerous. It means that the new stages of human progress will have been set out beforehand and that our sons and daughters will have to follow us and mindlessly carry out the will of their forebears. I entirely support the proposal of the World Federation of the Future Studies (I believe it was proposed by B. de Juvenal) to talk not of the "future" but of "futures". No-one has the right to impose a single model for tomorrow or to delineate a categorical one-dimensional future. Each subsequent generation shall be entitled to its own present and future, changes and solutions and how to overcome the problems of its own time.[39] The downfall of standard theoretical models and social formations is also inevitable. The new era will not consist of attempts to find substitutes for socialism, capitalism and liberalism but to find humanist principles upon which the existing models, ideas and cultures can give meaning to new life styles. If we accept the opposite idea and follow the line of division of the world into social and political formations, if we define some of them as leaders and the others as insignificant, this will lead inevitably to the restoration of confrontation and will open the way to denial and the transformation of differences not into stimuli for development but into destructive forces. The advocacy of the division and models of the 19th and 20th centuries or the division of the world into capitalism and socialism, liberalism or social democracy will turn the clock back and reject the opportunity for the creation of a better world. Does this mean that development needs to its own devices like a free flowing river or a chaotic melee of currents? Such an extreme thesis is as dangerous and inadequate for the new era as the theory of previously defined social and economic formations. If the division of the world into systems and models gives rise to confrontation and kills freedom and continuity then the lack of ideology and the absence of rules will cause chaos and the widening of the gap between the rich and the poor. In both cases we will remain within the embrace of the Third Civilisation instead of creating solutions for tomorrow. Evidently, humanity cannot accept either the coercive, cabinet models of society or chaos and chaotic development. History has frequently shown that periods of great chaos sooner or later give rise to dictatorships and vice versa. The 20th century was a century of systems, of the gaps between them, of confrontation and a century of war and violence. It is time that all this was replaced with principles and laws which would embrace the universality of the world and guarantee the processes of globalisation and reject the interdependence of imperialism. We could overcome the contradiction between the globalisation of the world and the evident need to preserve the wealth of national and local cultures by combining the differences and transforming them into a mutually complementary system rather than repressing and destroying them. This would be the main distinguishing feature between the outgoing civilisation and the emergent Fourth Civilisation. Modern humanity does not need to invent artificial models and to impose them on individual countries, but it does clearly have to sustain universal principles, standards and laws which are adequate to the level of globalisation. This requires the provision of conditions within which the different cultures can combine and mutually complement each other in order to achieve the reconciliation of cultural and civilisational contradictions. My conclusion entails the rejection of the divisions of world development into models, formations and social strata etc.. The more correct principle is to replace such opposition with the acceptance of the common principles of human life and with the relevant legislation to define the standards required for all countries and peoples. International law already contains a whole series of such principles and legislation and it is gradually becoming an ineluctable part of global awareness. Human rights are one example. This includes the rights of private initiative, personal choice in life, labour and a dignified existence. Another group of principles are connected with the free exchange of goods, people, services and information and with the opening-up of countries and peoples to each other. Another entire group of principles has arisen from the common recognition of borders and their inviolability, the unification of border and customs regimes and the joint efforts in dealing with international crime. In practice this means the rapprochement of national legislations, the mutual recognition of the rights of citizens and organisations. I am not convinced that the concept of "democracy" is sufficient to explain what needs to be done. Parliamentary democracy and pluralism have existed for a number of years and they have been unable to stop the processes of violence, poverty, wars, over-armament and all the other chronic problems of the Third Civilisation. Democracy clearly is merely a starting point from which development needs to be continued. I am convinced that the new civilisation will be integrated slowly and gradually into the heart of the old one. This will take place first of all in the most developed countries and subsequently in those countries which until recently resembled the Third World. This will be not be a socialist, capitalist, liberal or conservative model but this will be a process of development from differinent starting points to common principles and trends, a development which resolves certain difference in order to give rise to others. To this end the Fourth Civilisation may base itself on universal principles and legislation and the combination of different cultures and traditions. It is unlikely that these principles will develop all of a sudden or that they will be accepted by all. Together with human rights and the laws of world economic and cultural relations there is a need for many more new solutions. The arsenal of conventional methods available to the Third Civilisation is inadequate to give a chance to the poor and we will be unable to resolve the contradictions between the rich. Moreover, we will be unable to create new, just principles of international economic and political competition. The chaos and the conflicts will continue and together with this, the danger of the restoration of confrontation and the bloc model, and consequently the artificial continuation of the Third Civilisation. There is no doubt that mankind is aware of the end of the Third Civilisation and can feel the buds of the new era. The sounds of the new millennium are coming from the signals of space ships, the countless satellite dishes, from the electronic pulses of hundreds of millions of computers and the global awareness which is opening up a path into the minds of the people of the world every minute of every day. 3. THE DISTINGUISHING FEATURES OF THE FOURTH CIVILISATION The most significant distinguishing feature of the Fourth Civilisation is linked to the processes of globalisation. For several millennia, tribes, ethnic groups, cultures and nations have reflected the specific features of their natural environment. The Fourth Civilisation not only combines these features but also unifies the diversity in order to recreate it... E ach era in human development has its own features. The civilisation approach allows for the characteristic features of the new not to be severed abruptly from the past but to be appreciated as constant and gradual factors of influence. Just as during periods of transition in the past the new appears within the old era and spreads gradually to become the predominant essence of the new civilisation. When we speak of the characteristics of the Fourth Civilisation it should be born in mind also that they are not only political, or only technological or only cultural. Changes in technology, culture and politics exert mutual influences and the influence of new civilisation frequently appears on the borders which separates them. Such is the case now at the end of the 20th century when an enormous intermingling of cultures, economics, traditions, habits and customs is taking place. This is the most important characteristic of the Fourth Civilisation. A.Toynbee is an opponent of the unity of civilisations. In his analysis of the life of the Assyrians and the Egyptians, he is undoubtedly correct. However, this cannot be said about the end of the 20th century when the mutual interdependence of nations has reached a hitherto unknown level. During the first three civilisations we observed the slow consolidation of autonomous cultural civilisations. The three great eras in human existence showed a growth in homogeneity and almost universal coordination. During the first cultural civilisations (from the 5th millennium BC to the 4th and 5th AD), the first great migration of nations (4th-9th centuries), the appearance and domination of nations and nation states (15-10th centuries A.D.) humanity has been ruled by one constant logical requirement - to live in the conditions of growing economic, cultural and political dependence. Table 2 The Distinguishing Features of the Fourth Civilisation First Civilization (5000 BC-4[th]/5[th] AD) Second Civilisation (300-1400 AD) Third Civilisation (1400-1900 AD) Fourth Civilization (2000...) Technology Agricultural instruments and irrigation. Crafts and Agriculture Industrial technology Information technology and communication Manufacturing Structures Slave ownership Colonies Feudal structures Manufactories Factories and Concerns Internally autonomated technologies and communications Major forms of ownership Slave ownership Feudal Private, Private monopolies Socialised multi-sector State forms of government Empires Migration, collapse of empires, city states Nation states Global world, local regional societies Geo-political structure Autonomous forms - Colonial system bi-polar world Polycentrism, global regulation Culture Autonomous civilisations Cultural mixing via violence National cultures Multicultural society and global culture. Table 2 shows that the common content is the result of new technology but that it also affects the manufacturing structures, the forms of ownership, political systems, culture and spiritual life. This also leads to profound changes in the methods and forms of human interaction: manufacturing forms, the means of exchange of the product of labour and the definition of human consumption. A typical feature of the Fourth Civilisation will be the trans-national corporations but not those of the 20th century. They will have a strongly decentralised and localised structure. There may also be a boom of small and medium scale local business. Another feature of the new era will be the parallel globalisation of one part of manufacturing processes and localisation of other processes. The entire analysis of the collapse of the old civilisation shows that this process will be combined with the further development of international cooperation of labour of the transnational and multi-national corporations. Moreover, there is an emerging tendency for technological monopolies to disappear and the decision making processes and profit allocation to be decentralised. If this trend develops, the interdependence of the world will not lead to a growth in international economic monopolism but to the combination of globalisation and the development of local economic structures. I believe that the main feature which has undermined the Third Civilisation and which will embody the Fourth is the growth in communication. While the First Civilisation was characterised by primitive agricultural technology, the Second Civilisation introduced a number of crafts and the Third introduced industrial technologies, the main determining feature of the new civilisation is the appearance of new forms of communication and modern information and computer technology which have revolutionised life. It is modern communications which have led to globalisation and the gradual disappearance of the geo-political and economic structures which were typical of the outgoing civilisation. The Second half of the 20th century was a time of colossal development in international transport, radio and telephone. During the last couple of decades the most powerful new technologies of the new civilisation - television and satellite communications, have begun to dominate the entire world. Today there are over 1 billion televisions and 2.5 billions radios in the world which are constantly bombarding us with information. Satellite links have connected almost all the countries and peoples of the world in a single flow of information. This phenomenon has also played an enormous role in the areas of manufacturing and culture as well as in the social and political life of almost every country in the world. There is practically no area of life in which global communications have not exerted a renewing influence. The environment in which the people of the Fourth civilisation shall live is thousands of times more satiated with information than at any time before and will lead to a qualitative change in the entire life of man, his opportunities for work and participation within the cultural process of life. There is little doubt that the Fourth Civilisation will be distinguished by a series of profound changes in the form of property ownership. The typical type of ownership in the First Civilisation was slavery. The Second Civilisation was dominated by Feudal Relations and peasant farmers tied to the land. The Third Civilisation opened the way to private ownership and monopolism and the exploitation of hired labour. The key element of the new civilisation will be cooperative socialised ownership and the integration of hundreds of millions and billions of people in common forms of ownership and the simultaneous reduction in economic monopolism. The key distinguishing feature of the Fourth Civilisation is the emerging new world political order. During the First Civilisation the most advanced ethnic groups and nations formed or established their own empires. To this extent the First Civilisation was a time of great empires, permanent wars and colonisation. Babylon and Greece, India and China, Macedonia and Rome were typical examples of this. The collapse of empires was a result of the crisis of the slave owning era. The entire Second Civilisation was the time of the great migration of peoples, the destruction of certain states and the appearance of new. During the period of the Third Civilisation, the migration slowed down and stopped and the world population became stabilised within the borders of nation states. It was at this historical moment that the spiral of history once again began to revolve demonstrating that rejection gives rise to further rejection and that epochs tend to reproduce many of their qualities time after time at higher levels. The end of the Third Civilisation is connected with a much large migration of people than has hitherto been seen. This is the result of the new forms of communication, transport, the opening up of countries and the needs of world business. This trend has led to a reduction in the role of the nation states and has made their borders more formal. After a process in which the nation states united the whole of the world population within their borders and after the stronger nation states established a world colonial system based on expansionism, the opposite process is now beginning. This process will lead to the gradual optimisation of the super powers and the creation of more and more states which will play the role of regional centres. I believe that political polycentrism will replace the bi-polar world and will give rise to the need for global and mutually agreed political and economic regulation. Finally, I believe that there is another essential feature of the new civilisation which deserves attention: the intensive cultural mixing and formation of a global culture for the first time in the history of the world. Together with this unique product of globalisation we will be obliged to accept the principle of multi-cultural societies. This will lead to end to violence and the imposition of certain cultures over others and the creation of conditions for the mutual interaction of different cultures and traditions. For the first time, today, but even more so in the future, we shall be witnesses to the appearance of cultural and economic values which will not belong to any one country. These will be phenomena which both in terms of their origin and consequences will have a global character. 4. INEVITABILITY AND WHEN IT WILL HAPPEN. I do not believe in the absolute determination of events. People have not yet come to grips with the strength of their common creation. They are still too weak in the face of nature. Nevertheless there are processes which no-one can avoid... I t is quite clear that the Fourth Civilisation will not appear overnight nor is it possible to specify a date when it will. It will appear gradually, reshaping our daily lives, political and economic systems and geopolitical and cultural processes. It would be frivolous to specify a deadline for the advent of the new era. None of the civilisations which have existed until now have appeared suddenly despite the dates and events which historians like to use for their convenience. There is also no doubt that the entire 21st century will be a time of restructuring of the economic and political structures of the Third Civilisation and of the narrowing of their influence and the increase in the influence of the new civilisation. It is true that the nature of social processes today is incomparably more dynamic than at any other time in history. One of the main reasons for this is the fact that global communications are much more rapid and widespread than ever before. This facilitates the processes of globalisation and the restructuring of the world economic and political life. At the same time these dynamic processes could be stopped in their tracks or rejected by a whole series delaying factors. I do not support the idea of a priori optimism about the future and even less so the illusion that the emerging new phenomena will impose themselves automatically without direct human involvement. The inevitability of the advent of the new civilisation comes from the complex character of its driving forces, from its incessable expansion, its avant-garde technology and the irreversible nature of the social and political reforms which began this century. Is it not already clear that the Third Civilisation is collapsing in front of our very eyes? Is it not evident that the dictatorial regimes and closed national states are vaingloriously dying? Economic prosperity is possible only when peoples are open to one another and the combined manufacturing and cultural processes in the presence of new structures of ownership. Almost the entire modern population of the world will experience several decades of transition. In the most industrialised nations this will last for 30 or 40 years. For the rest of the world about twice as long. No-one can say exactly, since the rate of change depends exclusively on the human factor and the level of our common awareness. These transitional decades will be exciting but very difficult. There will be people who will greet the changes with triumph, others will see only the difficulties and will predict the end of the world. In reality the period oftransition will be at the same time both progressive and difficult, dark and light, exciting and dramatic. It is very important whether mankind will become aware of the new direction or whether the modern intellectual elite of humanity will understand the nature of change and will unite around it to recognise its own responsibility. If humanity and the world political and intellectual elite understand the need for common activities and the coordination of efforts and if this understanding is on a global rather than provincial and national level then the laws of the Fourth Civilisation will be consolidated relatively quickly and probably by the beginning of the 21st century we will be able to speak of new geo-political and economic structures and specific dimension of the new civilisation. There is another possible direction for world development - for the changes to be disputed and halted, for us to continue to live with the mentality of violence and the instincts of national domination. In this event we will experience a multitude of conflicts, disputes and larger or smaller wars. Each collapse of geopolitical structures creates not only the powers of progress but also the conservative powers which delay and halt the processes. This is also the case with the Third Civilisation. There is no doubt that at the end of the 20th century and during the final years of the second millennium, humanity is entering a new age. The main question is whether we will be worthy of this new age - this interesting and complex time in which we are living. Chapter 6 THE PARAMETERS OF THE NEW SYNTHESIS 1. THE SOCIALISATION AND DEREGULATION OF OWNERSHIP Private ownership will be a characteristic element of the Third Civilisation. All attempts at the nationalisation of private ownership have been purely illusory. Despite this the nature of property, including private property, is changing. W hen I speak of the new synthesis as the methodology of analysis of the modern world, I mean above all the changes in the way of thinking which were typical of the 19th and 20th centuries. The new theoretical synthesis is a result of the real processes taking place in society in the 20th century, the consequence of technology and ownership. Here I support entirely the theory of Karl Marx who was the first to prove beyond a doubt the link between technology (manufacturing powers) and ownership (manufacturing relations). There is no doubt that this methodological connection is also supported by modern social phenomena and processes. Changes in technology render certain forms of management ineffective and replace certain forms of ownership with others. The mass of small scale producers of goods in the 19th century were connected with factory production. The large investments in rail transport, the production of steel and electrical energy at the beginning of the 20th century stimulated the development of trusts and large scale enterprises leading to the domination of monopolistic ownership. At the end of the 20th century new computer and communications technology gave rise to integrated and decentralised production. In this way ownership has been a driving force in the development of social systems. The authors of the theory of the management revolution believe that in the modern world the significance of ownership has declined and that authority is now only linked with direct management. In other words, it is not the class of property owners but the class of managers which governs the economic life of society. George Galbraith saw ownership only as one of the sources of power. "Ownership today," he wrote, "does not have the same universal significance as a source of power, but this does not mean that it has lost all its significance."[40] A.Toffler went further. In his book "Forecasts and preconditions"[41] he reached the conclusion that ownership is just a left-wing mania and that in the society of new technology the main thing is not property but information. I find such notions inadequate In an analogous way the ideologues of communism believed, and many of them today persist in believing, that during the processes of economic development ownership would disappear and take with it the class divisions of society. In the communist meaning of the word, ownership disappears completely because the "entire ownership of property shall become public" and the products of labour are allocated "from everyone according to his possibilities and to everyone according to his needs". I believe that there is no point in criticising a viewpoint which was never sustained by the realities of life. In place of the determining role of ownership in power Alvin Toffler substitutes the role of information. This idea indeed deserves further attention. He who considers himself the source of information is the bearer of power rather than he who is the owner of the means of production. It should, however, be noted that this approach is still concerned with ownership as something which guarantees power. Therefore, we are not speaking of the removal of ownership (property) but a change in the object of this ownership. In the First Civilisation, people owned the primitive instruments of labour, in the Second Civilisation ownership attained the level of manufactories and in the Third Civilisation ownership to the level of large scale industrial complexes.In the Fourth Civilisation, however, the question of ownership will relate to the means of information gathering and provision and the means for the conservation and transfer of this information. But is this not once again some form of ownership or some form of property? Managers of modern corporations exercise their rights of ownership upon thousands and quite frequently, hundreds of thousands of other owners. They are the combined expression of these rights not only because they own management information but also because this property by being divided between many people is integrated by the owners themselves. Consequently ownership has not disappeared but has taken on new forms which will lead to new social consequences. While people and society exist there will always be forms of property and ownership. While production and consumption exist there will always be relationships of possession, use and disposal, or in other words, ownership. It is no accident that such categories have been preserved from Roman times to our days. Ownership is and remains the foundation for the construction of social structures, including the structures of power, the structure and the nature of human society. For this reason, when we speak of the transition from one civilisation to another and a new ideological and theoretical synthesis this is also inevitable in ownership relations. Thus, just as in ancient Rome where the ownership of large numbers of slaves meant greater power and in the 19th century the ownership of machinery and factories equated to greater social authority, then today the ownership of new forms of technology guarantees new forms of authority within society itself. Therefore, when speaking of the dimensions of the new synthesis then we ought also to speak of the trends and changes in the ownership relations. Modern changes in ownership can be examined both globally and nationally, micro-economically and macro-economically. Moreover, these changes should be examined historically as trends which were born during the Third Civilisation and will come to fruition with the advent of the Fourth Civilisation. Why should the evolution of ownership give us grounds to speak of such fusions and synthesis? As early as the middle of the 19th century when private ownership was already established as the dominant force, a series of theoreticians were aware that private ownership was undergoing change. The greater the accumulated material benefits of ownership the greater the integration of large numbers of property owners which eventually lead to the concentration and centralisation of property in the hands of fewer people. This trend persisted throughout the whole of the 19th century and undoubtedly lead to the transition from the stage of free competition to the stage of monopolisation of the market and its division amongst the wealthiest owners. The conclusion which the followers of Marx arrived at in response to this issue was for the specific period logical. They concluded that monopolisation destroys free competition, mutates development and opens the way for the socialist revolution. For Lenin, Trotskiy and, in particular, for Stalin the socialisation of ownership was tantamount to nationalisation, for all private property to come under the control of the authority of the workers peasants. It is now clear that this approach led to the real desocialisation of ownership and its alienation from people. In Western Europe and the United States the ownership development trends moved in the opposite direction. Anti-monopoly legislation was introduced and the practice of stimulating small and medium scale business was developed along wtih the expansion small shareholder. I find this process a brilliant confirmation of the thesis of the dialectics of socialisation and autonomation as well as the unity of the two categories of globalisation and localisation. However, there is also another possible conclusion which is equally important - the process of socialisation can and must develop not by means of nationalisation but by means of market forces. Lenin's prediction that the over-concentration of capital would increase the contradictions of capitalism which would collapse of its own accord did not come true. The concentration and centralisation of capital have a definite limit beyond which the process of autonomation and deregulation begins anew. The whole of the history of mankind is filled with such waves of concentration and then autonomation of social structures. Let us take a look at a number of major trends in the development of property during the last three or four decades. The first of these is the change of environment in which the private property owner finds himself. At the end of the 20th century the private owner in Scandinavia, Germany, France or the USA has nothing in common with the private owner of the 19th century. A whole series of social laws oblige the private entrepreneur to observe the laws of a minimum wage, health and safety, social security, environmental requirements, training and re-training of staff etc.. Small, medium and large-scale property owners have found themselves in an entirely new market and social context. Their activities are influenced by consumer councils, quality control, trade unions, independent media etc.. The totalitarian regime persisted in maintaining a distance between "national ownership" and "the ownership of all workers and peasants" and its citizens. The industrialised nations of the West, however, shortened the distance between ownership and the mass of the people. The change in the environment, control via market forces and anti-monopoly legislation increased the unilateral nature of private and social interests. In the 1980's the owner of small shop in Bordeaux, Boston or Gutheburg was much more socialised and integrated within society than the director of a state shop in socialist Bulgaria or Czechoslovakia. The "private" owner is subject to more social rules than his counterpart in a state shop. The private owner cannot change prices at a whim, he has to observe very strict rules relating to discipline, hygiene, the police and, most importantly, competition which requires him to aspire to the highest possible levels. On the contrary, the director of a state shop is dependent only on senior management and is little interested in the consumers or local public opinion. I remember a shop in the suburb of Sofia where I lived in the 1970's and 1980's. It was dirty and inconvenient. The staff were impolite and rude. Everyone in the area was dissatisfied but they were obliged to do their shopping there. There was no other choice and little possibility of the staff being replaced. Similar examples can be given in all areas of state owned bureaucracies. The conclusion is obvious: nationalisation does not mean socialisation. Administrative and bureaucratic control is not a guarantee for citizens to assume ownership responsibility. This alienation was the specific basis for the collapse of the Eastern European totalitarian regimes but emphasises the general trend which is taking place in the West as well. This is a trend towards the socialisation of ownership or, in other words, the more complete integration of private owners into civil society. This process manifests itself via the increase in horizontal control upon free private activity: through competition; international integration of millions of owners and, what is by far and away the most important element, the direct involvement of millions and millions of citizens as owners and co-owners of the means of production. In the East powerful state ownership isolated the majority of its citizens from the ownership of the means of production, in the West, as a result of the opposite process, people felt more involved in the system and in society. Albeit to varying extents, citizens' involvement in private ownership was the most common feature of all the developed Western countries. Initially, this was a faltering process, resembling "peoples' capitalism", but with time this trend became more and more tangible and grew in strength. In 1929, there were a little over 1 million shareholders in the USA with a share value of about 1.5 billion dollars. By the mid 1980's there were 42 million individual share owners[42]. Although they mainly represent small share packages, the trend is indicative. On the other hand, through their involvement in pension funds, the citizens of the USA own a significant part of the share capital of the country. It is a relatively well-known fact that the pension funds of the USA own about 25% of the shares of all the major companies traded on the major world stock exchanges. We might take a look at the shareholders in the large industrial companies in Germany (see table 3). Although as in the USA, France or the UK, the majority of shareholders are small and their votes exert hardly any influence on company management, these figures are very indicative. They show a stable trend affecting all sides of life. Table 3 The number of individual shareholders in the ten largest German companies.[43] Branch Company No.Shareholders Share of ind.shareholders Other major owners Automobile, aviation, electronics Daimler Benz 470,000 62.7% Deutsche Bank (24.4%) The Government of Kuwait (12.9) Electronics, telecommu-nications Simenz 607,000 over 90% The Simenz family (7%) Automobiles Volkswagen none over 80% The government of Lower Saxony (16%) Energy production, Transport Bebe Holding 405,000 none Allianz Holding (12%) Energy production, petrol RWE AG 210,000 none Local governments Chemical industry BASF 370,000 over 85% Allianz Gruppe (14.4%) Chemical industry Bayer AG 295,000 over 60% Banks and Insurance companies (38%) Mettalurgy, commerce Tissen AG 240,000 64.9% Foundations and families (35%) Machine production, telecommu-nications Manesman AG 200,000 Over 95% - Energy Production Chemical Production Transport WIAG AG 100,000 45-50% Government of Bavaria, banks Although differing in some specific details, the situation in Japan is somewhat similar. The anti-monopoly measures introduced in Japan directly after the Second World War changed the economic structure of the country and deprived the most powerful Japanese families (Mizui, Mitsubishi, Sumimoto etc.) of direct control over management. Over the past 30-40 years the Japanese directors have used their joint efforts to create a number of very powerful conglomerates combining the concentration of resources with strong decentralisation in the decision-making processes. Moreover, from a formal point of view, private ownership has been separated from management via a tiered system of share-holding involvement. I would like here to mention a Japanese study carried out in the 1970's but which is still applicable today. In a classification of 189 large Japanese enterprises carried out on the basis of type of ownership, 90% of them were controlled by senior management on the basis of long-term empowerment rights entrusted to them by the shareholders (table 4). Of course, here as everywhere in the industrialised world, the "ownership" was distributed amongst hundreds of thousands and millions of people making it expedient for it to be conceded to management. I relate these trends in the development of the world in general to the changes in what we refer to as democracy and technical progress. The new trends in ownership on a world scale have been stimulated throughout the 20th century by the clear impossibility of guarantee uncontroversial development without the need for bridging the enormous gap between the poor and the rich and the exploitation trap. On the other hand, changes in ownership have been stimulated also by the need for greater efficiency and also the technological changes of the past 20-30 years. Table 4 Classification of 189 major Japanese corporations according to type of ownership Type of ownership and control Number of companies % of the total Private ownership 0 0 Ownership of the majority of the capital 3 2 Ownership by shareholders owning up to 10-50% of the capital 17 8 Control by senior management 169 90 Total 189 100 Source: T.Kono. Strategy and Structure of Japanese Enterprises McMillan, 1987, p.51. On the basis of an analysis of the experience of the most developed 7 or 8 countries the following generalisations can be made: First. The world is undergoing a slow but steady process of socialisation of private ownership or the transition of private ownership into a new social framework as a result of the development of labour legislation, competition, market structures, financial capital and the intermixing of millions of enterprises and their finances. To this extent the socialisation of ownership is inseparable from the progress and the development of history in general. Second. If private ownership is subjected to constant socialisation this is due to the involvement of a growing number of people as owners and co-owners of the means of production. Through the involvement of a growing number of shareholders the ownership of the large economic structures becomes diffused and the significance of the large family properties becomes reduced. Third. The management of ownership is subjected simultaneously to two trends - socialisation or the combination of millions of owners in common systems (or common regulations) and deregulation caused by the impossibility of large socialised ownership to be centrally managed. Ownership is divided between more and more people in the world. It is managed in a more decentralised manner but it is also socialised through the voluntary combination of millions of individual properties. Fourth. The technological and social processes came into conflict with the alienated form of ownership which existed in the Eastern European countries until 1989. Inequality amongst the people living in the conditions of totalitarian socialism led not only to a lack of stability and social guarantees but also to alienation from authority and ownership. From a purely formal point of view, all the citizens of these countries were the owners of the means of production but in reality ownership was exercised by a minority. Fifth. The opening up of the world and globalisation have provided the stimulus to international forms of ownership, to the intermixing of more and more private, share-holding and mixed forms of capital. These five irreversible trends are a direct expression of what I would call a new synthesis. Private ownership in the manner in which the classic proponents of political economics of the 19[th] century portrayed it is dead. Social ownership or the "ownership of the people" as advocated by Lenin, Stalin and Brezhnev no longer exists. It is practically absurd to make contrasts between social systems divided on the basis of private versus socialised ownership. Other forms of ownership which typify the genesis of the Fourth Civilisation are coming onto the agenda. It is easiest to refer to this type of ownership as "mixed". When in the 1950's and 1960's P.Samuelson first used this term, it appeared at the time to be correct. At that time the level of socialisation and autonomisation of ownership was at such a level that the processes of "mixing" had indeed begun. However, this was rather a fusion of state and private property (Western Europe and Japan) and the large family enterprises and millions of private owners in the USA. In the 1970's, 1980's and 1990's the process of deregulation and socialisation of ownership entered a new phase caused by the acceleration of globalisation, the appearance of new integrating technologies and the related social processes. For this reason, to continue to use the intermediate term "mixed ownership", in my opinion is inappropriate. There is little doubt that today and in coming decades we shall have many, many types of "mixed ownership". Mixed ownership is a recurrent theme during the entire duration of the transition from the Third to the Fourth Civilisation. Nevertheless it is a remnant of the past, a combination of the two predominant forms of ownership which existed in the 19th and 20th centuries. A typical feature of the Third Civilisation was private individual ownership. For the duration of the transition between the Third and Fourth Civilisations, the typical features will be the differing forms of mixed ownership. A typical feature of the Fourth Civilisation will be integrated (socialised) and multi-sector ownership. By the term "integrated ownership" I do not mean corporate ownership but the completion of the processes of corporatisation. Integrated ownership is maximally individualised and maximally socialised ownership. Individualised - with individualised rights (decision making, control, profit sharing). Socialised - as a system of juridical, economic, social and moral standards which each owner is obliged to observe and which places individual, group, national and global interests in a common dimension. Today the thousands of computerised companies involved in management, software, legal services provide a prototype for the future. Their success is due to the horizontal structures of management, share-holding involvement in ownership, mutuality and the realisation of a commonality of interests. These have been the dominant trends within the majority of modern companies since the 1980's. They no longer have a single distinct owner as a result of the appearance of a multitude of new industrial and institutional ownerships in the industrial and financial corporations. Modern corporations, however, are not only losing their single family owner, they are at the same time restoring many of the rights of the professional shareholders and, most significantly, control over management and allocation of profit. To give an illustration of this I will use the well structured approach of the American researcher D.Margota (table 5). While during the period from the 1930's to the 1980's responsibility (management) and control gradually passed into the hands of the managers, after the 1980's the predominant trend has been for control to pass into the hands of the shareholders. Computer technology and modern management schemes have allowed for these developments. In general terms, modern corporations have been obliged constantly to increase their capital. One result of this has been the closure and disintegration of family ownership, the decentralisation of management and control and the impositon of more and more rules from "without". In the 1930's - 1980's we underwent a management revolution. After the 1980's the revolution developed into two parallel revolutions - globalisation and the blue collar revolution. The role of the highly skilled worker has become more prevalent in ownership and control and will continue to increase in significance in the coming decades. Table 5 The development of control and responsibility in modern corporations. Corporations pre 1930 Corporations 1930-1980 Corporations post 1980 Owner/Manager Ownership, control, responsibility, (management) - - Managers (non-owners) - Control Responsibility (management) Responsibility (management) Owners of shares, employed in corporations Ownership Ownership Ownership, control Individual external owners Ownership Ownership Ownership Source: D. Margotta, The Separation of Ownership and Responsibility in the Modern Corporation. Business Horizons, Jan-Feb, 1989 What is happening in the millions of small and medium juridically independent companies? In Western Europe, Japan and the USA they have been appearing as spin-offs from the larger companies or entering into the periphery of large-scale production processes within the distribution, commercial or financial systems. The ideal private owner died at some time between 1950 and 1970. The era of the old Grandee or other Balsacian hero who spent every evening counted out his profits has passed. The time of the standardised and integrated owner has come. He buys his franchise from "Pizza Hut" or makes plastic mouldings for "General Motors" or sells pears to "Kaufman". Everything and everyone is already involved in integrated and intermixed forms of ownership. All are already socialised to some extent. If anyone remains unintegrated, he will either die or become a member of the group of social outsiders who are of use to no-one. I have been speaking here of the determining trends which have come to us from the industrialised nations and about what drives the transition and defines tomorrow. Why do I believe that despite the enormous differences in the economic levels of different countries these trends will impose themselves? The reason is that these are trends which have appeared as a result of modern technology, from the character of globalisation and which have been valid for four fifths of world manufacturing history. Of course, different societies will approach the common features of the Fourth Civilisation gradually from different starting points and on different paths. There is no doubt, however, about their common fate. This is the fate of progress... 2. POST-CAPITALISM In November 1989 when the Berlin Wall came down everyone proclaimed the victory of capitalism. In actual fact, capitalism was itself beginning to draw its last breath - slowly and quietly dying like a victorious warrior. T here are no frozen social systems, or eternal mechanisms of government. The most dynamic element is technology and the least dynamic - economic relations. The most lasting and conservative elements are the political systems. However, there is no such thing as an eternal system. Capitalism passed through an early feudal stage, reached its height when free competition dynamised the whole system and then fell victim to the struggles between empires, two world wars and hundreds of colonial wars. Daniel Bell quotes a quite remarkable thought by the Arab philosopher Ibn Haldun, "Societies pass through specific phases whose transformations are a symptom of their own fall[44]. This is true of every society. They develop, they achieve a certain level of progress and reach their own heights of development. Then all . societies destroy themselves. This does not always happen through revolutions, turbulence and violence but through reforms and reformation of the roots and culture of life. Capitalism in Western Europe and North America was different from capitalism in Japan and probably more distinct from the forms of capitalism in Latin America. Today there are similar processes taking place everywhere. They are perhaps more rapid and remarkable in the USA, Europe and Japan, more anaemic in Brazil and Argentina and more accelerated in South Korea etc.. What were the typical characteristics of capitalism? In the 19th century and up until to the middle of the 20th century they were the division of society into the bourgeoisie and proletariate: the growing differentiation between the poor and the rich; the domination of economic and political life by a group of monopolists and nationalism and colonialism aimed at the economic and political division of the world. There are no doubt many other features of capitalism which could be added. However, these are the main features of what remains of classical capitalism. The transformations of ownership mentioned above demonstrate clearly that the bourgeoisie which existed 40-50 or even 100 years ago practically no longer exists. It is not a homogenous class with a dominant place in society or a single, unified attitude to the means of production, as Lenin might have called it. The class of the rich has not disappeared in the USA, Japan or in Germany. However, it is different in essence and character. Most importantly, the traditional owners of the means of production are of much less significance and have been replaced by managers, associated groups of small and medium owners, media magnates, the stars of show business and innovators. The division, diffusion and socialisation of ownership has lead to the decay of the bourgeoisie. It has disintegrated into different groups sometimes with conflicting interests. Significantly, the origin of ownership is no longer based solely on inheritance. Indeed, the majority of the wealthiest people mentioned in "Forbes" have not inherited their wealth but have accumulated it as a result of their own enterprise. The most famous example of this is Bill Gates, the creator and owner of MicroSoft. The old bourgeoisie has its successors in the same way as the feudal aristocracy has its own exotic representatives. None of these, however, fall within these categories. One group of the former bourgeoisie which has not managed to adapt to the requirements of modern competition has begun to resemble the middle class in terms of income and way of life. There have been more serious changes in what Marx and Engels referred to in the 19th century as the "proletariate". In the 1930's and 1940's the proletariate in the USA and Europe was still an homogenous group with a clear place in society. Today, this class and even such a social group does not exist. Technological progress has led to the disappearance of the proletariate and divided it into different social groups. A large number of former proletarians are now involved in the growing services sector. Today, the number of traditional factory workers has declined to 20-25% of the active population in the majority of the industrialised countries. The workers themselves are more diversified and many of them are now employed in intellectual rather than physical labour. "Intellectual workers and those employed in the services sector", wrote P.Drucker with justification, "are not classes in the traditional meaning of the word".[45] Neither are they the proletariate in the Marxist meaning of the word. It is no accident that the movements of employees and trade unions in the most developed industrialised countries during the last 15-20 years have reduced significantly. In the most developed 24 countries of the world there is a large group of citizens, in some cases more than 50-60% of the population with relatively stable middle-incomes which permit a high standard of living. On the other hand the ratio in income between the richest and the poorest has begun gradually to reduce. 60 or 70 years ago the incomes of the richest families were ten or more, even hundred time greater than the average incomes of the poor. According to the statistics of the World Bank at the end of the 1980's, the ratio of income between the richest and the poorest 20% of the population was as follows: USA 7.5; Japan 4.3; Germany 5.0; Belgium 4.6; France 7.7 and Italy 7.1. The number of the extremely wealthy and the extremely poor has begun to reduce significantly. There have been changes in the social conditions of the unemployed. Social benefits for pensioners and young people in Austria, for example, have reached levels unheard of in Eastern Europe. I am far from convinced that the developed nations of the West and Japan have resolved all their social problems or that they have created an harmonious society. I can, however, state clearly that the foundations of capitalism have been destroyed and that the Western European countries have outgrown capitalism. They are now in the process of transition to something different, something new and clearly demonstrated by the evolution of the market and market relations. The liberal market of the 19th and 20th centuries was the basis of mature capitalism. Its zenith was symbolised by the boom of electricity, internal combustion engines and the charm of Paris by night. The main feature of the market was the free exchange of goods, the formation of market values and, consequently, the stimulation of one or other type of production. Monopolisation of production has modified the basic categories of the market but has not abolished its role as the main regulator of economic life. The major question is the development of the market after the boom of small and medium scale business, demonoplisation and the computer revolution. I believe that we are at the beginning of a process of transition from post-monopolistic market to a situation of horizontal market relations. I believe that J. K. Galbraith was the first to turn his attention to such an idea. Many people who clearly seem to be used to the concept of the market find it difficult to believe that this great invention of the Third Civilisation might be replaced by something else. Indeed, the market will not be replaced by any form of ready-made committee-designed model. The market will simply be revolutionised by new technology and the replacement of traditional supply and demand by the super-organised planning of consumption, its stimulation and satisfaction with a perfect system of organised manufacturing. In the developed countries entire sectors of the markets are already being traded as futures; stock exchanges react to the smallest of changes, managers act within the tightest of limits and if they get it wrong they simply leave the game. This is true of the automobile and plane building industries, space technology, computers and practically types of high technology as well as many other sectors. Credit cards, smart cards, cash dispensing machines and all methods of electronic payment have been extremely influential on the transformation of the market. They may by some be considered as merely new forms of market mechanisms. However, in my opinion these technological innovations have outlined a trend towards a transition from the basic market mechanisms to principally new social relations and a new state of the market. For the moment these are still only trends in the most developed parts of the world. However, the improvement in efficiency which they offer will lead to their inevitable expansion to other parts of the world in the same way as electricity or the radio and television. New computers and communication technologies have a multiplying effect on all countries and markets. They are the basis of the fundamental changes in the way in which business in done. This has led to a change in the nature of supply and demand and the transition from the "trade in goods" to the "trade in ideas". It will not be too far into the future when new computer networks will allow consumers to place their orders even before a particular article is produced, at the stage of its inception and design. Consumers will become the managers of production. They will reject what they consider unnecessary and predetermine the type, quantity and quality of goods. In California there is already a computer trade network where consumers can order goods in this way.The stage of exchange will become strongly modified and the market will become a bridge between demand and manufacture. At the beginning of the 1950's Joseph Stalin in one his most "remarkable" works[46] predicted the disappearance of the relationship between goods and money. His approach of destroying money through total nationalisation inflicted heavy damage to many Eastern European nations and Asian peoples. By destroying the market and money through bureaucracy, Stalin and his followers also destroyed freedom and man himself. In 1986 in one of my early works I wrote that "money-goods relations will disappear only when they reach the peak of their development, when the market itself reaches a stage of perfection and not by moving against the current of development." I believe that a similar process is taking place today. With our new computer networks we now have the exceptional opportunity of changing the nature of exchange and removing inequality and monopolistic profits. I do not doubt that the new computer networks (such as the Internet) will create a revolution in the market and will transform us into an amazingly well organised environment for the exchange of needs, ideas, opportunities and goods. Such possibilities are being predicted for the financial markets and relations between banks and between banks and their customers. At the beginning of 1996 the founder of MicroSoft, Bill Gates outlined in one of his articles some exciting new ideas which would revolutionise banking. No-one, not the bankers or the corporations or small and medium business, not even show business or the individual can ignore these changes. What is happening to the capitalist society? Gradually, slowly, it is become uprooted and changing its basic nature. P.Drucker came to the conclusion that capitalist society is being re-born into a society of knowledge and a society of organisations. I agree entirely with his use of the term "the post-capitalist society".[47] The question whether the most developed societies in Europe, America and Japan have turned into societies of organisations is clearly much more complex. Undoubtedly the process of globalisation which is taking place at the moment via the transnational corporations (organisations) limits the nation state while increasing their own role. However, I feel that this is an inadequate description of post-capitalist societies under change. I would make the following generalisation: there four major processes which have changed and will further change the nature of capitalist societies. The first of them is the socialisation and re-distribution of ownership. The second is the profound nature of the changes in the social and class structures, the disappearance of traditional classes and the appearance of new social strata. The third is the integration of the market economy and the replacement of the typical capitalist market with a highly organised system of exchange and distribution of goods. The fourth is the limitation of the role of the nation state and the globalisation and growth in the role of organisations (manufacturing and non-manufacturing). All these processes have progressed so far at the end of the 20th century that it is possible already to speak of the evolutionary renaissance of the capitalist society and the existence of post-capitalist relations in all the industrialised countries (with the exception of the ex-communist). Of course, there are slight structural exceptions, e.g. the management and structural models of the USA and Japan. I also accept the distinguishing features of the American and the Rhine model (Germany, France, Austria etc.). There is, however, no doubt that all four processes are taking place in the industrialised countries and a consequence of the global market is that the differences between them are constantly reducing. They will not disappear completely, in fact some of them may produce other differences. Nevertheless, the common movement towards a new civilisation will continue. Capitalism is indeed dying. Proudly and quietly, like a victorious warrior in a pyrric victory. 3. POST-COMMUNISM The post-communist countries had three possible directions of development: backwards to the ashen illusions of neo-communism; forwards to primitive capitalism; or towards the challenges of the Fourth Civilisation. D uring the first years after the collapse of the Eastern European totalitarian regimes, certain more avid supporters of the former communist parties began to state publicly their beliefs that communist ideology after all was not such a bad thing and that in reality communism had not really been implemented properly. The systems which had existed in Russia and the other smaller Eastern European countries had been a mutated form of socialist ideas. They developed their beliefs that at some time in the future communism might reappear. These are not only the ideas of demagogues, but hypocrites. It is true that the society which existed in Eastern Europe was, according to official doctrines, not "communist" but "socialist", and that this was the "first stage of communism", the "first, lowest stage of communism". All of us who lived at that time in Eastern Europe had to believe that sooner or later the "glorious future" would arrive. I mention this at the beginning since I have met critics who categorically reject the term "post-communism". Nevertheless, the term post-communist means that communism has been overcome and that it will never return. It is not only a rejection of a doctrine but also a specific way of thinking. The post-communist period for the whole of Eastern Europe, Russia and to a large extent such countries as China and Cuba is indeed unique. Not to understand this uniqueness is one of the greatest errors of the 20th century which has caused and will continue to cause much damage to the Eastern European nations. When I speak of uniqueness, I mean that at the end of the 1980's the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Russia possessed an integrated material and technological infrastructure. At that time the GDP per head of population in Eastern Europe was between 2 and 6 thousand dollars, i.e. at the level of the medium developed countries. At the time of the changes these countries had a well-educated population, highly developed culture and significant social benefits. Should the post-communist countries have accepted the ideology and forms of development more typical of primitive capitalism? Everything which I have said until now is a clear indication that the global changes at the end of the 20th century have a common, civilising approach not merely a change of regime in Eastern Europe. There were two main choices for the post-communist countries after the failure of perestroika: either to reject their past and begin afresh with the development of capitalism or to join the common movement towards a new civilisation. The first of these paths was more attractive in terms of ideology but much more short-sighted. The second meant to accept the forms of development of post-capitalism and on this basis to begin the conscious reconstruction of the former socialist societies. In practice the revolutionaries of 1989 did not stop to ponder this dilemma. The collapse of perestroika threw the Eastern European countries into political battles, conflicts and the collapse not only of the totalitarian structures but also of the major management, industrial and social mechanisms. This collapse in practice led to the universal predomination of emotions and political conflicts over rational and sensible economic changes. In the first few months after the fall of the Berlin wall, in Prague, Sofia and in Bucharest nothing was sacred. Their entire past history was rejected - decades during which several hundred million people had lived were rejected. The old nomenclature was purged in the most impulsive manner and replaced by new, inexperienced leaders. It took some time for emotions to settle and for the stress of the "gentle revolutions" to subside. On the whole 1989--1991 in Eastern Europe was the beginning of an abrupt, impulsive process of capital accumulation. For a certain period a number of extreme anti-communist movements gained popularity. Some wanted revenge, other wanted radical revolutionary reforms. The movements copied to greater or lesser extents the solutions and models of the beginning of capitalist development. As a result, all the Eastern European countries found themselves facing similar phenomena - falling production, the destruction of regional economic links, widespread crime and corruption and the indiscriminate re-distribution of capital. These phenomena were particularly marked in Russia, Bulgaria, Albania and to a certain extent in Rumania. The countries of the Visegrad group and Slovenia were less affected. The greatest contradiction of the "liberal" anti-communist model was the re-distribution of ownership. For half a century (in Russia 70 years) the citizens of Eastern Europe had lived in conditions of uniformity and the domination of egalitarian ideas. To a large extent the gentle revolutions of the end of the 1980's were based economically on the fact that the communist elite had accrued vast privileges for themselves and had become transformed into an economically dominant social stratum. This was the pre-dominant propaganda which was used in the majority of the Eastern European countries in 1989-1990. For the same reasons the populations of these countries did not accept the rapid disintegration of society into rich and poor and the usurping of former "socialist" property by a small group of the nouveaux riches. Legislation guaranteeing the restitution of property in Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and elsewhere created in many people a sense of revenge. Even after the processes of mass privatisation in the Czech Republic and Russia the majority of the population felt deceived and did not receive any direct economic dividends from the economic changes. It was not so much the absolute scale of poverty but the nature of social differentiation and the collapse of social guarantees which led to a tangible level of dissatisfaction amongst the populations and a move towards the left. After the return to power of the former communist parties in Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Bulgaria, however, the processes of social division continued. The new capital accumulated at the beginning of the 1990's attempted to play the leading role in the processes of privatisation and to accrue more and more wealth. Mass privatisation, most significantly in Russia, led to the concentration of privatisation vouchers in the hands of a small group of extremely wealthy owners who acquired the ownership of enormous production potential for a fraction of its real value. To a lesser extent the same thing happened in Czechoslovakia and a similar picture of social division can be expected in Bulgaria after mass privatisation. The post-communist countries are experiencing a common crisis of identity and profound political contradictions. If they lead to a stratification of society into a small group of wealthy people (5-7%) and a large group of people deprived of any ownership of the means of production, this will be a backwards step. In reality these countries will return to a state from which the industrialised countries have already progressed and to outdated social models. If the division of ownership in Eastern Europe creates class divisions then it is extremely possible for this to create a chain reaction with exceptionally adverse consequences for the process of reform and the transition to a Fourth Civilisation. Clearly the collapse of the Eastern European societies into classes will not send them into the New Civilisation but will hold them back in the grips of the old. The peoples of these countries will have to experience its contradictions and to struggle with the problems which the Western countries have already overcome. This will cause difficulties for the socialisation of ownership and will render the reconstruction of the market impossible leading to a revival of bureaucracy and the bureaucratic state. We should not be surprised that such a transition will not only return the former communist parties to power but also the "strong hand" governments of corrupt politicians and combinations of the two. This will be extremely unfavourable for the development of the Eastern European states and at the same time it will be a retarding factor for the whole of world development, especially if such processes are allowed to take place in Russia, China and other larger countries. The question arises whether it is at all possible for the former totalitarian states to make the transition directly to the Fourth Civilisation. My response is entirely positive. The relatively good material infrastructure of the Eastern European countries, the high level of education and culture of the population as well as the experience of communism as one type of social development are all factors which create a basis for the transition to new types of relations without passing through the phase of initial capital accumulation. The technology of such a transition has been inadequately researched but it is absolutely applicable on the basis ofthe results of the period between 1990-1995. Above all, in order to accomplish such a process of development and to approach the level of the industrialised countries and the trends of the Fourth Civilisation it will be necessary to achieve some sort of minimal political consensus. If confrontations and instability continue, and if behind the facade of the "political struggle" corruption and crime is allowed to flourish, the post-communist countries will regress at least 30-50 years into the past. Only common will and the consolidation of society will redirect their material and cultural heritage towards the framework of the emerging new civilisation. The second great problem is the redistribution of ownership. As I have already mentioned, this process has begun with restitution, or the return of property nationalised at the end of the 1940's. This process, if it takes place within real limits, will throw the post-communist states into serious conflicts which are unnecessary at the end of the 20th century. The example of the Bulgaria is particularly indicative. However, even if privatisation is carried out without restitution, as in Russia and if it is carried out with the out-dated methods of the time of "wild capitalism", this will not lead to any positive results. The main aim of privatisation is to dynamise the post-communist societies, to form civil societies and for the majority of the citizens to receive some form of ownership of the means of production. A society of voluntarily associated owners is the alternative to totalitarianism, the class society and primitive capitalism. In order to achieve this a number of specialised privatisation methods will be required. The most successful experience has been demonstrated in the Czech Republic and Slovenia and, albeit under different conditions, in the former East Germany. The main aim of these methods in my opinion should be: firstly to demonopolise the large-scale enterprises inherited from totalitarian times, to preserve those with the greatest potential and to transform them into trans-national corporations; secondly, a reliable stock exchange system should be developed wherein a significant part of these enterprises can be sold by means of mass privatisation, market methods and the substitution of debt against ownership; thirdly, the necessary legislative framework needs to be developed to allow for privatisation by management teams as well as the possibility for as many small and medium enterprises as possible to be established for the use and gradual purchase by citizens; fourthly, the possibility for workers' collectives to receive without payment ownership in the enterprises in which they are employed. The eventual aim of such policies will be for the majority of the population within 5-10 years to integrated within the structures of ownership in the aims of establishing the economic basis for a civil society. The third major problem of the post-communist countries will be their integration within the world economy. As can be seen from table 6, between 1985-1993 and 1989-1993 five Eastern European states which were analysed achieved an increase in their trade with the EU. Although slowly, the market share of these countries in the European market began to increase. Nevertheless the processes of rapprochement analysed using the Maastricht criteria are extremely contradictory and slow (table 7). This shows that on the whole the process of the integration of the Eastern European countries into the EU will be delayed. The initial predictions of 10-15 years to integration have been revised to the years 2005-2010 at the earliest. Table 6 Trade in industrial goods between the EU and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. (millions of ECU at current prices, market share in % of the entire trade of the EU with other countries). CEE Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Hungary Poland Rumania Volume Market share Volume Market share Volume Market share Volume Market share Volume Market share Volume Market share Import EU 1980 1985 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993* 5146 7532 8222 9303 10525 13598 16736 12674 3,56 3,23 2,80 2,76 3,06 3,63 4,43 4,55 242 362 350 398 441 600 762 572 0,17 0,16 0,12 0,12 0,13 0,16 0,20 0,21 1139 1875 1950 2228 2401 3678 5102 3840 0,79 0,80 0,66 0,66 0,70 0,98 1,35 1,38 1131 1616 1816 2182 2547 3138 3554 2468 0,78 0,69 0,62 0,65 0,74 0,84 0,94 0,89 1709 2149 2552 2842 3962 4973 5984 4662 1,18 0,92 0,87 0,85 1,15 1,33 1,58 1,67 924 1530 1555 1654 1174 1209 1334 1132 0,64 0,66 0,53 0,49 0,34 0,32 0,35 0,41 Export EU 1980 1985 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993** 6808 8648 8412 10079 10522 15213 18875 15914 3,53 2,63 2,58 2,73 2,84 3,99 4,79 5,27 681 1378 1300 1323 818 895 977 777 0,35 0,42 0,40 0,36 0,22 0,24 0,25 0,26 1126 1730 1969 2142 2343 3428 5628 4582 0,58 0,53 0,60 0,58 0,63 0,90 1,43 1,52 1424 2254 2123 2673 2624 3136 3745 3173 0,74 0,69 0,65 0,72 0,71 0,82 0,95 1,05 2206 2324 2460 3299 3717 6663 6967 6051 1,14 0,71 0,75 0,89 1,00 1,75 1,77 2,00 1371 963 559 642 1021 1091 1557 1332 0,71 0,29 0,17 0,17 0,28 0,29 0,40 0,44 Eurostat and European Commission Services (see Transforming Economies and European Integration, UK, 1995, p. 63). * January--September ** January--September Table 7 Do the countries of Central and Eastern Europe fulfil the criteria for membership of the EU as set out in Maastricht? Criteria Bulgari Czech Rep. Hungary Poland Rumania Slovakia Complete convertibility Strong Central Bank Low inflation Low public debt Low budget deficit Low interest rate Convertible currency no yes no no no no no no yes no yes yes no yes no yes no no no no no no yes no no no no no no yes no yes no no no no yes no yes no no no National sources; OECD -- estimates and projections, Qvigstad, 1992; (see Transforming Economies and European Integration, UK, 1995, p. 39). The fourth problem is the integration of the technology of the Fourth Civilisation and the reconstruction of their own industries. The opening-up of the markets of the Eastern European countries and the invasion of competitors from all four corners of the world has created a danger that some of the more progressive sectors of the economy will collapse. In certain countries, Bulgaria for example, there is evidence of a process of detechnologisation or the reduction of high-technology production in comparison with the 1980's. The high level of outdated and worn-out industrial machinery in Slovakia and Bulgaria has delayed progress. This criterion is proof of how important it is to have a correct policy for foreign investment and skilfully to combine the pre--1989 achievements with world markets and technological structures. The fifth problem is the development of a market infrastructure adequate for the New Civilisation. To this extent the countries of the Visegrad group and Slovenia are undoubtedly in a position of advantage in comparison with the other former socialist countries. There is no doubt that after the fall of the Berlin Wall the Eastern European peoples began a process of rapprochement and integration with the world economy. The universal processes of globalisation and the spirit of the Fourth Civilisation have not left the post-communist countries untouched. The great choice with which they were faced between 1989 and 1990 was totalitarianism or democracy and a market economy. The great choice between 1993-6 and the end of the century will be primitive capitalism or new civilisation. An analysis of the economic and political situation shows that the former members of COMECON are no longer an homogenous regional group. This is due not only to the collapse of the common Eastern European market but also to the different policies which the different governments have been pursuing. In the mid-1990's the division between Central and Eastern Europe was an artificially imposed concept. Now, however, it seems more realistic. The Central European countries, sometimes referred to as the Visegrad Group and Slovenia, are integrating significantly more rapidly than the remaining countries and economically are becoming quite distinct. The second group has a slightly different fate - the three small former Baltic republics of the USSR who are seeking a channel into Europe by means of developing closer ties with the Scandinavian countries, Germany and the U.K. Finally, there is the third group of the Balkan states - Bulgaria, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia where internal disputes and conflicts have delayed their development significantly. The division of the former members of COMECON into separate regional groups could lead to delays in their integration the European Union and increase in the internal disputes. After the post-communist countries, Russia and China are of particular significance. With their size and resources they have an independent and significant geo-political role. In Russia the problems of transition are many time more complex than those of the smaller countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Political stability, the expansion of the market infrastructure and the redistribution of ownership are, in my opinion, the strategic problems of this great power. It is very likely that as we approach the beginning of the Fourth Civilisation Russia will for a long time remain in the orbit of state, corporative capitalism. Arguments in support of this are the concentration of privatised giant state industry in the hands of a very small group of the population and the close connections between this group and the state bureaucracy. China without any doubt will increase its role in the world which in its turn will increase its political stability and the continued awesome development of its massive economy. A open question for China will be the choice between a single party system and political pluralism with the preservation of the stability and integrity of the country. As can be seen, the post-communist countries are divided not by criteria of democracy-communism but by types of democracy and their closeness to the Fourth Civilisation. Some of them will become integrated quite quickly into the directions of progress, others will turn back to the era of corporate, semi-state capitalism. There is no doubt that the transition will be complex and drawn-out and will take place in stages and with the deepening differentiation between the Eastern European countries. The direction of this transition in the long-run will lead to integration with the economic and political systems of the most developed countries in the world. 4. THE APPROACH AND THE END OF THE "THIRD WORLD" Integration leads either to imperialist violence or the rapprochement of social systems and the improved conditions of life. U ntil the end of the 1980's politicians and academics divided the world into three parts: capitalist, socialist and the Third World - the world of the economically backwards countries. Ideologues on the two sides of the Berlin Wall divided the Third World into those countries with capitalist systems and those with socialist orientation. Today, this "structure" has entirely lost any meaning. The socialist world has evaporated and capitalism has become transformed into something else. The "Third World" has changed and no longer represents a community of countries with similar charasteristics. Until 6 or 7 years ago the Third World was defined as something unspecific which would eventually merge with the first or the second. Today, however, one has to use different criteria in evaluating any particular country. In my opinion these criteria are based on the outlines of the new, Fourth Civilisation, from those processes and phenomena which symbolise the leading trends of modern progress. I would place the accent on three of them in particular: 1. the share of high-technology production and activities within the GDP; 2. the structure of ownership and social groups;3. the level of socialisation of ownership and the integration of the market;4. the openness of countries and the stability of their national manufacturing and culture; 5. the GDP per head of population. By using these criteria quantitively and qualitively we can propose another global structure to the countries of the world. The first group is of those countries which are symbols of human progress and which are in transition from the Third Civilisation and to a large extent are the basis for the Fourth Civilisation. For them the advent of the new civilisation is already irreversible. I would include here the members of the European group with the exception of Greece and Portugal, the USA and Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the Czech Republic, Switzerland, Iceland, Malta and a number of other states. The second group is of those countries which on the basis of certain factors are on the edge of the Fourth Civilisation or remain within the traditions of the 20th century. They are on the threshold of the new civilisation but are essentially at a different level of progress from those countries within the first group. I could include here the new Asian Dragons - Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, South Korea, Taiwan as well as countries like Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Costa Rica, Greece, Portugal and Cyprus. The third group would include such countries which have an industrial or semi-industrial structure and state capitalist or some form of oligarchical or monarchist social structure.: Russia, China, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the UAE, Pakistan, the majority of Latin American countries, Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, the Philippines, South Africa, Indonesia, Mexico and a number of others. These countries have not yet achieved political stability and economic balance. The fourth and last group includes countries whose manufacturing and social relations are partially within the third and partially within earlier structures of civlisation. These are the majority of the African, some Asian nations and a number of countries of the Near East. These countries are sometimes referred to as the "forgotten" nations and need special help and programmes to link them to the rest of the world and to overcome problems of poverty and illness. Is it possible to speak of a common transition of civilisation when no more than one fifth of the world's population lives in conditions similar to those which we refer to as the transition to the Fourth Civilisation and more than one third in conditions typical of the transition from the Second to the Third? The basis for a positive answer to this question is integration, the speed at which countries are coming together in the conditions of globalisation. As a consequence of the openness of the large majority of countries and the expansion of the world market the transfer of new technologies and the management model is much easier and faster than at any other time in the history of mankind. The example with the countries of South East Asia shows that given a suitable political climate countries can penetrate world markets and achieve significant results. The rate of development in South Korea over the past 30 years has allowed it to overtake many of the Eastern European countries which in the first half of the 1960's were significantly more advanced.[48] The example of the Asian Dragons will be followed by a number of individual states in Northern Africa and the Near East. Thus we can speak of the collapse and the restructuring of the countries of the "Third World". The Eastern Europeans have great potential. Other countries such as Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Chile and South Africa also have strong possibilities. They and a dozen or so smaller countries will gradually begin to approach the highly developed countries - the leading figures in the new civilisation. For more than half a century, many of the leaders of the Third World have been looking for their own direction in the struggle to combat poverty and make progress. Ghandi and Neru in India, Mao and Dun Saopin in China, Castro in Cuba, Sengor, Tutu and Kenyatta in Africa have conducted their own experiments with varying degrees of success. The main question for all the poorly developed nations is not to demonstrate their uniqueness but to become incorporated into the trends of progress and the post-industrialised Fourth Civilisation. The fear that foreign investments, progress in the West and the open commodity and financial markets will undermine national pride and specific cultural features is not always justified. Such dependence exists only in the most corrupt regimes and where an imperialistic type of dependence has been allowed to develop. Technological and social progress even in the conditions of the open market does not inevitably lead to the death of national cultures and identity. In fact the opposite is often the case. The experience of China, South Korea and Singapore has shown that only against the background of a well developed economy can national and ethnic culture be preserved for the future. In the global world national identity and specific cultural features will manifest themselves only at a certain level of economic development when poverty and backwardness has been overcome. Nevertheless it will be difficult for the dreams of the apostles of Black Africa or Che Guevara to come true. The closed nature of the societies, corrupt regimes, the lack of law and order and ethnic calm will continue to maintain the countries of the "Third World" in the orbit of the past. When I refute the division of the countries of the world into three groups within the bi-polar model of the world, I, naturally, realise how important it is to adopt a clear position in support of an alternative for future development. The current lack of order and chaos has made many proponents of change wait to see what direction change will take. My understanding of this question is that for the next few years we shall live in a multi-sector world with an enormous diversity of economic and social conditions with enormous differences in economic levels. When I speak of the multiplicity of sectors, I mean a multiplicity of political and economic forms, political systems and specific governmental decisions. At the same time I can see no other prospect for development apart from growing integration and the gradual reduction of differences conditioned by the integration of world financial markets. To this extent the multiplicity of sectors is a transitional state despite the relative stability of the world. The differences inherent in the form of ownership and political systems will gradually disappear. On the other hand economic advances will allow for the protection of the cultural diversity of the world and spiritual identity. 5. BALANCED DEVELOPMENT Post-capitalism and post-communism are stages inthe process of the collapse of the Third Civilisation. The major question is what will replace it? I believe that it will replaced by the societies of the Fourth Civilisation -- societies of balanced development. R epresentatives of individual historical eras are bound to the limits of their own time and are unable to see the world as a whole. All the major ideological doctrines of the last few centuries have been linked to the need for the resolution of group, regional or class contradictions. Global thought was and continues to have little attraction for philosophers and politicians. Even in the 20th century when world globalisation is gradually on the increase, ideological and political doctrines have developed in accordance with the conditions in one or a group of countries and specific ideological models have imposed themselves through force. Marxism-Leninism claimed to be a teaching for the whole of humanity. However, despite Marx's attempt to evaluate the Asian methods of production his doctrine did not take into account the cultural and historical development of China and India. The imposition of Marxist or western bourgeois models upon completely different cultural and historical roots was a manifestation of philosophical and ideological monopolism. The 20th has century provided us with many forms of Marxism and Liberalism but with the increase in democracy more local cultural features have begun to dominate over ideologies. Today, while the Third Civilisation is in a process of disintegration many things have not yet changed. The global approach has made its mark and is no longer considered absurd or abstract challenge. The UN has taken on more responsibility and increased its role in the world. A number of new formations involved in global issues have arisen. One major result of such processes was the summit meeting in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 at which politicians from all over the world gathered in the name of the survival of humanity. However, up to now these efforts have not yet produced any serious results. Despite the conflicts evident in the world, despite the complete irrationality of manufacturing structures, despite the continuing destruction of forests and cultivable land, humanity continues to exist in the condition of nationalist thinking or class, social and other types of doctrines. While global reseach is mainly directed towards environmental and philosophical problems, there are still those who aspire to defend one system, one model or one culture. In the risk of repeating myself, I consider such attempts absurd. Neither socialism, nor capitalism, not the political models of the countries of the Third World can serve today as universal models for life on earth. There is little doubt that globalisation and global culture will continue to penetrate the common principles and standards of life. However, this process will take place through manifestations of local culture, as well as specific national, regional and ethnic features. The modern world will no longer accept unified "military" models of development. The dialectics of globalisation and localisation, the advent of the new civilisation can offer a new model. If it is democratic and not imperialistic as in the 20th century. There is no longer any room for universal doctrines in the new era. Universal principles and legal standards -- yes, universal ideologies and models -- no. "Yes" because of the inevitable integration and mutual dependence of countries, "No" because of the resolute and growing diversity of human life. The 20th century was a century of imperialism and forced globalisation. The 21st century will be a century of intermixing and synthesis of different cultures and ideas. I am convinced that the time has come to pose the question of the type and the direction of general world development and of the main principles and trends of the Fourth Civilisation. In this way the danger of global chaos and the resolution of global contradictions through myriad local wars, tension and never-ending disputes may be avoided. At the end of the 20th century, humanity has reached a stage in its development wherein no single nation can impose itself on others and no single country can exist in isolation from the others. This is the effect of globalisation and the constant increase in mutual dependence while on the other hand there is a marked growth in the role of local cultures. After the fall of the Berlin Wall three quarters of the population of the world now live in conditions of free economic initiative and more than 90% of the countries of the world have multi-party democracies. Human rights, the free movement of information and people are becoming more and more an integral part of life. Communism, fascism, Moaism and Polpotism have collapsed. Liberal capitalism is being gradually eroded by the growth in new technology, the growing role of small and medium business and anti-trust legislation. Socialism as it was once known by so many nations has been consigned to the past. What then will be the typical features of global development n the 21st century? Over the past few years many of the industrial nations of the world have begun to speak of "sustainable development". This was initially an environmental concept, a combination of the models of the developed Western societies and the desire to preserve life on Earth. A number of writers have attempted to use this concept to make more comprehensive evaluations of future economic growth, types of manufacturing and the challenges facing future generations.[49] However, the concept of "sustainable development" is still unclear and unnecessarily generalised. It is useful in that it links many varied national models to the common problems of humanity. Its inadequacy is that it does not analyse such fundamental questions such as global political and economic structures, the re-distribution of ownership and authority and control over the media etc.. However, the concept of sustainable development does not provide an answer to the major question -- what comes after post-capitalism and post-communism? What will be the result of their fusion? I would link the answer to this question with the concept of balanced development. From a micro-economic and regional point of view it is not new. The new aspect which I have added is to link it with the global transition to the new, Fourth Civilisation. The first general theory of economic balance was created by L.Walras and V.Pareto, (the Losanne school of political economy). Their aim was to create abstract mathematical models which provided a ratio between supply and demand. In the 19th century and the first half of the 20th A.Kurno, W.Jevans and A.Marshall made significant contributions to the formation of the classical views of market balance. During the second half of the 20th century, G.Hicks and P.Samuelson formed a "political synthesis" based on the studies by the great Swiss economists nd the classic writers on bourgeois political economy. The Hicks-Allan model is perhaps the best expression of market balance.[50] It combines the process of the maximum use for each consumer within the limitations of his income and the maximum profit for each entrepreneur within the limitations of his produce to produce a balance between supply and demand. L.Walras come to some particularly valuable conclusions on the role of the state in the establishment of balance and his advocacy of the principle, "balance of opportunity against imbalance of the the factual situation"[51]. Walras considered the liberal "Laissez Faire" doctrine as a pure illusion and included the regulating role of the state in his balanced system. He supports the cooperative movement and is the only one of many like-minded thinkers to tackle the question of ownership. To be unaware of the work of L.Walras is to be unaware of one of the most brilliant writers on economic and political science. The balanced economic theory of the Lauzanne school and to a lesser extent the school of the neo-classicists is an initial pre-condition for what I refer to as balanced development. At a theoretical and methodological level a number of Marx's conclusions on ownership and the state are also useful.[52] This can also be said of the ideas of "cooperative socialism". In contrast to L.Walras, however, I do not see balance as an ineluctable state or a description of the market but as part of the general reforms of civilisation. The difference is that I approach balance not from the point of view of the conditionally limited market but from a global point of view. In my opinion, balance is not an ideal model but a trend. There is no eternal balance, there is politics and specific historical conditions within which it can be achieved. Moreover, I believe that balance is not only an economic category but a tangential point for economic, political and cultural processes. The great modern significance of balanced development comes from the bankruptcy of "communist nationalisation" and the inadequacy of liberal doctrines. During the entire period of the 20th century these two concepts did not contribute either balance of harmony. In fact the opposite -- they caused innumberable contradictions and hundreds of wars. Pure liberalism divided the world into the rich and the poor and will clearly continue to do so as long as it is predominant in the world. Communism, in its very first stage, brought about the total nationalisation of life and killed freedom and civil societies. The idea of balanced development is an expression of the new theoretical synthesis and the link between it and the globalisation of the world. From a national domestic point of view balanced development is a trend, as well as a supporting policy, towards the redistribution of ownership amongst the largest possible number of citizens and the gradual limitation of the monopolistic role of families and individuals. Balanced development is not a revolutionary but a reformist concept -- an expression of the post-capitalist and post-communist development of the world. To this extent it is a generalised expression not only of the division and redistribution of ownership but also its socialisation. Integration and mutual dependence within the manufacturing processes and financial operations, the transition from a chaotic to an organised and computerised market presuppose the interweaving of interests of the traditional and the new social groups and strata. The gradual, logical and deliberate balancing of the market provides above all for general economic balance. It is here that the Hicks-Allen equation needs significant enhancement to take into account the increased consumption of services and the role of new art forms in the industrialised states. At high levels of economic balance the objective role of the state in the redistribution of ownership is reduced and vice versa. In a balanced society the state fulfils a supportive and regulative role up to the moment of the establishment of self-regulation and the horizontal balance of the system. Neither the state, nor the civil society has permanent limits but gradually during the processes of its maturation society overwhelms the state, not the other way around. Of course, this does not mean that centralised regulation will die or that the nation state will disappear tomorrow. Balanced development presupposes "balanced" human rights for all. The basic pre-condition for the consolidation of balance is the provision of the individual rights of citizens, their freedom to choose, to associate and to be protected from the hindrances of bureaucracy. For this reason the corner stones of democracy -- the freedom of speech and the press, the free movement of people, goods and capital are the fundamental basis for balanced development. This also requires the involvement of the state in the economy and other areas on the principle of minimal sufficiency, as a guarantor of civil rights and a factor in the formation of a dynamic social environment. In contrast to liberalism, however, balanced development is possible only with the redistribution of ownership amongst the growing part of the population and its socialisation and integration. There are clear differences between balanced development and the traditional (until the 1970's) concepts of social democracy. While the foundations of social democracy defined a priori the role of the state within society and presupposes nationalisation and greater or lesser levels of state control, balanced development presupposes the minimalisation of the role of the state with simultaneous horizontal socialisation. This excludes monopolism by a small group of the extremely rich and the state bureaucracy. Only in this context can there be any "balance" of difference social groups or relative "balance of opportunity" (L.Walras) and social justice. Balanced development presupposes the association of different ethnic groups and cultures within the framework of the national state and the global world. In general this concept is an expression of the expansion of the relations within a civil society and the current notion of human rights. Balanced development is inseparable from the legislative resolution of a series of social rights (life, health, work, education, maternity, pensions etc..) not only as the responsibility of the executive authorities but as the responsibility of civil society. This takes the form of social funds, companies, charitable organisations etc. which are independent of the state. This also leads to the need for the protection of the private life of the individual. There can be no balanced development if the social security of citizens is not guaranteed in a new way. This concerns the protection of the family, women and children, pregnancy and maternity, personal, genetic, ethnic and behavioural information. Balanced development presupposes the existence of any specific feature which does not negate any another, the combination and mutual harmony of all the features of mankind and social and ethnic groups. The political regimes and the cultures of the Third Civilisation imposed their models and cultures through violence. The Fourth Civilisation and its main features -- balanced development means the rejection of such practices. Most significantly, this doctrine could become a common reality only if applied globally. It is already clear that any further increase in the gap of imbalance between indivual nations stimulates chaos in the world and will cause even greater damage within the most developed countries. I recently heard someone say in a small Bulgarian town, "How can I live peacefully, when there is poverty all around me and rising crime?" These were the words of a well-off man who was aware of the simple economic truth that if you are richer than others, you become the object of their dissatisfaction. This is something which will have to be understood in the industrialised western countries. Otherwise, sooner or later they will be obliged to isolate themselves and to experience the hatred of the poor. The outcome is clear: gradually and inexorably, in accordance with the norms of the global world, economic levels will balance out. In other words, balanced development is only possible and necessary in the international aspect, both as a consequence of and a precondition for the global market. This requires changes in the international economic order and global regulation which I will mention at a later stage. Balanced development presupposes the creation of an environment for intermixing, cohabitation and development within the universal market and legislative frameworks of different cultures. Instead of cultural imperialism there will be a muliticultural society, instead of enmity between countries with different political and economic regimes, there will be rapprochement and a reduction of the multiplicity of economic sectors. There will also be an new trend in geo-politics: instead of imperialism and the domination of one or a group of states there will be a gradual process of policentrism. In the next chapters I will attempt to prove that the trends emerging at the beginning of the Fourth Civilisation and its main outlining feature -- balanced development -- are irreversible. At the same time I realise the strength of the inertia inherited from the past and the strength of other factors which want to delay global change. When I set out my views on balanced development before a mixed Bulgarian political auditorium I received two profoundly different reactions. The representatives of the former communist party said, "You've gone too far to the right." The other half of the auditorium occupied by members of the anti-communist groups commented, "This is left-wing babble". In reality balanced development is neither one nor the other. It is not me who has gone to the right or to the left but time and human progress which have gone forward. Chapter Seven OBSTRUCTIONS 1. THE DEFENDERS OF THE THIRD CIVILISATION During the entire period of the 20th century, the representatives of different classes, nations and blocs have battled with each other. They created the industry of confrontation and the belief in its eternity. Today these same people are the defenders of the Third Civilisation. E very historical phenomenon has its own driving forces as well as its own obstacles. The advent of any phenomenon on the historical scene does not come as an overnight victory -- this is the illusion of revolutionaries -- but as the result of the gradual propulsion of the driving forces against the obstacles which always exist to the new. This is also true for the Fourth Civilisation. The Fourth Civilisation could be accelerated or hindered by a series of political, economic and moral factors. Although we are living through the last years of the Third Civilisation, it still has many adherents. The inertia of the past is alive and its advocates constantly refer back to the old formulae, "How good it used to be in the past." I once discussed this issue with one of the initiators of the process of perestroika in the USSR, A.Yakovliev.[53] I asked him what was the reason for the conservatism of the older population in Eastern Europe. He joked in response, "Well, their wives were younger then!" There is perhaps something a element of truth in this joke. Conservatives in principle support the regimes and systems for which they have struggled all their lives. They always tend to over-dramatise the difficulties of the transition and consider any changes a deviation from the true belief. Moreover, conservatives are not only divided according to age or to party membership. There are pensioners who support the coming of the new and young conservatives with opinions set in concrete. In Eastern Europe the conservatives are concentrated mainly amongst the former communists, the former security forces but also amongst many members of the old bourgeois class who are involved in the struggle for political revenge and the re-establishment of the political status quo from the time before the Second World War. In the West the defenders of the old civilisation recognise only the collapse of communism as a symbol of change and their own thoughts do not go beyond their own privileges and global domination. This is an historical paradox. The defenders of the Third Civilisation are not divided into countries and ideologies. They are all enamoured to a greater or lesser extent of the structures of the bi-polar model and the cold war. Masses of anticommunists and anticapitalists, Liberals and Marxists, capitalists and party bureaucrats, generals and spies piously believe in their correctness and their way of life. Of course, it would be improper to reject their past, or the struggles they waged, not the fact that each one of them in his own way may have been an honourable defender of his native land. However, this is not the most important element. The most signicant thing is that they are defending models and attitudes which have crippled the 20th century and transformed it into the most bloody century in the history of mankind. The 20th century will be the last century of belligerent nationalism, imperialism and the domination of one nation over another. However, albeit with weakened authority, those political forces who advocated such phenomena have not disappeared. There are still insufficient guarantees that globalisation will not give rise to imperialism or that the reaction to this will not provide more opportunities to nationalism and autarchy. While thought and ideological criteria remain within the framework of egoistical national iterests, while global awareness is still undeveloped, the conflicts of the passing century are still possible. The question is whether we are for or against the structures of the old civilisation -- for or against the emerging structures of the new time. Those who dream of the renewed domination of one nation over another, of imbalanced international economic conditions, of party and nomenclature leaders, of media monopolism, of the eternalisation of differences in living standards are on one side of the barricade. Yesterday the party bureaucrats and the capitalists were opponents. Today they might even become allies in the struggle for survival and the survival of the structures of the Third Civilisation. Still prisoners to their old ideologies and international confrontations they maintain those ideas and structures which could still return us to the time of the Cold War or grant us a period of Cold Peace. Fighting with each other, the proponents of the Third Civilisation can only renew fears, thoughts and activities which leave us in the grips of the past. In Spain there is a monument to the memory of both the supporters of Franco and the Republicans. In one and the same place, under one and the same cross are gathered the honour and the debt, the errors and mistakes, the greatness and the perdition of people who killed one another. The names of the killers are illumiated by those of the victims, whatever side they may have fought for, whatever side of the barrier they may have belonged to. In Spain the reconciliation of history is already a fact. In Bulgaria, the former Yugoslavia and partially in Poland there are still many people who believed that Gorbachev was a CIA agent while in the USA there are those who consider Clinton an American communist. The sooner such thinking disappears, the sooner we shall become awards of the problems and the greatness of the new civilisation. In order to understand the new, we must forget the old language, the old categories of division, the old enmities and prejudices. The Cold War is over but the Cold Peace and mistrust could unknowingly lead us back to it. Unfortunately this is not all. The life of the Third Civilisation could be prolonged via the maintainance of the economic and political structures which were typical of the 20th century. In most general terms, these structures can be united into two mutually conditional phenomena, which albeit in different forms have supported the current world conflicts. These are imperialism and nationalism and their modern manifestations. As paradoxical as it might seem, these two satellites of the 20th century are supported by one common culture -- that of violence and confrontation. The alternative to violence and confrontation is tolerance -- the recognition of differences, respect for the problems of others, responsibility to help those who are worse off. Perhaps, it is indeed tolerance as an alternative to violence which is the most important feature of the political culture of the Fourth Civilisation. 2. THE GREAT THREAT -- MEDIA IMPERIALISM With the passing of the Third Civilisation it is also possible that the imperialist dependencies between nations will disappear. However if the abstract liberal trends of the past continue to develop this may lead to new forms of imperialist domination -- less overt but with equally dangerous consequences. T he first manifestations of the global world were inseparably linked with the ambitions of empire and the growing power of the most developed countries of the time. The colonial system, international trusts and cartels, the redistribution of the world into zones of influence and two world wars was an expression of imperialist domination. The division of the world into two systems and the cold war was also a form of international imperialism. The main slogan used by Lenin, Stalin and their followers was the "struggle against imperialism". They, however, created a system closely based on imperial allegiance. If Gorbachev with his power had begun a process of the gradual reconstruction of Eastern Europe and the world, imperialism could have been replaced by the agreed establishment of a new world economic, informational and legislative order. I am convinced that such a policy would have found support amongst the majority of the political and intellectual circles in the West. Gorbachev's failure was to allow the Eastern European regimes to collapse without any dignity opening the way for the globalisation of the world without removing the danger of new imperialism. The gap between the poor and the rich remained as wide as ever. The differences in political and military power were so different that the danger of imperialist domination remained. Of course, it would be imprudent to suppose that imperialism might return in its old colonial forms or to the time of the Cold War. Although the wealth of the world is divided as unequally as 150 years ago, many things have changed. The colonial model has been rejected by history. Anti-monopoly legislation has put down deep roots, major changes have taken place in peoples' awareness and the infrastructure of the UN and other world non-governmental organisations have expanded guaranteeing the rights of all the citizens of the earth. Thus the old type of coercive, belligerent imperialism has for ever been consigned to the past. I ask myself, however, whether imperialism as a method of domination of certain nations over others has finally died. I do not think so. In fact, the opposite may even be true. Together with the globalisation of the world there are now new pre-conditions for a new type of imperialism, of a new type of domination by one people over another. This, without doubt, is one of the greatest dangers facing world development and the establishment of new relations within civilisation. The most powerful modern force for globalisation is the trans-national corporations. Their roles can be as positive for development as they can lead to its deformation. At the beginning of the 1980's the trans-national corporations accounted for one third of the world's industrial production. Their appearance in Russia and China after the democratisation of their regimes made them, especially in a number of specialised branches, the absolute rulers of world production. As a rule the trans-national corporations take national legislation into account but in global terms they are uncontrollable. This allows them to redistribute enormous funds and to exert influence in all spheres of social life. In recent years the trans-national corporations have tended to decentralise their activities and adapt them to the conditions of the countries in which they are operating. A typical example of this are the European operations of Ford and a number of Japanese corporations. This, however, is insufficient. If the present state of the distribution of global production and products is allowed to persist then the imbalances in world development will worsen. If the status quo remains without significant changes in the world economic order then the rich will become richer and the poor even poorer. International imperial power in this case will not be guaranteed by armies and conquests but via financial operations, technology and the structures of the trans-national corporations. The finances and management structures will remain in the most developed countries of the world. The countries which provide cheap labour (predominantly in Asia) will manufacture products without seeing any significant improvement in their life while a groups of other countries (equatorial Africa) will remain for some time to come in the grips of poverty. It seems as though the imperialism of the 20th century and the domination of the super powers is on its way out. Or does it only "seem" so? If the structures of the old civilisation are preserved for any longer this will not only serve to delay the reform processes but it may also lead to serious new local and world conflicts. Imperialism which was the main cause of the crisis of the Third Civilisation might simply mutate its form. Imagine a world in which 80% of the news, 70% of the technology, 60% of the films and 50% of all profits are created in two or three countries. Imagine that all other countries are dependent on those news broadcasts and that the awareness of their peoples is modelled by a group of media magnates. Does this not closely resemble some of the predictions made by George Orwell? Will it not lead in the long term to reactions from the majority of countries and peoples? I would call this phenomenon electronic or media imperialism. By this I mean the monopolisation of the world's media and culture by individual nations and trans-national groups. The danger of such a system dominating the world is evident. If globalisation proceeds in this way, if the global world does not turn into a world of mono-truths and mono-cultures disseminated by one or a number of centres than this will lead to a mutation of human development and will render us dependent on new empires. Today the ambitions of empire are not manifested through wars of conquest and battles for resources but in the endeavour to dominate as many sectors of markets, cultures and media regions as possible. There are only a few countries and corporations in the world which can afford the development of world-wide television networks. Only few can survive in the sphere of super investments. National legislation is powerless. This allows for unbelievable global power. It can make people accept standards, buy goods and accept truths broadcast from the screen by a group of media magnates. I do not think I am oversimplifying the situation. I am convinced that the majority of the owners of the world media are conscious of their responsibilities to the citizens of the world. I believe that Ted Turner the founder of CNN is one of these. His company promotes respect for the culture of all the countries of the world. However, despite the efforts of such people the consequences of media imperialism can be dramatic. The danger is that the television and radio channels of the world are monopolised by the representatives of those countries who have the historical advantage over the rest of the world. The USA, Europe and Japan are the leading countries in this respect. Russia, China and a number of other countries are relatively well protected because of their scale and their capabilities. But what about the rest? What will happen to the culture of the smaller and the poorer nations, their culture and their identity? If the trend of the 1980's and early 1990's continues and if global media continue to express the positions and the cultural policies of but a handful of countries this will strike a serious blow to many other countries and peoples and will have a general delaying effect on the processes leading to the advent of the new civilisation. To begin with a large number of small cultures will disappear taking with them the identity of many peoples. As can be seen in a number of countries this will cause defensive reactions and lead to protective nationalism. In the end this will cause complex political conflicts and will turn the world into a world of a small group of dominant nations. Electronic or media imperialism is the remnants of the Third Civilisation, reborn into its final possible form of the domination of one people over another. I see the solution to media imperialism in pluralism and the gradual construction of national electronic media in the poorer countries and in multicultural policies of the world television media. For at least the next 20--30 years cultural and media production will be concentrated in the hands of a small group of countries. During this period it will be necessary to form a new attitude which takes into account the interests of the smaller and poorer nations and cultures. The problem does not end here. It also concerns the cinema, video, cable television networks and satellite television. Clearly the new media technology can be used to stimulate world development, but at the same time it could lead to the destruction of the traditions of many peoples. A major question, especially in the conditions of the transition, is how will we use the new technologies and what will be the consequences for world development. 3. POST-MODERN NATIONALISM Nationalism as we knew it in the 20th century is the antipathe of the new civilisation, the global world, the intermixing of national cultures. Its chances of survival depend on it changing its limits and forms. T he Fourth Civilisation will be a time of openness hiterto unseen in the world. However, it will also involve a difficult, sometimes painful combination of different cultures and economics. We would be completely naive, however to believe that this "intermixing" will come about automatically simply because culture and economies are becoming globalised. If the processes are left to blind chance, the world will find itself beset with many local and regional conflicts, local wars between ethnic groups, religions and cultures. In practice this means the artificial blocking of globalisation, new contradictions and in the long run, the restoration of confrontationalism. Although such a danger is also posed by the "march of the poor" and by the reaction against media imperialism, the major resource of such a gloomy prospect is undoubtedly nationalism. John Lukac defined nationalism as the greatest political force on the planet. Although I doubt whether this conclusion is absolutely precise, I find myself concurring that nationalism is still very stubborn and persistent especially when one takes into account the inertia of the political thinking of the past. For the whole of the 20th century nationalism has been the driving force, notwithstanding the official "domination" and propaganda of communist, liberal, socialist and other ideologies. Very frequently these ideologies have been but a facade for nationalism. Stalinism and Nazism are perhaps the best examples of this. Can globalisation and nationalism be reconciled? This appears possible only if we equate nationalism with something new, if it changes from what it was in the 20th century and does not stand in the way of globalisation. Otherwise nationalism will find itself in very serious conflict with objective trends in the development of the modern world. On the other hand, globalisation will either be a bridge leading to the resolution of total poverty of billions of people or it will stimulate the most mutated forms of nationalism. Let us think for a moment about this important mutuality. Globalisation which unifies the world by destroying local customs and traditions and by killing small cultures cannot avoid causing mutation and reaction. Consequently, only globalisation based on and stimulates diversity can be an alternative to reactionary nationalism and stimulus for the structures of the Fourth Civilisation. At the end of the 20th century after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the dominant factor of world development is openness. There is now only a small groups of states (e.g. North Korea) which maintain policies of isolation and the absolutism of their own traditions. At the end of the 20th century, nationalism might reappear as an ideological movement protected by culture and religion. Ideological nationalism is a relatively rare phenomenon in the modern world although in a certain number of poorly-developed countries of Africa and Asia it might seen as a panacea for the resolution of serious problems. North Korean communism, for example, is ideological nationalism wrapped in a mask of dead-end ideology. A more widespread and typical form of nationalism at the end of the 20th century is defensive nationalism. This may appear in any country which feels under threat, for the survival of its economy from the invasion of imported goods, its culture -- from the invasion of foreign information and cultural products. Defensive nationalism is not necessarily cultural or religious. It often appears as a result of economic reasons or is linked with historical and political aims of particular nations. The question is not whether this is the "defence" of an individual small culture from the invasion of foreign media or "protection" against an undisputed and powerful culture from the presence of foreign immigrants. In both cases this leads to conflicts, isolation, blocks the processes of globalisation and gives rise to chimera and xenophobia. Ethnonationalism is similar in character and is also widespread. The explosion in ethnic self-confidence and self-determination is a direct and explicable reaction in the struggle for survival in the conditions of globalisation. When, however, this self-awareness has specific historical, cultural and religious roots it can give rise to serious conflicts. Why is nationalism on the rise? Why has this happened despite the continuing intensive processes of globalisation? Why in many places has nationalism taken on extreme forms and lead to military conflicts? The reason is that the surge of nationalist feelings is a reaction to informational and cultural imperialism, to the invasion of the world media and trans-national coporations. In such conditions is has become convenient and fashionable for politicians and ordinary people to re-identify themselves as the members of a regional family. In the poorer countries the rise in national self-determination is a result of former humiliations and repressed ethnic awareness. Before the fall of the Berlin Wall the new nationalism was less important than the struggle between the two world systems. Today, however, this is not the case. National survival and self-determination has replaced Marxist and Leninist teaching in the East and the liberal-conservative doctrines in the West. They have filled the emotional, spiritual, economic and political vacuum almost totally unhindered. Finally, self-identification and its consequent nationalism within modern conditions has become possible as a result of the reduced authority of the nation state as a consquence of globalisation. Nationalism is not the only, but undoubtedly the major reason for the possible new division of the world into opposing economic or military and political blocs. The regrouping of countries into new economic alliances is a part of the geo-political restructuring of the world. Here the danger is in the trend for the divisions to turn into confrontation and the bi-polar model to be replaced with a new bi- or tri-polar oppositional structure. What will predominate in the future the global prospects for the Fourth Civilisation or new regional isolation? Nationalism, combined with regional autarchy or forms of the new open world society? I believe that the answer to this question will still be unclear for the next few decades. There is an undisputed trend towards global integration and the advent of the new civilisation. It is inevitable and it will continue. However, the question whether this process will involve a new phase of world conflicts and collapses, whether there is a danger of evil egoism dominating the world will depend to a very great extent on the means and forms of globalisation. 4. THE EGOISM OF POLITICIANS The responsibility of politicians is not to incite conflict but to resolve them, not to serve the people of the past but to open up the potential for the future. T he advent of the New Civilisation is indisputably irreversible. However, when it will come and what controversies it will bring with it depends to a large extent on the modern political leaders. There is grounds to speak of the possibility of the formation of new global elites in accordance with the great structural changes on a world scale. They will be above all the leaders of the trans-national corporations and other international companies, international traders, representatives from the world of show business and intellectuals who identify their lives with the progress of the whole world. Would it be correct to say that the majority of contemporary world politicians are the defenders and advocates of the Fourth Civilisation? Hardly. The mass of people seem to be conservative defenders of the Third Civilisation. There are exceptions, of course, such as Jacques Delor, Hans van der Bruk, Leo Tindemans and other architects of European integration. Other exceptions include those politicians who have contributed much to world peace such as Bill Clinton, Itsach Rabin, Edward Shevardnadze and many others whose world view is more global than local. Unfortunately, the majority of modern politicians are influenced not by global responsibilities but purely local and national interests. This local egoism is above all a product of the political structures themselves. In every country where there is a pluralist structure the party leaders have the responsibility to their own parties or at best to their countries while members of parliament are responsible to their constituents. Even when the level of education and intellect of the politicians makes them aware of the interests of others their dependency on the national and local systems renders them powerless before the challenges of the New Civilisation. Minimal efforts are necessary to bring a halt to infant mortality all over the world and the funds needed to finance this are less that 1% of the budgets of the industrialised world. Young people at universities are more interested in the resolution of environmental problems than the elected representatives of the nations. However, the egoism of politicians is a product of the electoral systems and the necessity for each politician to defend first and foremost the current interests of his electors. In this way the richest countries and peoples of the world are protecting their own interests above all and the problems of the starving and childrens' illnesses remain in the periphery of their thoughts. The political forces which should work to establish the Fourth Civilisation are not yet clearly identified. They are somewhere amongst the different interests and competition of the trans-national corporations, amongst the group of leaders of the major nations and the representatives of the intellectual community and environmental movements etc.. Despite the successes of the New Civilisation, despite the growing global awareness, these forces are insufficient. Clearly, for an indefinite period of time the majority of politicians will play a conservative, rather than a progressive role in the furtherment of global relations. Today the political awareness of the majority of people involved in such activities goes as far as agreeing to inter-state positions almost exclusively on the basis of national interests. The expansion of global problems is still in no-man's land. There is a clear need for changes in the culture and the awareness of the political elite as well as changes to the political systems. One has to admire the majority of modern European politicians for their constancy and stubborn resilience with which they have built the European Union. It is not customs mechanisms nor the development of a prototype European parliament which should serve as shining examples to the rest of the world but the gradual development over a period of forty years of the dynamic processes of the European idea. However, even here there are a number of examples where the European idea has been compromised by national ambitions and prejudices or has been used demagogically for local political interests. British, French and German members of the EU parliament acknowledge the interests of those who do not want to give up its privileges and to accept their challenges of economic and political integration. Analyses have shown that these are people who put priority on the interests of the manufacturers in their constituencies or a simply victims of limited political thought. The main reason for the egoism of politicians is inherent the nature of the political systems, in the national limitations of the concept of political responsibility, in the weakness of the link between the electoral mechanisms and the concern for future generations. 5. MILITANT RELIGIONS When a shell exploded in the market place in Sarajevo and killed dozens of people, a young woman cried out, "Allah, have revenge for me..." A friend of mine from Serbia told me how a detachment of Muslims in Bosnia raped a group of women and them murdered them... The hatred which he spoke was enough to last him for the rest of his life. T he ethnic war and cleansing in Bosnia, the religious attacks in Algeria, the fundamentalist attacks in Egypt, the victory of the Islamic party in Turkey, ethnic and religious problems in Iran, Iraq, Northern Ireland, Israel and Palestine, India and dozens of other places all over the world are all steeped in the blood of continuing religious conflicts. They are sometimes referred to as the militant religions. Perhaps this is correct. Religion and faith is the greatest unifying principle, the strongest mass feeling overwhelming emotions, traditions, indignation and interests and unites them under a common will. Whoever captures this will shall be victorious. It is true that there is no life without faith just as there is no matter without spirit. No-one can deny that the major traditional religions have survived for many thousands on this earth and they will clearly survive for many more. Religions have learnt how to adapt to new processes and phenomena, to demonstrate flexibility and to acknowledge the needs of the people. Some call this pragmatism, others call it hypocrisy. The great challenge of the modern day which faces all world religions is should they adapt to the global world or should they continue to fight over their old conquests. The dilemma is either to adapt to the open and modern world or to defend the life and traditions of the past, to integrate religious symbols into a modern, open economy or isolation and a war of cultures. Another great challenge is tolerance between religions. Will they continue to fight with each other or will they allow co-existence with other faiths and the free choice of people? The militant isolationist and totalitarian religions are in opposition to the New Civilisation. They and their representatives form part of the obstacles to the advent of the new. There is little doubt that the conflicts arising from the conflict of open societies and cultures will frequently be based on religious principles. I and inclined to think, however, that the role of the militant religions will grow only if this is allowed for by certain preconditions such as poverty and nationalism and the spread of new utopian ideas. When in 1991 President George Bush and his aides unexpectedly halted the American invading force en route to Basra and Baghdad many people could not understand why he did this. Five years later it is now clear that the Americans had to choose between the consequences of religious conflicts or the preservation of the regime of Saddam Hussein. Militant religions can take power, as they did in Iran or they can halt the processes of modernisation of entire regions. However, they can do little more since for the same reasons for which I reject the thesis of S.Huntington I believe that religious modernism will prevail over fundamentalism. 6. A CUP OF COFFEE IN APENZEL The defenders of the Third Civilisation do not only live in the poor countries. A large number of them live in resplendent luxury and comfort or in conditions of social harmony alien to four fifths of the world. These people live in the West and do not want global change... H ave you ever been to Apenzel? It is a Swiss Canton with a capital of the same name on the road from the lake of Boden to Liechtenstein. It is the smallest, best ordered and quietest of all the cantons in the Swiss confederation. There are no large factories as there are in Basel or the vanity of the financial centre of Zurich. There are none of the bank employees forever in a hurry or the limousines of the major banks. Apenzel has the the cleanest cows in the world, the most beautiful green fields merging in the distance into the majesty of the Alpine peaks. It is a land of peaceful, almost invisible work where everyone knows what to do and when to do it. If you get the chance to go to the capital of the canton, take a walk across the bridge and a stroll through the little town and you will feel as though you are in a fairy story. The flowers in the windows, the decorated roofs of the houses and the hidden little backstreets. My reason for writing about this is because Apenzel is not only the smallest and most comfortable canton in Switzerland but also the most conservative. Here the majority of the people do not want any form of change. For them Switzerland's membership of the European Union is a dangerous event with unforeseeable consequences. I stopped in Apenzel for a cup of coffee and a cake in the summer of 1993 and my contacts with the local people made a strong impression on me. This was not only because they had voted against Swiss membership of the EU but for the reasons which they explained to me. The people passionately and convincingly did not want to become part of the united Europe since they were afraid that the underdeveloped European countries would hold back their development and their towns "would be invaded by immigrants" and that they were "getting on very well without the Common Market" etc.. I would not have bothered to mention this event if this attitude was not repeated in other wealthy parts of the world. One of the main sources for the rising xenophobia in Germany, France and Austria is this unwillingness to share their wealth with others and to experience the risk of cultural intermixing. In contrast to the supporters of Zhirinovski in Russia who admire his defence of traditional Russian values or Erbakan in Turkey who advocates the traditions of Islam against the modern processes taking place in the West my experience in Apenzel has completely different origins. I could call it result of "resplendent comfort". Millions of people in Western Europe and North America are entirely satisfied by their lifestyles and do not want to jeopardise the status quo. Employment, security, mistrust of other cultures are reasons for which they prefer nationalism to the open world and the advent of the New Civilisation. Do not be angry with the conservatives of Apenzel. This is not an emotional but a widespread cultural and political phenomenon. It manifests itself in many forms of protective nationalism and is the social basis for potential serious conflict against the Fourth Civilisation. About ten years ago the French Nationalist, Le Pen, seemed a political curiosity, now, however, he is accepted as something real and necessary by many intellectuals. Such is the case with the Austrian Nationalist J.Heider whose party categorically won third place in the country and has even greater political ambitions. Thus the defenders of the old civilisation come not only from amongst the ranks of the fundamentalists, the supporters of Islam or the ultra-nationalists from the lesser developed countries. They also come from the West, from its more conservative circles, from people who are frightened of losing the luxury which they have achieved. Undoubtedly the New Civilisation will involve the intermixing of cultures and economies, the global redistribution and harmonisation of resources, production and benefits. This will also lead to structural changes and even cause difficulties in the most developed countries of the West. Will the people of these countries be prepared to concede some of the privileges which their current state of economic and political advantage allows them? This "drowning in luxury" will continue to hold back the progress of the New Civilisation and lead to a variety of conflicts and other hitherto unknown phenomena. Together with the slow and gradual opening-up of the world and its cultural intermixing we will also become witnesses to processes of temporary "closing-up" and the victories of nationalists and fundamentalists. If in the richer countries of the world those who live in states of "resplendent luxury" win this battle imperial or neo-colonial thinking and fundamentalism will inevitably increase. Section Three The Alternatives to the Fourth Civilisation Chapter Eight THE NEW ECONOMIC ORDER 1. THE ECONOMIC HEART OF THE GLOBAL WORLD Throughout the whole of the 20th century the economic dependence of nations grew to become what is the now the nucleus of the New Civilisation. One essential part of the modern infrastructure is the supra-sovereign control of nation states. The main question is whether this will lead to a new economic order or will it revive the familiar conflicts... T he economic interaction of countries and peoples is at the basis of each human community. "Economic interaction" is not always the leading factor but is does always dominate. It challenges not only the autonomy of particular communities but also their unification into nation states. The new elements of the 20th century is that the modern global economy is becoming less and less an object of control of national governments and is tending to form its own, independent relations. This process has been taking place throughout the 20th century. Between 1870 and 1913 world trade increased by 6% annually. Between 1918 and 1938 there was practically no growth. This can be explained by the slow processes of reconstruction after the First World War, the Great Depression (1929--193) and the self-imposed isolation of the USSR, Germany and a number of other countries. After the Second World War international economic exchange reached it highest level of progress. This was mainly driven by Western Europe, America and Japan. Between 1946 and 1973 world trade was increasing on average by 10% and doubled n volume from 1980--1995. Notwithstanding wars, political confrontation and the accompanying protectionism, the entire period of the 20th century was a time of expansion and global economic strengthening. By resolving their conflicts countries began more and more to see or were forced to see the advantages of the "open" economy and to accept bi-lateral and multi-lateral customs and trade unions. The Genoa conference in 1922 and the World Economic Conference in 1927 are of great significance despite the non-implementation of their decisions as a result of the crisis of 1929 and the Second World War. On the 30th of October 1947 the General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs (GATT) was ratified. This was a milestone leading to the removal of trade discrimination, the consolidation of the principle of "most-favoured nation" status and the formation of customs unions. Between 1964--1967 the "Kennedy round" of talks in which 54 nations took part lead to a 35% reduction in trade tariffs. A further round of talks held in Tokyo in 1979 helped to further develop this process. Together with progress in trade there was also significant progress in economic integration: the complete economic opening of the American states with each other; the German customs union (1871), the Belgium-Luxembourg economic union (1921), the European Iron and Steel Agreement and the Rome Treaty of 1957 on the creation of a Common Market within Europe; the Committee for Economic Cooperation (COMECON) in Eastern Europe (1949) and the European zone for free trade (1960). Despite the political, class and military confrontation of the 20th century there has been a constant process of opening-up and a reduction in the significance of national borders. This has expanded with the ratification of the Latin American Association for Free Trade (LAFTA) in 1960 the Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM) in 1973. At the beginning of the 1990's a new stage in European integration began with the reatification of the Maastricht treaty. The NAFTA agreement on free trade in North America was also signed in 1993. I mention these facts in order to show once again the constant increase in the integrational processes taking place within the entire world. As a result total world trade has grown from 1635 billion USD in 1979 to 1915 billion USD in 1984 to 3667.6 billion USD in 1992. Through the exchange of goods and services the entire world has become linked within a single system. The major factor for integration is the exchange of goods in the area of: -- communications, including satellite television, international telephone links and electronic mail, these advances are particularly significant; -- petrol which despite a marked decline has continued to account for one third of world energy consumption; -- food and raw agricultural products .-- trade with grain, sugar and coffee are amongst the most important factors; -- metals and ore; -- transport and machine building -- planes, cars, ships etc.. the production of which is continuing to increase. A significant new phenomenon in recent decades has been the linking of the financial systems of practically all the countries of the world into a unified system. In the 16--18th century world trade was carried out on the basis of national currencies, gold and silver. During this same period international trade was also based on trade credits and exchange of goods for goods. It was only in the second half of the 19th century that the most industrialised countries accepted the gold standard and the predominance of the British Pound Sterling. Up until the 1930's this system remained, in general terms, in force. Later it was replaced by the Brenton Woods agreement and the domination of the American dollar. At the beginning of the 1970's the Brenton Woods system gave way to floating exchange rates and open financial and currency markets. The predominance of the British Pound was undermined as a result of the reduced importance and the collapse of the British Empire. However, the reason for the changes which took place in the 1970's was the impossibility of any single national currency to monopolise international markets. This is a further demonstration of a common phenomenon, globalisation does not stimulate monopolies but, on the contrary, it creates the conditions for their destruction. In recent decades the world has witnessed the hitherto unseen linkage of countries and nations via currency and financial mechanisms. The replacement of the Brenton Woods system was in fact the removal of the last barriers to the multi-directional fusion of national currencies and exchange rates and to banking and stock exchange operations. Floating exchange rates served as a shock absorber for the resolution of differences and a bridge for overcoming global economic imbalance. During the last 20 years the trade in securities reached previously unknown levels. The trade in international bonds has increased from 76.3 to 167.3 billion dollars[54]. In practice this has meant the growing mutual dependency of capital markets. We can add to this the enormous increase in Euro-dollar markets. After the fall of the Berlin Wall the processes of linkage of the capital markets in all the countries of the world has become undisputed and to a large extent irreversible. Another particulary important indicator of this are the currency policies of practically all the countries in the world. Through a system of mutual convertibility, the maintenance of official reserves in varying currencies and the greater independence of commercial banks, the national economies of countries over the world have become more dependent on each other. After the beginning of the 1970's the international role of the dollar began to subside slowly. This could be seen in the reduction in the size of the official dollar reserves of the industrialised countries to be replaced in the main by the German mark and the Japanese yen. Perhaps the clearest indicator of the economic growth of the Fourth Civilisation is the level of direct investments and the development of trans-national corporations. In the world today there are 37,000 trans-national corporations with over 170,000 branches. Of these, 24,000 corporations are based in the developed countries, 2700 in the developing countries (mainly, South Korea, Hong Kong, Brazil and China) and less than 500 in Central and Eastern Europe. In 1992, the global volume of direct investments reached 2 trillion dollars accounting for a level of sales by the foreign branches of the trans-national corporations of 5.5 trillion dollars.[55] As each year goes by the internationalisation of industry increases which will lead to the intermixing of cultures, manufacturing structures and changes in the awareness of billions of people. Everywhere in the world, the USA or France, Russia or Rumania, Kenya or Ruanda people are becoming more and more aware of the influence of the world economy on their day to day life. Most significantly the houses in which we live and the services which we use are becoming more and more internationalised. I do not know whether it is an exaggeration to say that the modern citizen of the world is a "product of the world". Everywhere in the world, even in the most isolated of countries you will come across cars from the USA, Japan and Germany, household goods from Italy, coffee and fruit from Latin America, electrical goods from Hong Kong and Japan, carpets from Iran or Bulgaria and clothes from China and India etc.. If you take a look at the raw materials used in the production of the finished goods then you will see the labour and the talents of millions of people from many countries. All this might be summed up as two basic phenomena which show the end of one human civilisation and the beginning of another. The first of these phenomena is that the mutual dependence of countries has reached a level at which nation states, autonomous religions and cultures can no longer historically dominate the processes of integration and universal human interests. It is true that the danger of new class, cultural and religious divisions is still possible but the trend towards world integration is becoming more and more irreversible. The new factor is that the most integrated regions in North America, Europe and Japan have created sound economic and financial links with each other. This has also lead to the involvement of all the remaining countries in the world in the global economy. If we take foreign investments as our criteria, we will see that at the beginning of the 1990's the three main economic centres of the world had direct influence over about 50 other satellite countries which accounted for over 3/4 of the world economic product. Today, there is not a single country which can exclude itself from the world economy without causing serious damage to its own development. The attempts by North Korea, Iraq and in the recent past, Albania and Cuba to develop independently in conditions of self-sufficiency have lead to their economic collapse. The huge level of economic inter-dependence in the world has lead to more than just closer integration. When different systems grow closer they form a common, more universal community which is more vital than any individual national or regional, economic or political force. The second phenomenon is the formation of economic forces for which national identity is more formal than essential. Not only in terms of behaviour, interests and structures these forces belong more to the world than to any particular nation state. Above all, these are a part of the trans-national corporations whose economic activities are spread throughout a number of countries and whose connections and dependencies upon national governments are of less significance than, for example, the state of the London Stock Exchange. We could also look at the large number of financial institutions who operate on a global level not as the citizens of any particular country but as citizens of the world. I believe that both the level of mutual economic dependency of countries as well as the several thousand trans-national manufacturing and financial corporations form the economic nucleus of the new civilisation. At the end of the 20th century these structures which control the majority of world manufacturing and trade are the most powerful globalising force in the world. The 20th century was a time when the global world was born but also a time of the creation of supra-national economic structures and the essence of a new civilisation. When I speak of the economic nucleus of the Fourth Civilisation, I mean the influence it has on all areas of life and that the objective changes brought about by the integration of manufacturing and finances have imposed profound changes in the world economic order. 2. NEW GROWTH AND NEW STRUCTURES The trend of the 20th century towards the constant opening-up of national economies will continue at an increasing rate for the next few decades. This will cause the wide-scale redistribution of manufacturing forces and their re-structuring on a branch level. The dynamics of national and world economic growth will be determined more and more by international exchange... T here is not doubt that the globalisation of the world economy is accelerating. According to the predictions of the World Trade Organisation the volume of goods traded in 1995 will increase by 8%. In 1994 this figure was 9.4%. The fact that during the past ten years, world trade has grown faster than the annual global domestic product (see table 8) shows that the integration and opening-up of national borders continues to be a dominant process. Table 8 % annual growth 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 World Trade 8,0 2,5 4,1 5,3 7,9 6,5 4,5 3,5 4,0 3,5 9,5 World GDP 6,0 2,4 2,8 2,9 4,9 3,4 0,5 -2 -0,5 0,2 2,4 Source: World Trade Organisation. How can this phenomenon be explained? Why for the greater part of the 20th century has world trade been greater than manufacturing? My brief response to these two questions is as follows: the constant growth of world exchange has been caused not only by the growth of manufacturing but also by the cultural and political opening-up of countries, the laws of human progress and technological development. The vast majority of the governments in the countries of the world realise that the effectiveness of their efforts and the wealth of their citizens depends on export and their successful involvement in the international distribution of labour. It has become beneficial not only to exchange newly manufactured products but also those products created in the recent past as well as knowledge, services and personnel. Of particular significance is the difference between the growth of trade and the growth in World Gross Product over the past six years (1990--1995) or since the collapse of the Berlin Wall. There has been a rise in the levels of export from the most developed nations to Eastern Europe and Russia and a continuous increase in the exchange of trade with China. In 1984 alone the progressive Asian economies, including China but with the exception of Japan, achieved a 20% increase in their services trade. There is a simultaneous related increase in Eastern Asia and Central and Eastern Europe. There is no doubt that we are witnessing a new rise in world trade and a reduction in the significance of national borders. If we exclude Africa and the Near East, there is evidence almost everywhere of a growth in world trade and the resulting economic revival. The growth of export is a feature of future change in the structure of product manufacture. The most dynamic group of new products in recent years has been telecommunications and office equipment. I believe that telecommunications will continue to increase their share of world trade and will be the most dynamic and profitable export area. This will result in increased communications between people and the intermixing of cultures and manufacture in the world. Telecommunications are a symbol of the Fourth Civilisation and the main technological channel for its development. Clearly telecommunications will continue to contribute to the re-structuring of social life and the stimulation of growth, the opening-up of the world and the linkage of millions and billions of people. The main integrational effect will be the linking of the new communications technologies to televisions and computer technology. The American media group "Time Warner" has already developed and begun to market the first digital interactive television network in the world. Their "Full Service Network" permits its subscribers to carry out banking operations from home, to receive information about products, services and events, to buy and to order and to see new films etc.. Consumers' choice is guaranteed. However, at the same time, this allows the television companies to guarantee their monopoly of the market. Whatever happens in the future, there is little doubt that telecommunications will continue to expand their share of world trade and be a key factor in economic development and structural and social changes. Together with world finance which has developed as a result of improved world communications, telecommunications will continue to be the most attractive area of the world economy. The Internet has allowed tens of millions of people over the entire world have become part of a single network of communications and access to information. Computer networks will lead to revolutionary changes in finances, trade and manufacturing. Despite certain serious predictions concerning a fall in profits from manufacture and sale of aeroplanes[56], I believe that all modern forms of transport will continue to grow dynamically. People of different races, ethnic groups and cultures are coming closer to one another, running to embrace each other. They are beginning to realise how useful it is to travel together and to meet and use the experience of others. The conclusion which seems to suggest itself is that the branches of the Fourth Civilisation (telecommunications, finances, services, computers, information technology, transport, services etc..) have made life more integrated and are a product of the new inter-dependency which is required by humanity. The process will not stop here. On the basis of these key branches of the New Civilisation, still more, newer, branches will be formed. Television and telephones will spur the creation of new audio-visual telephones. Paging systems and mobile telephones will become cheaper and will allow parents to have more control over their children and to gain information from their teachers. Doctors and policemen will be called to where they are needed. This will change politics and management. It will ease and change ways of voting. There is already software available for conducting trade over the computer with full legal support. In ancient times peoples were separated from one another by years of travel. In the Middle Ages the distance shortened to months. In modern times distances can be covered in days. In the New Civilisation the whole of humanity is connected within hours, minutes and seconds. I recently had to fly from Sofia to Honolulu by Lufthansa and United Airlines. I covered the distance in 15--16 hours. Twenty time zones to the other side of the globe in 16 hours! I am convinced that in the Fourth Civilisation people will be able to circumnavigate the world in less time. Despite the opinions of certain sceptics I am sure that transport will continue to improve and develop with leaps and bounds. This applies to car manufacturing, aeroplane construction, shipbuilding and certain other completely new forms of transport. This will also provide new prospects for world economic growth. New technologies will continue to stimulate this growth and the dynamic processes will never stop despite the critics who believe that the computer and audio-visual market are already satiated. The limits of high technology growth and integrational products have not yet been reached. It is not certain whether this growth will dominate the world economy as a whole. It is most likely that the next 10--20 years will be years of technological progress but also slow reconstruction. The lack of manageability and even elementary order within the world economy means that it is not clear which of the two will gain the upper hand. Above all this requires the replacement of old industrial production with new technology, a process which has been in progress for the past 15 years. This process, however, should not be perceived as the elementary replacement of the "factory chimney with the computer", as some philosophers believe. The old industrial sectors (metallurgy, chemicals, machine tool engineering, energy production, transport) will be partially reconstructed, partially relocated to the lesser developed countries for the sake of cheaper labour and the lack of environmental pressure groups and opposition. One only has to look to see what is happening with the automobile industry, machine tool production, electronics and the electronics industry and chemical production. Everything now involves new high technology and computers. In modern automobile construction as much money is now spent on new electronics as on improvements to engine design. The new generation of aeroplanes, "Boeing" and "Airbus" are practically operated from the ground taking off and landing using electronic equipment, while the pilots fulfil mainly regulatory functions. The chemical industry is re-orienting itself to new, environmentally clean technology and hitherto unknown products. The construction industry is investing more and more in new highly resistant materials. Just as in the 19th and 20th century the industrial revolution lead to revolutions in agriculture without replacing it, the new technology of the New Civilisation will revolutionise industrial technology and will change their essence but will not destroy it. Development does not allow for absolute rejection. Revolution itself always means the addition of the new to the old and its transformation. It has been interpreted in other ways in history, but that was just destruction. The second very important area in the restructuring of the world economy, in my opinion, is the huge process of the geographical re-distribution of world production. Today, the citizens, trade unions and politicians in Bavaria and California are concerned about the re-location of manufacturing facilities to the countries of South East Asia and Latin America. Millions of people are suffering as a result of the reduction in military production, as is the case in California. This fact cannot be ignored, but this is only the beginning. The modern geographical distribution of world production was formed at a time of colonial power and consolidated during the bi-polar world. Given the new world conditions of the Fourth Civilisation, things will have to change out of all recognition. As paradoxical as it may sound even the direction of investments will have to change. Amongst the favourites are the countries of South East Asia. The export of manufacturing potential from North America and Europe will expand. This will consist mainly of those products which can be easily adapted to the new technologies and the constant increase in the cost of labour in the industrialised countries. Finally, the advent of the New Civilisation will be accompanied by the closure of a number of manufacturing processes. This process will be more intense than at any other time during the whole of the 20th century. Whether we live in New York, Tokyo, Belgrade or Dakkar we are living in a state of transition between two civilisations. This is a technological transition, a transition in the nature of economic development. New manufacturing sectors and products will come to the fore. The distinct division between intellectual and physical labour and the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sector will disappear. This is indisputable and supported not only by P.Drucker but also by the chairman of the majority in the US Congress N.Greenwich. The state of change is indeed similar to that which existed at the end of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th. Let us hope that the consequences for the people of the world will not be as dramatic as they were then. During the processes of industrialisation millions of people were thrown out onto the streets or transformed into factory slaves. The developed societies were divided into classes causing huge social unrest. Today the experience of the past and the bitter lessons of the 20th century provide us with the hope that the great changes in technological and economic growth will not inevitably lead to chaos and social strife. 3. WHO WILL DOMINATE THE WORLD ECONOMY Recently, everyone has been trying to convince us that the three economic centres -- the USA, Japan and Europe dominate the world and that the technological and financial power of Japan will replace the economic power of the East. I do not believe in these prospects... D uring the Third Civilisation the power of countries was determined by their military and political power. This was based on economic strength but was not always the most decisive element in the consolidation of power of one country over another. The Ottoman Empire was not more advanced materially when between the 13--16th centuries it conquered one third of Europe as far north as Vienna. France under Napoleon the 1st was no stronger economically than the rest of the countries in Europe but managed to conquer with better military organisation and leadership. The Fourth Civilisation precludes the military resolution of conflicts. The achievement of nuclear parity and the nature of nuclear weapons makes it absurd to wage nuclear war. This is also true conventional conflicts as well. Let us take the example of the war in Bosnia. There have been over 200,000 deaths (perhaps many more), the complete destruction of industry and infrastructure, valleys of blood and violence. The war ended with the signing of the peace accord in Dayton, USA which brought the sides back to their starting points. The reason for such absurdities is the potential possibility of the mutual neutralisation of the nuclear powers and their influence on the smaller warring countries. I begin this chapter in this way since in the 1960's and 1970's when nuclear parity was achieved a "new concept" of world economic domination was born. There are still people in a number of countries who believe that the USA or Japan can play the role of a world economic super power. In the 20th century many countries have aspired to such a role but all of them lost in the long run. I believe that today on the basis of the laws of human development the imposition of economic domination by one country or a group of countries over the rest can only be a temporary state. In the context of globalisation the economic levels of the countries of the world have begun to level out. This process can only be stopped by political coercion or the isolation of countries from each other. In the civilisations which have existed up until now, nations began their development in different climatic conditions and with different resources. In the 19th and 20th centuries these same nations began to realise how wide was the gap had grown between them. During the last 50 years a series of processes began to take place within the heart of the bi-polar model which proved that economic domination from an historical point of view is purely illusory. Let us take as an example the most powerful institutions of the world economy, the trans-national corporations. Immediately after the Second World War the American corporations were the undisputed dominating forces of the world economy and only a group of British companies managed to upset their hegemony. In 1962 of the 500 largest companies in the world, 300 (with a total product of 365 billion dollars) were in the USA and 200 (with a total product of 174 billion USD) in other countries. Today this picture has changed beyond recognition. In 1992, of the 50 largest industrial companies in the world, only 14 were in the USA, 13 in Japan, 2 in the U.K., 7 in Germany, 3 in Italy, 5 in France, 2 in South Korea etc.. This trend will continue. We can expect a serious increase in trans-national companies from Germany, Russia, South Korea, Brazil and also a number of smaller countries. The process of levelling will take place slowly. This is the inevitable result of the opening and expansion of the world market. In contrast to 40 or 50 years ago, today investments, manufacturing processes and goods are being exported everywhere it is economically viable to do so. At the beginning of the new technological revolution in the 1970's and 1980's investments were directed at the most developed nations which had educated and well-trained personnel. I believe that since the 1990's a significant part of the world investments will be redirected mainly to some of the new "dragons" of South East Asia, Australia, China, Latin America and, given greater political stability, Eastern Europe. Similar changes are taking place in the commodity and stock markets. Only a few years ago the stock exchanges in New York and London were dominant. Today the Tokyo stock exchange has changed all that and is now quite convincingly the leading stock market in the world. There has been a gradual, almost invisible process whereby the new financial markets have developed. This will lead to the re-distribution of the economic power and new hitherto unseen trends. Until the end of the 1980's and in particular during the period of the Cold War, the major criterion for political and economic power was still closely associated with the military and armaments industry. If the positive trends of world development continue economic power will depend more on technology, information and resources and will guarantee the future of promising industrial sectors. This will lead to the re-determination of the power and wealth of the countries and nations of the world and their place in the global division of labour. The new technologies will not permit monopolisation. They will guarantee advantages for the countries which possess them only until they are mastered by other countries. High technology in the modern world is being spread via the trans-national corporations and the activities of governments. Japan, despite its world domination in the development and production of new technology is also a major exporter of high-tech products and know-how. In South East Asia and Latin America there are number of production facilities with the most modern telecommunications technology. Competition between the trans-national corporations is the main reason for this. I believe that this is in principle impossible for technology and information to be monopolised in the aims of the domination of certain countries over others especially in the context of the modern scientific and technological revolution. The New Civilisation will still maintain the trend of the free movement of technology and information. The direct result of this is the formation over the past 30--40 years of a new global distribution of manufacturing and technological priorities. Each of the developed countries to a certain extent have found their market niches and has established itself in world export. For example at the beginning of the 1970's the USA exported 77.5% of world aeroplane production; 44.1% of organic chemicals; 55.9% of office equipment; 35.2% of computer technology; 39.3% of industrial refrigeration; 35.8% of grain and 37.1% of steel export etc.. In 1985 Germany accounted for 23.2% of world automobile export; 19.8% of plastics; 51.5% of rotary printing presses; 32.4% of synthetic organic dies; 34.1% of packaging equipment; 30.4% of textile and leather processing machinery. In the same years, 1985, Japan possessed 30.8% of world automobile export; 37.5% of lorries and trucks; 80.7% of televisions and tape recorders; 82% of motorcycles; 62.2% of cameras and video-cameras; 55.7% of microphones and amplifiers; 37.9% of peripheral electronic equipment and 31.7% of tankers etc.. It is interesting that during the same period a number of smaller countries achieved significant levels of long-term exports. For example Sweden accounted for 41.7% of the world export of paper and boxes; 17.2% of centrifuges; 15.5% of sulphate cellulose. The Swiss accounted for 45.1% of textile looms; 34% of wrist watches; 25.3% of synthetic dies and 20.6% of herbicides.[57] Another criterion is the state of the available natural resources in a given country and whether they can exert influence on the power and strength of countries and their role in the world economy. The freer the exchange of goods, services and labour the more open countries become to each other. In this case the power of countries will be determined by their total national wealth based not only the existing manufacturing facilities but also on the available natural resources. On the basis of this logic, in September 1995 the World Bank published an analysis of the ecologically sustainable development and the natural resources of the countries of the world. Accordance to their classification of the available national wealth per head of population (table 9) Australia came out in first place followed by Canada, Luxembourg, Switzerland and Japan. The USA was quite far down the list in 12th place and Germany in 15th. Other countries with enormous reserves of natural resources such as Russia, Brazil, Argentina and others are outside the classification due to their low levels of existing production facilities and human resources. The methodology of the World Bank is flawless: resources are of benefit when there is an adequate material base and human resources. On the other hand, those countries who do not have such resources will have to pay for them and to compensate for the inequity with more labour and technology. Table 9 Classification of the 15 leading countries on the basis of national wealth per head of population. State Wealth per head of population Sources of national wealth % population capital assets natural resources Australia Canada Luxemburg Switzerland Japan Sweden Iceland Qatar UAE Denmark Norway USA France Kuwait Germany 835 704 658 647 565 496 486 473 471 463 424 421 413 405 399 21 22 83 78 81 56 23 51 65 76 48 59 77 62 79 7 9 12 19 18 16 16 11 14 17 22 16 17 9 17 71 69 4 3 2 29 61 39 21 7 30 25 7 29 4 Source: World Bank, 1985 These figures show the constant increase in the number of countries with an established position in the global division of labour. There are at least 30 countries with a high level of economic potential and another 60 or 70 with the potential to join them in the next 30 or 40 years. Most significantly, in the current situation no one country can impose a monopoly on another. The USA, Europe and Japan are inter-dependent on each other. Their mutual dependence is unilateral and is not only between the three established economic centres. As a result of structural reforms in the world economy, there is a whole group of countries aspiring to reach the levels of the top three and as a result of narrow specialisation and resources they will soon catch up with them. Is it then true that economic power will move from the USA and Europe to Japan? A number of academics seem to believe this. I believe that this is possible but that it will be a short-term and limited trend. The reason is that the global market is now strongly influenced by significant market forces which are capable of balancing out the economic levels of the country. Only with strong protectionism or as a result of political cataclysm will one country or another be able to reach a situation of monopoly or privilege. During the entire period of the 20th century only as a result of political and military conflicts has one or a group of nations been able to establish such a position of privilege which has transformed it into a political force. This time is over. No-one any longer recognises the legality of protectionism or uses political arguments in the resolution of ordinary economic issues. The choice is great and the competition offers better alternatives. Manufacturers and merchants in the whole world are forcing their governments to remove prohibitions and limitations. There is a number of cases where the opposite is true, for example the European agricultural policies and the limitations on import into Japan. However, no-one can be convinced of the strategic benefit of such policies. The Fourth Civilisation offers simultaneously the gradual approximation of economic levels and the creation of similar, equitable conditions for economic activity and the mutual conditionality of these two processes. The 20th century opened the way for this process which is irreversible whatever difficulties the transition might bring. Despite the influence of Japanese commercial, manufacturing and investment expansion and despite the fact that in the 1970's and 1980's Japan was the most dynamic economic force in the world, I believe it will not be remain single most powerful leader of the world economy. The economic dynamics of South Eastern Asia will continue but this will give rise to a reverse wave of investments to other regions and countries. It is true that in the last 15 years the USA has lost a part of its share of the world market and Japan has increased its market share by 15%. The American share of the heavy machinery market has fallen from 25% to 5% in 30 years while Japan has increased its share from 0% to 22%[58]. However, even this cannot convince me that this process will continue to develop unilaterally and that the Japanese economy will dominate while the American economy will flounder as this was once predicted by the former director of the European Bank, Jacques Atalie. I am writing these lines early in the morning in perhaps one of the least American and the most Japanese of the United States of the America. I can see through my window the waking lights of the beautiful capital city and perhaps one of the most beautiful places in the world. My first impression is that the atmosphere is mainly Asian and in particular Japanese. Only the liberal spirit of the USA could allow for the mass concentration of Japanese, Chinese, Korean and Vietnamese influences in a single, albeit island, state. It is here that I can understand the arguments in favour of another type of thinking, that the majority of the older Asian immigrants as well as the new arrivals consider themselves to be Americans or at least citizens of the world and that Honolulu has become a bridge between the USA and Japan and that it is such bridges which create a balanced market. Japan and the smaller Asian "dragons" cannot become the masters of the world. However, they have indisputably destroyed the economic, technological and financial monopoly of the Atlantic countries of the USA and Europe. They have created conditions for a completely new distribution of world manufacturing production and hitherto unknown geo-economic structures. In the 19th century Britain and France and eventually Germany dominated the world. During the first half of the 20th century the USA and the USSR caught up and eventually became the world leaders in a bi-polar world. Between 1960 and 1990 Japan indisputably became a member of the family of the world economic leaders and this list will continue to grow. There are at least another 5 or 6 countries in the next 20--30 years which will win significant economic positions and will find their niches in the world market, balanced between the old leaders. At the end of the 20th century and clearly at the beginning of the 21st century the stimulus will continue to come from Asia -- not only from Japan but also from China where the growth rate at the beginning of the 1980's deserves admiration, from Australia whose resources and its "bridge" policies between the USA, Asia and Oceania have given it tremendous advantages and from Indonesia and the Philippines which are also making strong progress. There are good grounds to expect that at the beginning of the 21st century the more powerful Latin American economies will also begin to move ahead beginning no doubt with Brazil. If they achieve political stability and a balanced process of denationalisation then a number of Eastern European economies will also begin to make progress. Russia with its colossal, untapped resources will also begin to play a serious role. I am leading to a statement of my opinion that further economic growth will of necessity require the removal of economic monopolism. Despite the ambitions of dictators, selfish politicians and militant ideologues the globalisation of the world has not lead to the economic domination of one or two countries or individual governments. At the end of the 20th century there is also another clear growing trend which will be predominant in the New Civilisation. I could call this "economic polycentrism" or in other words, the trend towards the re-distribution of economic power and strength between a larger number of countries with the gradual involvement of new ones. It should not be considered that such a trend towards economic polycentrism will summon in a "glorious future". There is not a single country (or group of countries) which can independently control global finance, natural resources or the markets. There is no one country which is in a condition to force the others to follow it. Directly after the fall of the Berlin Wall the theory of the "responsibility of the single super power" become popular. Some people in the USA between 1991--1994 developed this idea, combined it with the American dream and tried to establish a complete doctrine on this basis. Fortunately, the majority of American politicians and the majority of American intellectual elite have realised that this concept is unreal and have rejected it. During my many meeting with American politicians and diplomats in the State Department of the USA between 1995--1996 I became growingly aware of the rejection of this idea but also of the impossibility of this task from the point of view of finances and resources. The experience of the USSR and the USA during the last 50 years has shown categorically that to take on the role of a world super power to defened the sovereignty of the remaining states means to take on an unsupportable financial burden. The collapse of the USSR and the growing gap between the USA and Japan are to a large extent due to the burden of military expenditure. Polycentrism is at the root of world economic development and at the root of democracy. It is a counter-trend to the experiences of imperialism which has dominated world politics for the last 150 years. 4. IS THERE A NEED FOR GLOBAL ECONOMIC REGULATION? If the global economic world is becoming more polycentric is there not a danger of permanent chaos? Is global economic regulation a way to avoid it...? T he new civilisation which humanity is entering is the antipathy to imperialism. Instead of the super powers and the great powers of the Third Civilisation the main trends of the Fourth Civilisation are polycentrism and the possibility for an increased number of countries and people to participate fully in the international division of labour. The mutual dependency of the countries and state leaders make this process sustainable. To this we should add one more element which was discussed in chapters five and six, the transfer of a significant portion of the economic power of the nation state to corporations, companies and individuals or, in other words, organisations and the civil society. The combination of these two processes has lead to great changes in global economic structures but has also posed a number of new questions of principle about world development in general. During the past four or five hundred years everything seemed to be clear: all dependended on the state and their monarchs or leaders, later governments and parliaments. Today things have altered significantly. The multi-national corporations control the major processes of the global world and more and more people including political leaders realise that this is the case. The lack of correspondence between globalisation and the nationally organised activities of governments could lead the world into serious new crises as was discussed in chapter three. If politicians are aware that they are losing their grip over power and realise that they cannot guarantee their election promises to their electors, what should they do? The most logical solution would be for the large international companies to assume national responsibility for all their activities and to be put under some sort of legal control. This should also extend to the investments of large sums of money abroad. Such experiments have been made and will continue to be made. The results are usually disastrous since they lead to the "closure" of the national economy depriving it of any possibility to rationalise its manufacturing industry. If any particular government or parliament imposes limitations upon companies which are acting within their jurisdiction, then they will simply leave the country and will find other more accommodating partners and patrons. Experiments to impose limits on the movement of capital or to impose direct influence on the management of corporations in modern conditions is doomed to failure. Such methods are within the arsenal of the outgoing civilisation. So there remains another possibility, the creation of an adequate system of global economic regulation. The aim of this new system is to form common economic conditions and regulations for the activities of all economic subjects operating within the global market. I am convinced that sooner or later such a system of global regulation will become a reality. History cannot be halted. It is not possible to turn back the trans-national corporations upon which so much of modern progress relies, nor is it possible to delay the progress of globalisation which is stimulated by them. Progress means the establishment of a new world economic order based on the common global rules of the game. Years perhaps even decades will pass before such an order is established but even today the need for it is evident. This is the only guarantee against the threat of a return to imperialism, the widening of the gap between the poor and the wealthy nations. One must be aware of two possible misconceptions, firstly, that there is a need for the creation of a united world government and secondly, that the role could be fulfilled by the United Nations. Undoubtedly, the generations which will live through the second half of the 21st century or later will find some solution to the matter of a world government. Today, however, this is still a Utopia and not only because it will be derided by the vast majority of politicians but because nation states have not exhausted their functions. For this and many other reasons the UN cannot take on the responsibility of global governmental functions. Globalisation which is being propelled by the multi-national corporations and new technology presupposes the gradual development, above all, of a new world economic order. The quicker this takes place, the sooner humanity will enter a new, more mature stage of its development. When after the Second World War the Brenton Woods system was established, governments bore the complete responsibility for the management and movement of monetary flow. The medium and long term transfers of capital were managed by national governments and the international finance and currency organisations. In these conditions fixed exchange rates played an important role as a stabilising factor and the International Monetary Fund complemented the role of the central banks as a reserve fund. This system functioned for three decades. The main reason for the end of the Brenton Woods system was that as a result of the turbulent development of world trade, the majority of international liquid funds overflowed beyond the limits of the nation states. This mass of funds increased by such a huge amount that the volume of international currency speculation began to overtake the volume of trade in goods. In such a situation the world stock exchanges became a significantly more influential factor than fixed exchange rates. With the transition to floating exchange rates the world entered an intermediate state. The abilities of the national governments to "manage" their economies independently became significantly hampered. This was a state of "paradise" for the trans-national corporations and world financial players. The world has lived with this system now for more than twenty years. I can now categorically say that this system based on floating exchange rates, enormous levels of currency speculation and the uncontrollable growth in government borrowing can last no longer. We are sitting on top of a powder keg as a result of the huge mass of money which is outside the control of financial institutions. This system has created privileges for corporations which possess large amounts of free money and those who exploit the instability of the system to multiply their billions. As an antidote to the present international practice of "liberalism" I propose the logic of balanced development. This requires the creation of a set of common rules for the movement of monetary flow, compulsory reserves in the case of investments, stronger controls of "off-shore" zones and the environmental responsibilities of investors etc.. Such measures will lead to a reduction in interest rates which in turn will be of benefit to the weaker nations and will lead to a re-direction of investments into the real sector of the world economy. I do not know whether there will be enough willingness or readiness on the part of governments and central banks of the largest countries to carry out a common global macro-economic policy on the basis of general agreements and long-term accords. The problems could be resolved by the financial and governmental leaders of 7--10 countries and given the current state of the world, the rest would follow. The other possible solution would be to create a real World Bank which would guarantee universal conditions for the exchange of currency and a single global macro-economic policy. Such an idea, if it was supported by a number of financial experts would have a revolutionary, radical character and might be able to put a stop to instability. I am not convinced, however, that at this stage the national governments and the central banks would agree to such a step, although I, personally, am strongly in favour. The majority of world financial strategists still hope that the Federal Reserve System of the USA[59] and the central banks of Germany, Japan and a number of other countries will be in a position to control the world currency markets. During the past twenty years this has, more or less, been the case. When the world financial markets begin to "hit below the belt" the central banks of the major countries coordinate their activities to intervene. There is sufficient evidence to show that this practice is ineffective. One only has to look back to the collapse of the US dollar against the yen in 1995. This was a clear enough sign that the restoration of balance is becoming more and more difficult and the powers of the central banks more and more inadequate. This process is inseparable from the universal logic of the collapse of the institutions of the Third Civilisation. First of all, liberal international economic relations in the last couple of decades have caused the increase in the strength of the "free" players on the world financial markets and made their structures infinitely more complicated. Secondly, the polycentralism of the world economy has brought many more national currencies into the "turnover" of the world stock exchanges. Despite the interest of many countries the dollar will no longer be able to play the role of an international currency. Consequently, there is little likelihood that the current system will survive. It will be necessary to begin negotiations on the creation of a new system of global economic regulation or to develop an entirely new World Bank with similar regulatory functions. I believe that there will be more and more support for the issuing of a currency which will be subject to multi-lateral control and which could be based on the special issuing rights of the International Monetary Fund or other forms of securities which could be issued by a new World Bank. The system of global economic regulation is an inevitable new feature of the Fourth Civilisation. We shall gradually have to become used to the idea of accepting universal standards of economic and human activities and the formation of international courts which will resolve any conflicts which may arise. These will be above all a series of environmental standards about which the people of the world are particulary sensitive at the moment. However, at the same time there will have to be new standards for the payment of labour, social security and arbitration etc.. It is a shameful fact that many of the trans-national corporations have moved their production facilities to less developed nations to avoid pressure in other countries. Recently a large number of workers in Ecuador appealed to an American court to request compensation for being poisoned by pesticides while working for an American company. It is not clear whether the American court will be able to pass judgement on matters pertaining to foreigners outside their jurisdiction. However, it is clear that the absence of acceptable international standards and an adequate international court system is a precondition for inequality amongst nations. What it cannot do in the USA, an American registered company may do in Ecuador. There are innumerable examples of such practice in our modern world of inequality. One of the main aims of the system of global economic regulation will be the increase of global savings with a view to the increase in the level of investments on a world scale. The needs for investments in Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America are constantly on the increase. As a result of the opening-up of the world and after the fall of the Berlin Wall the need for investments will continue to rise until the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st. If the levels of savings reduce as they did in the 1980's, this will create extremely serious problems and will hold back world development. In general terms the system of global economic regulation is the mechanism which will limit and will, eventually, put a stop to the processes of the chaotic development of the world economy. This would provide a stimulus to the development of many countries creating the opportunity for the gradual balancing of the economic levels of the countries of the world assisting in the formation of universal world criteria for economic growth. Sooner or later this system will become reality. The problem is for people to become aware of its necessity sooner rather than later. 5. VIVAT EUROPA AND THE DEATH OF THE INTROVERTS One of the possible scenarios for the future is the division of the world into regional blocs. Is there a risk that the integration of Europe and the aspirations of the Europeans to create a common home will lead to the new division of the world or will globalisation turn the regionally integrated blocs into marginal powers...? T he establishment of the global institutions of the Fourth Civilisation will take place from the bottom up through a gradual process of the transfer of the rights of the national governments, legislative and judicial institutions to international organisations. The best example in the history of humanity is the unification of Europe: from customs unions, the free movement of people, capital and knowledge, the creation of a European parliament, government and court to the decisions to create a common European monetary union (EMU) and the single currency (EURO). Over a period of 30 years the builders of the European Union have not only established the Common Market on the basis of tremendous dedication and created the foundations for universal citizenship but also created a common feeling of belonging for all the citizens of the member countries. In answer to the opinion poll carried out by the "Eurobarometer" in July 1994 "Are you frightened of or do you believe in the European Market?", 53% believed strongly or relatively strongly, 35% were afraid or relatively afraid and 12% had no opinion. I mention these statistics here because I want to prove the most unbelievable fact that only fifty years after the most destructive war in Europe, former enemies have realised that the borders between them are of little significance and that the road to progress is not through war and disputes but via a single market. There is no need to dwell on the details of European integration. There are literally hundreds of books written on the subject which say practically all there is to say. For the needs of my study, the European experience of integration has a different meaning. If the advocates of integration in Europe succeed (and they almost have) this will have an exceedingly positive effect on global processes. The European Union has proved in practice that the processes of integration are stronger than national prejudices. It is no accident that the European continent which during the 20th century has suffered more than any other region of the world has managed to overcome its divisions and the selfishness of its national interests. Europe has learnt from its suffering and torment. More than 60 million Europeans died in world and civil wars in the 20th century alone. The collapse of the Berlin Wall and the unification of the two halves of the divided Europe was of particular significance for the pan-European processes. It posed the question of whether the model of European integration can be applied in other parts of the world. Would this example be followed in North and Latin America or Asia? Are the European Union, NAFTA and the far-Eastern processes of integration comparable? Would the regional processes of integration push globalisation to one side? One of the possible scenarios for the future is the division of the world into regional trade blocs. The European market and currency union, the North American Free Trade Agreement (a new version based on the old 1960 agreement), The Caribbean Common Market and a new far-Eastern zone for free trade are trading blocs which could become a basis for conflict. There are a number of writers, L.Thorou, for example who believe that the 21st century will be a time of regional trade blocs and their selfish domination of the world. There are a number of political concepts based on this. The USA will distance itself from Europe. Europe will strengthen its borders with the East to isolate Russia. Military security will coincide with the borders of the integrated regions etc.. Such ideas are logical only if the intellectual horizons of the advocates are no further than the ends of their noses. Regional isolation within the limits of whatever integrated bloc is an extremely dangerous prospect. It will lead to a chain reaction within the whole world and the creation of similarly isolated regions within American and Asia. While there is little likelihood of this taking place within the new Asian dragons, or the newly confident Latin American economies or Australia, this prospect does not look too improbable for Europe. The European syndrome of "protecting one's achievements" and "strengthening of one's borders" in order not "to let chaos take over" is still alive and in real danger of being provoked. Of all the autonomous economic regions in the world at the moment Europe is one of the most closed. Its internal exchange of trade is extremely high it providing between 60 and 80% of the imports into the larger countries of the Union. While as the European economy is strongly dependent on Asian markets, its investments in Asia have reduced in comparison to American levels. Europe cannot profit from this "integrational introversion". It profits from its own integration but is losing as a result of its introversion and from the lack of sufficient aggression in relation to other markets. This is further stimulated by the fact that the share of national ownership in Europe is significantly higher than in other parts of the world. At the end of 1995 there was a meeting in Spain of the leading European industrialists. I was able to talk to one of the major European industrialists after the conference, the president of the Swiss company ABB, David de Puri. The European industrialists understand the simple truth that "openness is at the root of success". They are in favour of the "more rapid integration of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe into the common European market" and also that it is up to the "Europeans to re-discover the open world economy". I quote the opinion of David de Puri not only out of respect for his undisputed talent as a global leader but also because of the significance of his views in general. Each regional integration, including European integration will be successful if it takes into account the laws of globalisation and if it finds its place within the open global world. There is no doubt that if the European Union becomes transformed into a more or less closed community, if it becomes a closed bureaucratic multi-national state, this will reduce its prospects. As a Bulgarian politician I am firmly in favour of the acceptance of Bulgaria as a member of the European Union and I believe Bulgaria to be part of the European cultural tradition. However, I am not blind. Europe is the richest part of the world, with the vast majority of historical and cultural archaeological sites and monuments. However, it is only one part of the world. In the same way as I cannot accept the term Americanisation, Westernisation or Japanisation, I cannot accept the term Europeanisation. I would like to be able to shout out, "Long Live Europe", "The end of European isolation", "The end of European introversion" -- "Yes, to the open world!" This brings me to my main conclusion. The regionalisation of the world is possible and a probably inevitable stage in world integration, of the transfer of the authority of the nation states to the supra-national economic and political institutions. Regional integration is typical of the transition between the Third and the Fourth Civilisation. It was typical of almost the whole of the 20th century during which alliances between states began to take on more long term features. After the Second World War they took on an economic character. On the eve the new century, however, the regional processes of integration will become more and more subordinate to global processes. The globalisation of financial, raw material and information markets will not permit anyone, including the champions of integration from Europe to close themselves up from everyone else. This will just be ineffective and of no benefit to anyone. The Fourth Civilisation will accept the regionally integrated formations as a intermediate stage in the framework of the polycentric organisation of the world economic order. For a certain period of time they will make up for the absence of global economic regulations without being able to replace it completely. Thus, step by step, stage by stage the structures and the institutions of the new human civilisation will be formed. 6. THE BALANCING OF ECONOMIC LEVELS The balancing of economic levels of countries is also as important as their opening-up to the world. Each of these processes is impossible without the other. G lobalisation and regionalisation, economic polycentralism and the openness of countries, trans-national corporations and global economic regulation, the new global communications and the reduction of the role of the nation states, the deregulation and socialisation of ownership -- these features best describe the economic essence of the Fourth Civilisation. This could also be called global reconstruction or a new economic order or a number of other titles. Countries are opening up to each other but this inevitably requires the balancing of economic levels of development. Each of these categories is impossible without the other at least at the end of the twentieth century. Today there are 1 billion rich people in the world, 2 billion people with medium income and 3 billion poor people. It may be madness to speak of the balancing of economic levels in such conditions. However, if there is to be a new economic order based on the criteria of the New Civilisation this is not impossible. To ignore the problems of poverty and the widening gap between the poor and the rich countries is not only amoral but ineffective. If the world continues to be divided into rich metropolises and a poor periphery this will lead to further isolation. Sooner or later this will give rise to further serious conflicts and new utopias and a new return to totalitarian doctrines. Rich countries will not benefit from this. Rich people do not like to live next door to poor families since they feel that this will affect them. In the same way in the global village the rich countries will be faced with more and more problems from the poorer countries. Earlier in the book I wrote about the problems of realisation of poverty by the poor and their possible reactions. Now I am writing about the slow but inevitable process of realisation of poverty on the part of the rich. The balancing out of economic levels of countries and nations will be a slow and drawn-out process. It is a general consequence, a common result of all the structural and institutional changes which will accompany the advent of the Fourth Civilisation. The huge level of imbalanced development between the countries and nations is caused by the disintegrational processes of isolated development of nations during the past three civilisations. Different tribes and later national communities developed in the context of completely new climatic conditions, resources and socio-political context. It is entirely logical that certain nations should develop further than others. First of all the Shumerians and the Egyptians, then the Greeks and the Romans followed by the Chinese and the Indians. By the 15th century there was already a clear trend towards European domination over the other countries of the world. It is only now at the end of the 20th century that this domination could be said to be coming to an end. What are the differences in the development of the individual countries of the world now in the 20th century? If we take as our basis the GDP per head of population we can divide the countries of the world into three groups, the rich with a GDP per head of population of more then 10,000 USD, the medium-rich with a GDP of 2-10,000 and the poor with a GDP of less than 2000 USD. Table 10 Gross Domestic Product per head of population (US Dollars)[60]. Wealthy countries Medium wealthy Poor countries Switzerland Luxemburg Japan Bermuda Sweden Finland Norway Denmatk USA Iceland Canada Germany France Austria UAE Belgium Italy Holland U.K. Australia Brunei Qatar Hong Kong Singapore Spain New Zealand Israel Bahamas Ireland 33,515 30,950 26,919 26,600 25,487 24,396 24,151 23,676 22,560 22,362 21,254 21,248 20,603 20,379 20,131 19,295 18,576 18,565 16,748 16,595 16,554 15,484 13,192 12,869 12,461 12,136 12,092 11,708 10,789 Cyprus Taiwan Kuwait Dutch Antibbes Saudi Arabia Malta Bahrain Barbados Greece South Korea Puerto Rico Lybia Portugal Macao Estonia Gabon Trinidad Surinam Latvia Russia Belorus Fm. Yugoslavia Brasil Mexico Uruguay Argentina Czech Republic Lithuania Hungary Cuba Venezuela Botswana Malaysia South Africa Kazakhstan Mauritius Ukraine Iran Moldova Chile 8,641 8,546 8,520 7,300 7,300 7,217 7,075 6,581 6,498 6,356 6,338 5,842 5,626 5,417 3,829 3,777 3,620 3,585 3,418 3,220 3,111 2,956 2,921 2,874 2,860 2,794 2,714 2,711 2,690 2,620 2,614 2,585 2,503 2,474 2,467 2,429 2,336 2,205 2,176 2,163 Ruanda Vietnam Malawi Laos Burundi Bangladesh Madagascar Zaire Chad Cambogja Afganistan Nepal Buthan Uganda Ethiopia Somalia Tanzania Mozambique Sierra Leone 261 227 227 226 216 216 213 213 211 208 199 195 178 177 164 116 100 86 72 All the countries of the first group are inseparably linked to the world economy. They have open economies and a relatively stable position within the international distribution of labour. One part of the second group has the potential of catching up with the first if they are permitted to participate in the integrational processes and are provided with sufficient investments. Greece, Portugal, Mexico, China, South Korea, Hungary and the Czech Republic, Poland, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, Brazil, Venezuela, Thailand, Malaysia, The Republic of South Africa and even Kazakhstan have sufficient potential to make serious advances. Table 10 shows a third group of countries whose position is practically hopeless and whose manufacturing structures are hundreds of years behind that of the most developed countries. Of course, the GDP criterion is not exhaustive. It only shows the actual productivity of the world population. Many countries in the second group will face problems due to the high costs of servicing their foreign debts, especially when compared with GNP. Table 11 shows this ratio for 40 countries whose manufacturing industry is not in a position to pay the rapidly accumulating foreign debts. 15 of them are medium-developed countries including Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Malta, South Korea and others. Of course, the foreign debt problem will hamper attempts to reach the necessary level of economic development. The paradox of the transition to the Fourth Civilisation is that one group of countries is already within its embraces, another is standing at the threshold while a third group is still living within the conditions of the pre-industrial era. The majority of the population of Tanzania, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria and other countries still live in huts. Large numbers of children in Somalia, Ethiopia, Ruanda and Congo are dying of starvation. Given such a situation, are we right to pose the question of the balancing of economic development? I believe that we are right and that this is the only way for the New Civilisation to establish itself. Table 11 Foreign Debt as a percentage of Gross National Product[61] Syria Bolivia Uganda Oman Costa Rica Bangladesh Pakistan Bulgaria Tanzania Cyprus Mozambique Ghana El Salvador Kenya South Korea Papua New Guineau Tunisia Poland Lebanon Malta 728,4 426,0 283,4 262,6 250,8 225,3 222,6 221,7 214,7 181,7 167,5 155,9 148,3 142,4 130,2 129,9 118,1 114,5 113,8 109,8 Mauritius Hungary Ethiopia Zaire Barbados Zimbabwe Panama Sri Lanka Dominican Rep. Togo Gabon Benine Jordan Egypt Nepal Nigeria Uruguay Laos Cameroon Lesotho 109,2 108,8 104,9 95,4 94,8 89,6 88,1 88,1 85,3 85,0 84,6 82,3 81,0 80,0 79,0 77,0 73,6 72,9 72,6 71,5 If the existing world structures and the liberal structures of the world economy are preserved, the gap between the most develop and the least developed countries will continue to increase. Only in the last 30 years this gap measured on the basis GDP per head of population has doubled. If these policies continue in the future there will be no significant change. It is true that the economic development of China and the smaller Asian "dragons" and the expected revival in the economies of Latin America to a certain extent will fill this vacuum. However, this is not the case for many countries in Africa or for another fifty or so poorly developed states where there is little hope . The pure market approach will not guarantee balanced development for another reason. 8-10 of the first group of the most developed countries will for some time to come continue to "rule the world" and to aspire to the role of an independent economic regulator. I am not saying that the global market will not impose limits on this trend but the intense competition for investments in the developed countries will give the poorer countries a chance and will force investors to take risks. However, this will not be sufficient. I believe that the decisive factor will the combination of market trends with global regulation which will stimulate a significant increase in investments from the wealthier to the poorer nations. Of course, each of them will have to take additional responsibility for the establishment of stability, order and the fight against corruption and crime. For the moment things have been left to the interest of the multinational groups. With certain notable exceptions this has not stimulated the improvements to infrastructure in the poorly-developed countries which they need for further economic development. The problem of world poverty and in a broader context -- the balancing out of economic levels will be resolved at a global level. This will be accomplished by the United Nations, the IMF or the World Bank but above all, by changes in the world economic order and the creation of institutions of global economic regulation. Certain statesmen, including the late President of France, Francois Mitterand, believed in the need for a comprehensive agreement between the North and the South, between the rich and the poor states. This was a good if not realistic idea. I believe that it would be much more effective to develop specific economic programmes for individual countries aimed at the stimulation and guaranteeing of private investments via specialised funds and the integration of the poor states in the world economy. Only about 2% of the global military budget would be sufficient to carry out such programmes, or about 10-12 billion US dollars. This would give a powerful impetus to the process of resolving the problems of hunger and illness, the reduction in the birth rate and the creation of more sustainable forms of income for specific populations. The balanced development of the world requires a change in direction from charity and hand-outs to policies aimed at changing the economic infrastructure of the least developed nations in the world. It is true that this will not at all be easy and that the reduction of military budgets does not mean the sudden release of huge funds for investments. In many cases these funds will "sink" out of sight as a result of corruption, the lack of organisation and the desperation of the hungry. However, these are inevitable difficulties which should not stop the process. If humanity and especially the wealthiest nations do not take serious steps to change the trends in the development of the poorest nations, this will lead to the appearance of new utopias, open the way to religious fanaticism and confrontation and incite new local, regional and even world wars. If humanity finds the strength within itself to begin the processes of resolving this matter this will lead to a change in the face of the earth. New opportunities will be opened up not only to the people of the poor countries but to all. What seems impossible and too expensive as an approach to the struggle against poverty in actual fact will save money in the long run because future generations will not have to pay the bill. Such are the laws of the mutually dependent global world. Chapter Nine THE CULTURE OF THE FOURTH CIVILISATION 1. THE BEATLES, MICHAEL JACKSON AND THE BULGARIAN CAVAL Some of the strongest driving forces of the Fourth Civilisation are the new global communications. They permit not only the simultaneous distribution of information products all over the world but also promote cultural images and standards, universal models and styles. With every passing day the world is being taken over by a new universal culture. W hen I heard the Beatles for the first time in 1966 I was 12 years old. This was in Sofia at a time when television, radio and the newspapers divided the world into the "good" (socialism) and the "bad" (capitalism) in the most terrible and primitive manner. The Beatles came into our small, closed country via the radio. I remember that first of all, one or two of my classmates and then almost everyone began to swap information about them -- who they were, where they came from and we began to learn off by heart the titles and the melodies of their songs. The popularity of the Beatles began to worry some of those responsible for education in Bulgaria I remember one day our teacher saying to us, "Even if we like their music, the way in which they dress and their behaviour is unacceptable". This fact alone demonstrates that the Beatles were much more than just music and that they were much more than just another pop-group. From their appearance in Liverpool and their first concerts in Scotland in 1963, Germany and Britain the Beatles transformed their music into a world cultural and social phenomenon. The entire youth of the 1960's and 1970's took John Lennon, Paul Macartney, George Harrison and Ringo Star to their hearts. In 1964 and 1956 the Beatles conquered Europe, North American, Australia and New Zealand. In 1966, much to surprise of the sceptics, they took Japan and the Philippines by storm. Their concerts in Tokyo and at the national stadium in Manilla were no less successful than their concerts in Europe and America. The sensation was undisputed. It was a new global phenomenon for which there were no borders or, perhaps, which destroyed the existing cultural barriers and prejudices. Beatles' records went all around the world and their songs were sung in Africa, Asia and in Latin America. The Beatles were a phenomenon of special cultural value. For the first time a pop-group had achieved such universal global fame. This is, however, not to underestimate other such famous performers such as Elvis Presley or Edith Piaf or Caruso. Although each of them was a part of the cultural treasury of the 20th century, the Beatles phenomenon was an expression of and the beginning of something entirely new. The undoubted reason for their success was the talent of the musicians from Liverpool. However, if they had been born 30 years earlier with even greater talent they would have not achieved such colossal success. The Beatles appeared at the moment when the electronic media had just begun a global revolution. This was not only a matter of electric guitars but the new means of information transfer and the speed and methods of disseminating new cultural images. The Beatles were the first swallows of the new era and heralds of our current civilisation. The process of the globalisation of world culture began with the Beatles. New musical styles began to appear within a given country, in a particular town or bar but as a result of the electronic media they became international and lose their local and national significance. The language of music is a language equally understandable in all the corners of the world. It was logical to expect music to be the main and most natural channel for the dissemination of universal cultural symbols and images and that music would be the starting point for the process of globalisation of culture. Moreover, together with the dissemination of cultural images created within one individual state the 1960's were also a time of the intensive intermixing of cultural styles and the search for points of intersection between formerly autonomous national and cultural traditions. The Beatles looked to the cultures of India and Japan for some of their motifs. In the 1970's many African and Latin American musicians gained significant popularity. Generally speaking, in culture as in economics there were two types of phenomena which could no longer be defined as purely national either in terms of their significance nor in terms of their specific legacy of cultural traditions. Some symbols appeared in a local context and then gained global recognition. Other appeared as a result of cultural intermixing and the creation of cultural models and styles which organically combined or synthesised individual national cultures. What national and cultural style is expressed today by the music of Michael Jackson? The Anglo-Saxon cultural tradition? Hardly. The culture of black America? Yes, to a certain extent. As he grew more independent and more creative, his music became more primal separated from local concepts and traditional criteria of beauty and aesthetics. Michael Jackson's style and his songs have been influenced by a number of cultures. However, his primal attraction and personal musical energy are products of a time which does not recognise national borders and which forms global cultural and aesthetic standards of beauty and values. In previous centuries cultural influences were imposed mainly by coercion and they tended to effect only individual parts of the world. Today modern global communications and the global media do not only disseminate the best manifestations of global culture but also require the creative artists to observe the new cultural criteria and requirements of the new world art. Anyone who wishes to achieve world fame must be allowed access to the hearts and souls of people in the different parts of the world. The Beatles and Michael Jackson, Madonna and Queen as well as many other musicians have created works of music and artistic influences which owe their success to a hitherto unknown musical style and to the unique combination of dynamism and expressivity which knows no national boundaries. There have been similar phenomena in the other art forms. Television and video, and advertising have begun to penetrate the whole of world culture. First of all they penetrate a local culture and then in conjunction with other less culturally specific products form a part of global culture. I recently listened to an interview given by the world famous designer Lacroix in which he was describing his attempts to combine influences from different cultures, "Intermixing -- this is the essence of things". This is the essence of the new and it is a logical consequence of the opening-up of the world and the influence of global communications. The intermixing of cultural traditions is an expression of the same synthesis which is now apparent in global economics. It was his death from AIDS which elevated Freddy Mercury to a status perhaps greater than he was in life. However, Queen's music was not purely English or European but a more universal music of the future world as an integrated community. Who does the music of Jean Michel Jarre belong to? It has nothing in common with the powerful tradition of the chanson. The music of Jean Michel Jarre is a product of the electronic society not only in terms of technology but in terms of its historical significance and the beginning of the new age. The main result of this process is the formation of a universal spiritual and cultural content of the world. This is above all manifested in the appearance of a growing number of cultural products which have no national borders and limits. Music was the first of these but now similar processes are taking place in the cinema, fashion and art resulting in the appearance of millions of new bonds between the people of the whole world. I live in a country with rich and ancient cultural traditions. I am saddened by the destruction of traditional culture which has been taking place since 1992. However, I am encouraged by certain new and important phenomena -- the combination of the global culture with national traditions on the one hand and the adaptation of national traditions to global trends. Few people would recognise the Bulgarian folk instrument, the Caval. There are similar looking wind instruments in other countries of the world, but the Bulgarian Caval in terms of its construction and sound is unique. Theodosi Spasov has used it to win many significant international awards and has conquered the hearts of many people. His performances have little in common with the traditions of the Bulgarian Caval. His improvisations are filled with the spirit of the new and his compositions are a symbol of modern musical philosophy. For this reason he is understandable anywhere. There is no chronological distinction between his art and that of the greatest modern composers. This is only one example. Many others could be drawn from the various areas of art. Most significantly even the smallest of world cultures can produce global culture. All they need to do is to find the link between their own identity and the universal global cultural processes. Between 1984--1995 the famous Bulgarian folk-singer Stefka Subotinova recorded a number of Bulgarian folk songs with a modern arrangement which achieved enormous popularity. Other famous Bulgarian pop singers such as Lili Ivanova and Georgi Hristov also combine Bulgarian and global cultural elements. There are similar processes at work all over the world. The most important conclusion which I draw here is that after the 1960's together with the appearance and the spread of new global communications and the media there also began a new process of the globalisation of world culture or in other words, the creation of a culture with a supra-national character. This culture created global criteria and values, overcame national, cultural and religious prejudices and is undoubtedly an element of the coming Fourth Civilisation which the 21st century will bring us. This culture is creating the future. It is a bridge to it and a bridge to the unification of new generations from all over the world. This new culture became possible as a result of the mass influence and cultural mixing born by the world media. Satellite television made possible the removal of borders without tanks and violence without the dissemination of militant ideology and doctrines. The world is united with new communication networks -- a process which will clearly continue with growing intensity into the coming century. This is the greatest guarantee for the continued globalisation of world culture. A shining example of this is the creation of television networks which cover the entire globe. It can be easily predicted that such global television networks will continue to penetrate all the corners of the earth. Part of them will carry information, some of them will broadcast art, while other will show sports. However, they will all be the most powerful integrational factor in the world. While the collapse of the Eastern European totalitarian systems was a political revolution, the first part of the collapse of the Third Civilisation, the new communications will be the material manifestation of the new age. Microchips, computers and satellite televisions spell death for bureaucracy, partocracy and the restrictions of human rights. The Beatles, Freddy Mercury, Jean Michel Jarre and Theodosi Spasov are all directly linked. They are but different manifestations of one and the same global phenomenon, the globalisation of art and new cultural dimensions which will combine the strongest national traditions with a new, hitherto unknown global culture which will belong to no one single nation. Will national traditions and cultures disappear? Will cultural differences not become a reason for the new division of the world? Is not global culture a covert form of media dictatorship? These questions will be answered later. 2. THE TRAVELLING PEOPLES Until only fifty years the majority of people travelled only to the neighbouring town or village and foreign travel was a privilege of only a select few. Each subsequent generation bears within itself the spirit of the global world. Today millions and billions of people travel around the world. Travel has become a bridge over which the peoples of the world can get to know one another and exchange their cultures. T he globalisation of world culture has lead to a particular form of cosmopolitanism which has flourished as a result of new technologies and communication. Cosmopolitanism, however, is not characteristic of all countries and peoples nor is there any direct link between cosmopolitanism and the level of technological and economic progress which a given country has achieved. Switzerland is one of the most advanced countries in the world. However, they are more conservative than cosmopolitan. They acknowledge and service the cosmopolitanism of others without accepting it for themselves. Everything depends from an historical point of view on the development of a given nation, its openness to the world and at the same time its ability to preserve its integrity. Many peoples exiled from their native lands over the centuries have dissolved into foreign ethnic groups or have been simple either enslaved or annihilated. Therefore the decisive factors are not only national openness and mobility but also loyalty to one roots. Those nations in history which were the first to master new forms of communication were able to spread their culture to other states. I like to refer to these nations as the "travelling nations". In this process they achieved significant historical advantages and became leaders in the processes of integration. The modern world is now dependent on those "travelling nations". Joel Kotkin calls them the "global tribes". For Kotkin these global tribes combine a strong feeling of loyalty to their family roots, observe the principles of national fidelity and despite being spread all over the world identify with one specific geographical area. According to my analyses these global nations are not only a continuation of an historical tradition but are, above all, a powerful integrating element of the modern world. In the same way that the ancient Greeks spread their culture to Scythia and Rome, today the global nations are amongst the most effective bridges for the dissemination of capital, technology and culture. Each of these peoples left their native land and later established positions of strength in dozens of other countries and created an invisible network of families, relatives or national ties or channels for the dissemination of economic and cultural values. A typical feature of these "travelling nations" is their facility to become naturalised successfully in different countries amongst varying ethnic groups at the same time preserving their national roots and traditions. There are several reasons for this: the absence of a homeland state; colonisation of cultivable lands; migration as a result of wars and natural catastrophes; political, ideological and religious conflicts. These are the most common reasons which instill the spirit of the pioneer and traveller. The Jewish people are a typical example of this. The modern world economy and world corporations were founded by Jews. Expelled as a result of persecution and the lack of their own homeland, as early as the 18th century the Jewish people began their own processes of economic integration. At the time when everything functioned within narrow national borders, the Jews exploited the differences between national manufacturing conditions and today it is no accident that their representatives are amongst the richest people in the world. The religious prohibition against Christians lending money with interest allowed them to master the secrets of banking. The lack of their own state institutions and land made them into the best traders in the world. Perhaps their greatest strength was the close network of connections and their efforts to preserve the traditions of the old Jewish families. Today the Jews, the oldest travellers, are not alone. One might go so far as to say that their trans-national monopoly has been taken from them. There is another group of peoples who are keenly following the achievements of world communications and are gradually catching up with, and in certain cases overtaking, the achievements of the Jews. The British, the Armenians, the Chinese, the Indians and more recently the Americans and Japanese are gradually becoming global nations or in other words, people who are links in a complex chain spanning the world with millions and millions of other links. Many of these global peoples have specialised themselves in significant parts of world manufacturing and trade. For example the Jews from generation to generation have expanded their influence in the entertainment industry, the world of finance and the diamond trade. The Japanese are the world leaders in precise engineering, in the production of high powered computers and computer technology. The Indians are amongst the world leaders in software, the British in banking and communications, the Americans in telecommunications, aerospace engineering and the Chinese in textile manufacture etc.. Perhaps, the most important factor is while preserving their relative specialisation and making their own contributions to the global cultural treasury, these travelling nations have helped greatly in the removal of borders between the nations of the world. Thanks to them the world today is closely integrated and the intermixing of their cultures has reached tremendous levels. The global world would be impossible without these "travelling peoples". The preservation of national cultural traditions and tolerance to other cultures has allowed them to become some of the leading architects of the new world. At the opposite extreme those who are isolated and intolerant to other cultures have no chance. They will either remain at the tail-end of world progress or they will incite conflicts which will have serious consequences for themselves. The totalitarian regimes were typical examples of this. Totalitarianism can flourish only in isolation. The Russians, Czechs, Bulgarians and Poles were isolated from progress and the new technological revolution which embraced the world in the 1960's. Today they are having to redouble their efforts to make up for lost time. On the other hand, there is the example of the eternal Jews. They have occupied key positions in the economic, cultural and political life of France, Russia, the United States and the Republic of South Africa. Members of the same families can be found in London, Paris, New York, Capetown and even Hong Kong. It is these families and clans which have been the major channels for the explosion in world trade over the past 30--40 years. Another similar example is that of the Indians who apart from operating within their own country exert strong influences in London, Los Angeles, Chicago or Lagos. If you visit Nairobi the capital of Kenya, you will be amazed to see how many Indians there are in the financial and commercial sectors. As a result of their powerful navy and great colonial empire in the 19th century, the British have very strong global positions. The influence of the British financial networks is particulary strong in Sidney, Singapore, Toronto or San Francisco. The majority of the travelling nations became established in the 19th century and the first half of the 20th. They opened the way for the globalisation of the world. They not only gave birth to this process they were also its children. Today the "old travellers" are accompanied by new "travelling nations" who are more dynamic and will perhaps make up for what they missed out on. One of the newest travelling nations are the Japanese. They have the biggest banks in the world, the most progressive world technologies and their own "settlements" within all the world economic and cultural centres. I would say that from the 1960's onwards the Japanese have spread all over the world. Some people consider that this is a planned invasion with a view to conquering new economic influence and living space. Others say the opposite, that the Japanese economy is like a balloon which if it is to avoid bursting needs first to be deflated. I do not believe that from an historical point of view any one given nation can dominate the rest and by the same token I do not believe that international Japanese invasion has reached its apogee. The Chinese and the Indians will have a hard job to try and take their place. At least until the beginning of the next century the Japanese global diaspora will continue to exert a strong influence on the formation and development of the whole world. The strong Japanese influence on the American economy, their penetration into European economic structures and their strong overtures to Latin America and some African countries demonstrate that the Japanese will continue to be one of the leading travelling nations. Only one example is sufficient. Each year the Japanese economy invests huge amounts of free capital into real estate in the USA and Europe. According to some analysts almost 40% of the property in the centre of Los Angeles in Japanese. The same can be said of the huge skyscrapers in New York. There are thousands of Japanese enterprises in the USA some of which occupy leading positions in technology. One of the most prestigious world resorts, the Hawaiian islands are owned to a large extent by the Japanese. If you walk along the coastal boulevard at Waikiki beach you are more likely to hear Japanese than any other language and you will see that the majority of the marvellous hotels by the beach are Japanese. What the Japanese were unable to achieve with their attacks and their bombs against Pearl Harbour they have achieved by hard work, money and consistency. Today only a few kilometres from the place where in December 1941 Japanese bombers inflicted their most serious blow against the American Pacific Fleet there is a chain of luxury Japanese hotels. The Japanese have two amazing features. They have a tremendous ability to adapt and to achieve progress quietly and consistently. Take a look at the streets of any of the world's large cultural, financial or tourist centre. Practically everywhere you will see Japanese tourists taking photographs, taking notes and they are always in little groups. They are soaking everything up. They will later analyze the information they have taken away with them and then they will come back, this time with investments and specific ideas for entering the market, quietly, slowly and unnoticed. The other new global travellers who can be seen everywhere are the Chinese. According to some statistics, the Chinese who live outside the border of China control the larger part of the hard currency reserves of the world. There are "Chinatowns" in Los Angeles and San Francisco, Toronto and New York. They are becoming more and more influential and add their own colour and new cultural phenomena to the countries in which they live. There is a growing Chinese influence in Japan and Australia. Clearly the reform government of China is trying to emulate the experience of Japan to create conditions for new world domination on the basis of traditional Chinese domination. If the current rate of Chinese economic growth persists to the end of the century and the hard currency reserves of the Chinese living outside China continue to increase then within 10--15 years they will become the most dynamic "travelling nation" in the global world. With new simplified procedures, an ethnic economy, strong national links, extreme hard work and consistency -- these are the characteristics which guarantee great chances of success for the Chinese. The Indians and the South Koreans whose economic elite are becoming more and more self-confident will also direct their attention to a similar global approach. It can be expected that the Asian economies will not only experience an ardent renaissance but that their development will have a colossal global effect. The example of South Korea and a number of smaller Asian states is indicative that it is not necessarily only the larger peoples which become "travellers" and take on a global significance. Perhaps their example will be infectious. The collapse of the bi-polar model and the destruction of the Berlin Wall gave the Eastern Europeans a chance to discover the advantages of the open world. Very soon after 1990--1991 the Slavs and in particular the Russians began to re-settle all over the world. Although it is too early to make any sort of conclusion, the Russians seem to be turning into one of the new "travelling nations". The large export of capital (according to the Russian official figures -- over 40 billion dollars between 1991--1994) and the creation of a Russian suburb in New York, the purchase of real estate in London, Paris and Madrid, these are all features of the new, long-term Russian presence in the global world. When I speak of the "travelling nations" I am not emphasising the leaders of this group. I mean the general trend towards the re-settlement of people, people travelling for the purposes of business or leisure. People are no longer restricted to their own states as they once were. They do not only travel to neighbouring countries. Younger generations are losing their feelings of loyalty to the country in which they were born and are more capable of living anywhere where there is a chance of good work and decent living conditions. For the past 20 years the number of people travelling by air has constantly been on the increase. The forecasts for the year 2010 are particularly significant. Table 12 The number of people travelling on international airlines (millions) Year Passengers 1986 318 2000 485 2005 624 2010 789 Source: The World in 1995. L.,1995. As can be seen from table 12, for the next 15 years the number of those travelling on international airlines will double. If we also add the number of people travelling by other means of transport we will see that more than one third of the world's population travels to different parts of the world. Most of the travellers are from the industrialised countries and there is a logical trend arising, the greater the material progress of a given nation the more they are inclined to travel. The "travelling nations" are uniting the world in an inimitable manner. Their families and ethnic and cultural connections, their national affiliations unite countries and continents, frequently in spite of official government policies. They are the bearers of globalisation and it is no accident that they produce the vast majority of the representatives of global culture. Only those nations which can adapt to the conditions of new world communications will be able to survive and to dominate the world intellectually and economically. The Jews, the British, the Americans, the Japanese and Chinese are the leading nations in the processes of globalisation. They are immediately followed by the Indians and Armenians who in their own way and in different scales have attempted to establish their own networks. The Armenians are fewer in number but very closely knit while the Indians are motivated by their desire to catch up with the rest of the world. It should, however, be noted that very soon the benefits which can be gained by "travelling" will be discovered by others. There is a great likelihood that the Russians, Brazilians, Mexicans, Nigerians and South Koreans will follow in the footsteps of the other "travelling nations". Some people say that the time of ethnic groups has arrived, I personally believe that now is the turn of the "travellers". 3. MAN WITHOUT ETHNIC ORIGIN OR THE REBELLION OF ETHNICITY No-one can say how many people of mixed blood live on the earth. No-one can say how many mixed marriages there are, but one fact is certain -- that they are on the increase. There are hundreds of millions of people who by blood or by spirit do not belong to one nation or group of people. They are simply citizens of the world or a part of the New Civilisation. T he demographic statistics of the UN show that about one third of the modern world population is of mixed ethnic origin. This may include the majority of the population of multinational countries, the children of mixed international marriages and so on. I am convinced that all the figures which have been collated in relation to this question are relative simply because of the different types of methodology used and the lack of precise statistics. There is one significant element: the more globalised the world becomes the more people will become the bearers of multicultural traditions. This is another demographic aspect of globalisation and global culture. While the "travelling nations" stimulate the processes of opening-up, the children of international marriages are the truest expression of the new civilisation. It is not important where a person is born and what passport he possesses. Even if a person is defined as an American, although he is of Italian-Irish or Russian descent or even if he is Tatar-Ukrainian, this is not the most important. What is most important is that there is an increasing number of people in the world who on the basis of their behaviour, their lifestyle and their value systems demonstrate the characteristics of the multicultural society and the intermixing of different traditions and customs. There is a growing number of people all over the world who are becoming aware of their global belonging and regard their specific citizenship as a relative and distant concept. The daily life of these people bears little resemblance to that of their mothers and their fathers. They may have come from India, Egypt, Zimbabwe or Thailand but they dress like Europeans, live in apartments with simple modern furniture and eat international cuisine. Their ethnic origins might be expressed only through certain national dishes, items used to furnish their homes or the celebration of certain national feast days. With the intermixing of trade and communications and national cultures, man himself is changing. Little by little day by day he is becoming a citizen of the world. Born of a European mother and a Latin American father he might wake up in an apartment in New York, watch the world news on the BBC and go to work in a Japanese company. He might lunch in a Chinese restaurant and then go to Russia on business. This Mr.X might have a house which is furnished with items "made in the world", he might have a Polish wife and his children might be learning Italian. There are innumerable examples of this. They are the signs of an emerging, unclassified phenomenon -- the appearance of a universal human culture and common global awareness. The main centres of this intermixing used to be in university cities, tourist areas or companies with employees from many countries of the world. Today these processes of drastic change are taking place all over the world. There are certain exceptions, where the women of a certain country are not allowed to marry foreigners or to have children by them. The Palestinians, for example, do this for reasons of national survival. When the Jordanians require the children of mixed marriages to take Jordanian citizenship this is mainly for religious reasons. The ethnic and the cultural intermixing of the world is a slow and evolutionary process. It can be seen in cultural adaptation, the use of one and the same language and the intermixing of lifestyles and cuisine etc.. Let us take for example language learning. As can be seen from table 13, at the moment there are 12 major languages in the world. In total there are between 4000 and 10,000 spoken languages and between 20--50,000 dialects. There is an undisputed trend towards the gradual disappearance of a large number of dialects and languages. The process of cultural intermixing also is taking place in languages. On the one hand this is a sign of the trend towards the use of a single or small number of languages as a global lingua-franca. To a great extent this is the role of English. On the other hand there are a large group of local languages which thanks to the electronic media will survive and will play a significant role in the survival of the culture of certain nations. At the moment more than 1 billion people in the world use English as an international language. This is due to the fact that the English speaking group is the second largest group of people in the world (table 13) as well as the fact that it has been the English-speaking countries which have provided the main stimuli for progress and that the world media broadcast in English. English is undoubtedly the major language in North America, one of the major languages in Europe and is used widely in Japan, India and Latin America as an international language. Globalisation will require sooner or later one of the world languages to become a global language. It is very likely that this English will fulfil this role. This is because the most active processes of globalisation during the last 50 years have come about as a result of the domination of the USA in the world economy. It is possible, however, that in the processes of economic polycentralisation English will lose part of its domination to French or German or one of the eastern languages such as Chinese or Japanese. Whatever the outcome I believe that the future of culture and language lies in a combination of global language and culture, national cultures and languages and the unsustainable cultures and languages of the smaller nations. There are notably over 2 billion people in the world, mainly in the poorer countries who do not speak any of the 12 major languages of the world. Table 13 The major languages of the world. Chinese More than 1 billion China, Taiwan, Singapore English 300-400 million people United Kingdom, USA, Canada, Ireland, India, Nigeria, Australis, South Africa (official language of 87 nations and territories) Hindi 250-300 million North Africa, Trinidad, South Africa, Mauritius Arabic 165 million North Africa, Near East Russian 250-300 million Republics of the Former Soviet Union Malay 180 million Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei Bengali 150 million Bangladesh, India Spanish 180-520 million Official language of 20 nations and territories in Europe and America French 100-150 million Official language in 37 countries and territories in Europe, Africa, America and Oceania Japanese 125 million Japan, minorities in USA and Brasil German 150 million Germany, Switzerland, Luxemburg, Lichtenstein, Austria and Belgium Urdu 50-90 million Pakistan. Source: the Universal Almanac 1996 ed. J.Wright, Kansas City, 1995. It is still unclear which of them will preserve their languages and which of them will fall under the influence of the stronger cultures. Neither one extreme, the disappearance of ethnicities within a global culture, nor the other, their isolation and conservation is capable of answering the needs of humanity. It has already been mentioned that the explosion of ethnic groups is more or less an attempt at self-defence and a consequence of aggression against smaller cultures and nations. If migration, mixed marriages and the world media stimulate the intermixing of culture, then education and concern for the smaller cultures is a compulsory precondition for the preservation of local traditions and universal harmony. The Fourth Civilisation will be an era of global cultural phenomena but also the preservation of all the smaller cultures which express the diversity of the human species. This process cannot be stopped and there is little doubt that there will be an increase in the number of people who will lose their "pure" ethnicity but this will not lead inevitably to the destruction of national traditions and features. There have been periods throughout the history of humanity when the mixing of blood for many nations was considered shameful. Many nations aspired to preserve the purity of their roots and people through the purity of their blood. The formation of nations and nation states coincided logically with this process. The New Civilisation places the emphasis on the moral aspect of the common human spirit, the search for the common elements between autonomous cultures and peoples. Only in this way can the new dimensions of technical and spiritual progress be combined with tolerance, mutual influence and unification of difference cultures. The other alternative is isolationism and conflicts between civilisations and religions. Whether the 21st century will be a century of wars between cultures and civilisations as S.Huntington seems to believe or a century which places the priority on the universal and humanitarian elements of development -- this is a question of choice between the past and the future. 4. GLOBAL AWARENESS The 19th and the 20th centuries were a time of mass ideology. Global awareness rejects the closed ideologies of confrontation. It is a reflection of the common elements which unite the inhabitants of the earth but also of the differences between us and our neighbours. Global awareness is the main driving force of the Fourth Civilisation. It is the sense of the compatibility and legitimisation of these differences. H umanity is constantly adapting itself to the common spiritual values of integration. The integration of manufacturing and communications has lead to a growing awareness of the common problems of people and the ways in which they can be resolved. Religions are a typical expression of this unified awareness. Sometimes they are imposed through methods of conviction more frequently by violence and coercion. Religious conflicts over the past 2 millennia have been struggles between spiritual values and the different systems and structures of human awareness. Homo Sapiens in his evolution from the apes inherited and developed this common awareness. Over the centuries group ideologies became more and more massive. General or mass awareness is reflected in the common features and standards of life, in common gods and religions and in common spiritual values. The industrial age from the end of the 18th century saw a new period of structuring of mass values. The unifying nature of existing dogmatic religions was gradually replaced by unifying ideologies. Liberalism, Marxism, Leninism, nationalism, fascism and Maoism are just some examples. Certain ideologies reject religious awareness, others try to adapt it to their value systems. Until the 19th century violence was the basic, albeit limited, means for the solution of all conflicts between peoples, cultures and ideologies. Mass ideologies gave rise to mass violence. The most radical religious ideologies of the 20th century were undoubtedly communism and fascism. Although they were essential different and had different economic bases they both used violence as a key political method. Zbignew Brzezinski was correct when he referred to such ideologies as "coercive utopias". Such ideological religions allow for only one truth and exalt one system as the true system. They share the same eternal ideas and the same laws of human society. This is not only an expression of the primitivism of Utopia or subjective illusions imposed through coercion but a definite stage in the development of humanity. Ideological religions are an expression of the mass awareness which is caused by violent and radical integration, by the coercive persecution of the rural population and their transformation into industrial workers, the exploitation of hired labour, the violent colonisation of hundreds of nations and billions of people. Mass ideologies are the result of violence but also carry its seeds. How otherwise is to explain that communism, the greatest utopia of the 20th century was accepted by practically half of humanity? Or that the Germans, Italians, Spanish and Japanese believed in fascism? Ideological religions appeared on the historical scene as a result of the great cataclysms of the 19th and 20th centuries but above all as a result of the internationalisation of manufacturing forces and spiritual life. This internationalisation of manufacturing gave birth to the illusion that the world might be ordered on the lines of a ready-made political model on the basis of dogma imposed by a group of people. Utopias become transformed into mass credo only when the social conflicts and chaos have caused huge destruction. Historically, mass poverty and mass violence have always caused mass reactions which has prepared the ground for the appearance of coercive utopias. Ideological religions create different types of culture. In their extreme forms these ideologies have given rise to the cult of personality and the exaltation of leaders. Just as the ancient peoples prayed to Amon Ra, Zeuss or Tangra in the 20th century they prayed to Hitler, Stalin, Mao and Pol Pot. Of course, the cult of personality is not the only type of mass utopia. The ideological religions also created the cult of the system itself, the notion of the future, power and its structures. All this was the imposition of freedom of thought. In certain countries and certain peoples this type of mass awareness lead to accompanying forms of daily life, dress and behaviour humiliating man in favour to ideology. One of the most important consequences of the collapse of the Eastern European totalitarian regimes was the destruction of the totalitarian type of mass awareness. The collapse of the Berlin wall not only destroyed the communist utopia but also created the opportunities for the entire historical removal of ideological religions. Hitler, Stalin and Mao had aspirations of disseminating their utopian notions over the entire world. Fortunately this did not happen. The destruction of ideological religions did not mean the ideological and spiritual division of the world not the final removal of the danger of new coercive utopias. The removal of the iron curtain does still not mean the final end to global inequality, economic violence or the impossibility of the appearance of new ideological religions. IN order to put a stop to such a danger many things will have to change in this world. Global awareness is radically different from the ideological religions and the culture of the coercive utopia. It is developing as a result of the new communications and the natural technological progress of humanity. It is not a consequence of violence and coercion but of the modern technological and cultural revolution. Its origin has to be looked for in the intermixing of values and the criteria for the most advanced cultures of the world and in their constant enrichment. The intermixing of different cultural values leads to the formation of common thought processes with common foundations which have began to develop rapidly since the falling of the iron curtain. Global awareness is the common understanding of people for the common problems of the world which cannot be resolved by one or a single group of countries or by one or a group of peoples. This is the realisation of the interdependence of the world and that the tragedy of one individual people might lead to a tragedy for all. Global awareness is also a change in the hierarchy of human values and in the extent to which common human conflicts come to the fore. The enormous problems of pollution, the appearance of holes in the ozone layer, global warming, the destruction of the rain forests, AIDS, cancer and other mass illnesses of the 20th century, the dangers posed by nuclear energy and numerous other problems are occupying the thoughts of people around the world more and more and motivating their actions. Global awareness is reflected in the growing realisation of a larger part of humanity that only human rights, individual freedom, freedom of speech and the press and the gradual improvement in labour and living conditions around the world can guarantee the preservation of the human species. The most important thing is that in this way, gradually but undeviatingly the common criteria for good and evil, justice and injustice, progress and stagnation are being formed. This is the basic meaning of the new theoretical and ideological synthesis which has been mentioned in an earlier chapter. Global awareness is developing on the basis of the cultural images and standards of world significance and which do not belong to any one national cultural school. Education and science, information and the media, trade and finances, sport and tourism, food and daily life are a part of this growing awareness. Today over 90% of the adult population of the world receive information from more and more accessible and homogenous sources of culture. The universal heroes, the universal film stars, the universal sports idols are all symbols of one and the same phenomenon. Claudia Schiffer, Naomi Cambell and Cindy Crawford are the greatest models at the end of the 20th century because they are a reflection of the diversity of the ideal of beauty and universal aesthetic standards. The travelling peoples have taken their cuisine all over the world to Latin America, the USA, Russia and Africa. Pele was the world football idol and the death of the racing driver Aerton Senna was mourned all over the world. The reason is because we are becoming citizens of one global village about which each subsequent generation will know more than we do. Today, global awareness is still just a trend but a trend which is developing in the space of hours and minutes. The world corporations, the global culture, mixed marriages, the "travelling peoples", universal communications and values and common experiences are all an undisputed fact. However, the trend towards the formation of a universal global awareness is still at its very beginning. It has to cope with national and local prejudices, ethnic enmity as well as social and economic inequality. This trend towards the formation of the global awareness of humanity cannot be stopped. It will take a long time and will most probably reach its peak in the next century. 5. MULTICULTURE AND GLOBAL CULTURE Multiculture or the combination of global, mixed and local cultures is the main feature of the Fourth Civilisation. T he modern era was a time of cultural coercion. The violation, plundering and export of huge amounts of works of art to Europe and America was a symbol of colonialism. Fascism and Communism with their ideologies of unification destroyed many cultural traditions and opened the way to the violent imposition of monolithic cultural products. Imperialism in all its manifestations bore within itself the idea of unification and multiculture or, in other words, the domination of one culture and the transformation of others into museum exhibits. One only has to compare the ancient cultures of Benin and Nigeria and their artifacts exhibited in the British museum or the culture of Bukhara and Samarkand preserved in the vaults of the Hermitage in St.Petersburg with what has remained in the local museums. The 20th century was a century of colonialism and imperialism, a century of the greatest progress of humanity. It was at the same time a century of the greatest destruction and oppression. One can but hope that the New Civilisation will resolve the problems of cultural aggression. However, this will be conditional upon the removal of media imperialism as a threat to cultural imperialism. Only the future will tell whether the trends of imperialism and cultural monopolism associated with the outgoing civilisation or the global trends of the Fourth Civilisation will prevail. I personally believe that historical progress and the global changes in the world are taking us towards something different from cultural imperialism and the dominance of one culture over others. There is, however, absolutely no guarantee that we will turn the clock back. If the trend towards imperialism persists and is not modernised, if the media and cultural unification of the world takes place as a result of the cultural domination of a number of countries via the trans-national corporations then the forecasts of Samuel Huntington may very well come true. The 21st century will be a century of conflicts between cultures and civilisations and the slow and turbulent development of economic polycentrism and associated cultural structures. The cultural equivalent of economic polycentrism is multiculture. Multiculture is the combination of many different cultures and their intermixing and also the preservation and the development of international and supra-national relations. The preservation of the cultures of small and large nations will be preserved with the relevant legislation and economic conditions. Multiculture means the rejection of media and cultural imperialism. Together with economic and political polycentrism this is the next most important feature of the Fourth Civilisation. Integration causes either oppression or intermixing which is at the foundation of multiculture. It is this intermixing stimulated by economic growth will be the main cultural feature of the 21st century. The most obvious manifestation of this process is in the area of showbusiness, art and music, dance and the fine arts. The resolution of religious conflicts, however, will be more difficult. The formation of a global culture and the localisation of cultural ethnic communities will have determinate roles in both economic and political processes. Globalisation and autonomisation are already leading to the huge re-structuring of cultural communities. Everything I have mentioned in this chapter: the intermixing of cultures and global culture, the intermixing of ethnic groups and the "travelling peoples", the formation of global awareness are features of this process. There are, of course, no absolute or automatic processes. I am speaking only of a determining trend for the future. There will be processes and events which will lead us forward but there will also be retrograde influences. There will be a struggle for the establishment of new relations between civilisations and the temporary victories of the protectors of the past. The greatest task faced by the modern world is the removal of cultural imperialism, the intermixing of religions and cultures with mutual tolerance. The international media have great responsibility to avoid becoming the advocates of new forms of oppression. However, they could also become the proponents of a new spirit of multiculture. In practice this means the protection and support of small and large cultures, a respect for the daily life and traditions of smaller nations, the implementation of policies of mutual adaptation of different cultures and, importantly, the rejection of totalitarian cultural forms. The last of these steps is of particular importance. As can be seen in table 14, there are in the world today five basic religions. Each of these religions and the cultures which are associated have their own geographical and historical roots and form part of the world's cultural and ideological treasury. However, at the same time each of these religions has its sects and branches which would like to transform their religion into one of world dominance and demonstrate intolerance and irreconcilability to non-believers. This is as true for Christians as it is of the Muslims. The gentle nature and lack of aggression inherent in Orthodox Christianity, perhaps, make it the only exception. After the collapse of the two-bloc system of the world the ideological vacuums were filled by religions and a semi-overt struggle for domination began. A number of evangelical Christian sects decided that the time was ripe for them to impose their own belief on the world with little concern for the fact that they were depriving many people of their individual freedom and turing them into obedient instruments. Table 14 Region Christianity % Islam % Hinduizum % Buddhism % Judaism % Africa East Asia South Azia [62] Europe Latin America North America Oceania Fm. USSR[63] 236300 22300 125900 420300 392200 227200 21500 102200 15,3 1,4 8,1 27,2 25,3 14,7 1,4 6,6 215800 22300 534900 9200 600 2600 100 31500 26,4 2,7 65,5 1,1 0,1 0,3 * 3,9 130 * 644000 600 600 700 300 * 0,2 * 99,5 0,1 0,1 0,1 * * * 143400 150900 200 500 200 * 400 * 48,5 51,0 0,1 0,2 0,1 * 0,1 300 * 3900 1500 1000 7900 100 3100 1,7 * 21,9 8,4 5,6 44,4 0,6 17,4 Total 1548500 100 817000 100 647500 100 295600 100 71800 100 *100000, 0,1% Source: The World Christian Encyclopedia, 1985. Islamic fundamentalism has also displayed public intolerance to non-believers and the representatives of other countries. The murders in Egypt and the execution of foreign hostages in Algeria and international Islamic terrorism are examples of intolerance towards the traditions of others. It is extremely important that such features of modern religions be overcome. This will not be resolved by force but with the efforts of the world community and states and their politicians and government to achieve reconciliation. If modern Islam turns towards modernism combining its profound cultural heritage with the achievements of the modern world it will become part of the New tolerant Civilisation. The other alterative is isolationism and the division of global cultures and traditions. During the middle ages in Asia Minor and other places in the world Islam was the embodiment of progress and was a source of innovation and new philosophical and cultural trends, in the modern world it could assume a similar role. The opening-up of cultures and religions to each other is a slow and clearly painful process. It requires people to live democratically and in mutual tolerance particularly of those nations which live in the border areas between two geographically and religiously different zones. One shining example is that of the Israelis and the Palestinians who since the historical events of 1993 have been attempting to find a new non-confrontational model for the resolution of their conflict. The Bulgarians, Greeks and the Turks also have a vital role to play living as they do on two sides of the divide between Christianity and Islam. There is much dependent on the way in which these countries will resolve the problems of their ethnic minorities and international relations. Cultures and religions have to be sensitive to other cultures and religions. This does not only mean avoiding conflict but actively assisting and complementing each other. Only in this way will the principle of multiculture be able to throw off the burden of the outgoing world of imperialism. Perhaps, the ideal model of multiculture and tolerance for others can be seen on the Hawaiian islands. Japanese and Polynesians, Americans and Koreans, Buddhists and evangelists live in harmony and peace on such a small piece of land. After so many centuries of inter-cultural conflicts the nations which make up the multicultural communities of the USA have achieved an impressive state of tolerance and unity. I am convinced that the idea of global multiculture is not at odds with the universal processes of globalisation. Clearly the structures of world culture and the structure of the New Civilisation and will contain the following mutually influential components: -- the emerging global culture is being developed and disseminated via the world media and is becoming distinct from the culture of the large nations which have done much to create it; -- the culture of the large nations which together with the establishment of the principles of political polycentrism and multiculture will gradually lose their ability to influence and erase the culture of smaller nations; -- the culture of the smaller independent nations which require more specific forms of protection and whose preservation and development is one of the most important issues in the modern world; -- intermixed or border cultures as a product of the mutual influence of individual nations. There is little doubt that during the 19th century and for the entire period of the 20th, there was a great deal of inequity between cultures and religions. This was a result of colonial oppression, of two world and hundreds of local conflicts and the violent attempts to impose cultural domination. After the collapse of the two world systems humanity has every opportunity to stop this trend and open up the way for multiculture as the direct alternative to cultural imperialism. A balancing element to this is the undoubted development of global cultural values which will take their inspiration from the larger countries and nations who control the world communications. The responsibility of the owners of global communications and the governments of the countries in which they function will be to ensure the development of the smaller countries and their integration into global culture exchange. There is no doubt that sooner or later this process will require strict forms of global regulation, less passive and powerless than perhaps that of UNESCO but, nevertheless, similar in terms of its profound and multi-lateral experience. Many small nations and languages have already disappeared and this process will, no doubt, continue for a number of years to come. Countries living in isolation can not but be affected by this process. Cultural autonomy is closely associated with weak economies. Weak economies permit a low level of economic integration and lead to conflicts rather than cooperation between ethnic groups and culture. This is an almost universal truth and can be seen in Iran and Iraq, Israel and Turkey, India, the Balkans and the Caususus. The opposite example of cultural intermixing and emergent multiculture can be seen in those regions of the world where people have realised the senselessness of cultural assimilation and the value of peaceful cultural co-existence. The USA, Australia, Europe, Cuba, Brazil and a number of other countries in the world are fine examples of the intermixing and cooperation of different races and cultures. Chapter Ten THE NEW POLITICAL ORDER 1. THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPERPOWERS The Fourth Civilisation will change the global political order. This is a logical consequence of the end of the cold war the appearance of new world economic powers and the globalisation of finances and the stock markets. T he political history of humanity has developed through a number of large cycles. The First Civilisation was a time of great empires. Later, over a period of about 10 centuries, from the 4th to the 13th century, the world was witness to the collapse of empire and the formation of small unstable states and the large scale migration of tribes and entire nations. The Third Civilisation saw the development of nation states and new imperial aspirations which reached their height with the creation and the struggle between the two world systems. The New Civilisation will to a certain extent once more return us to the features of the Second Civilisation but to a qualitatively new cultural and economic level of development as well migration of large groups of people the collapse of great blocs and empires, the redrawing of national borders. Is this part of a logical cycle or is it merely a temporary political cataclysm? I believe that the cycle of predominant political concentration has already come to an end and we are entering a new cycle of the domination of global culture and the parallel development of local features. This, of course, does not mean that globalisation will come to a halt but that the parallel processes of globalisation and localisation will exert a strong influence on current state and political formations. The 19th century left us a legacy of the concept of the Great Powers. The 20th century brought in the concept of the two superpowers: the USA and the USSR. With the collapse of the USSR the world found itself faced with two possible alternatives: either to develop monocentrically with the domination of the single remaining superpower, the USA, or to search for a new geo-political form. A number of researchers, politicians and journalists seemed to be in favour of the idea of the exclusive role of the USA as the superpower to lead the world into the 21st century. Indeed, during the first years after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union this seemed possible. Without its basic enemy, the USA was transformed into the most powerful economic and political force in the world. After 1989--1990 the USA seemed to be the only power capable of resolving a number of world conflicts and stabilising the world order. The war in the Persian Gulf in 1991, the intervention in Somalia, the positive role of the USA in the peace process in Bosnia in 1995 and the resolution of the problem of Palestinian autonomy served to strengthen this conviction. The USA are still the strongest nation state in the world but, nevertheless, I believe that the time of the superpowers has passed. The Fourth Civilisation will finally reject them and even now, during the transition between eras, there are already noticeable trends and processes which support this. The gradual twilight of the superpowers is for a number of reasons a general process. It is consequence of the trend towards global balance and the expected balancing of the global market. It is also due to a number of reasons associated with the cyclic development of geopolitical structures. I mentioned earlier that the economic development of the world has become polycentric. Japan, South Korea, more recently China and a number of other Asian economic powers have achieved significant economic strength. European integration has undoubtedly raised the importance of the European Economic Community in the world division of labour. The Latin American markets have become more attractive for investments. The globalisation of the economy has allowed for many more countries to accumulate economic strength and self-confidence. During the cold war and up to 1989 the appearance of new powerful and independent economic centres was of secondary importance. Military power and nuclear weapons were an undisputed factor in the determination of political power. This trend persisted for the entire period of the 20th century. In the 1960's and the 1970's there was a growing conviction that there would in fact be no victor after a nuclear conflict. Indeed, after the collapse of the Berlin wall there are still people who continue to wag their sabres and claim that they can achieve their aims through armed conflict. Nevertheless, things do seem to have changed. The emergence of new technology and new economic opportunities have come to the fore. This has reduced, at least for the time being, the role of Russia in world politics leaving it to ponder the questions of its domestic political and economic restructuring. For the same reasons, the USA now finds itself in a completely new situation. The vacuum which was formed after the collapse of COMECON and the Warsaw Pact (1990--1991) has begun to be filled not only by the USA but Germany, France, Japan and the European community as a whole. Although this process is rather veiled and timid it will continue in the future. Germany demonstrated its new-found self-confidence with its independent position on Bosnia. The nuclear tests carried out by France in the Pacific in 1995 were more significant from a political point of view than scientific. Similar ideas can be read into the applications by Japan and Germany to join the Security Council. The other issue which has always seemed to dog the USA and which will undermine its potential as the only superpower in the world is the issue of economic expenditure. Since the Second World War the USA has run up a huge armaments bill which has lead to a colossal increase in its foreign debt. Today the world's financial systems is under an enormous strain because of the constant increase in American borrowings, especially in the 1980's (table 15). In the 1970's and 1980's, however, this seemed not to be such a serious matter. The USA at the time was the leading figure in the Brenton Woods system and the dollar was the only reserve currency in the world and the US was able with some ease to compensate for the debts it had accumulated. In the 1980's the USA was paying 250--300 billion dollars in interest alone on its foreign debt. The majority of global economists believe that if this trend persists for much longer the American economy will begin to slide and the dollar will lose its position to the yen and the German mark. Table 15 Federal debt of the USA Year 1900 1920 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1992 1994 Billion Dollars Per head of population (USD) Interest paid on debt (bill) % of federal income 1,2 16,6 - - 21,2 228 - - 256,1 1688 5,7 13,4 284,1 1572 9,2 10,0 370,1 1814 19,3 9,9 907,7 3985 74,9 12,7 3233 13000 264,8 21,1 4064 846 292,3 21,1 4692 026 296,3 80,3 Source: Bureau of Public Debt, US Dept of Treasury. There is little doubt that the USA and Russia will progressively have to reduce their military expenses which are the main causes for budget deficits and huge debt. IN 1994 the USA spent 280.6 billion dollars on defence which more than all the other countries of the world put together with the exception of Russia. US military expenditure was 9 times greater than that of Germany (35 billion dollars); 9 times that of France (34 billion); 7 times that of the UK (41 billion); 50 times that of Japan (5.9 billion dollars); 100 times that of China (2.7 billion)[64]. I have never seen accurate or proven figures for Russia but I believe that up to 1990 they were similar to the US. There is no economy in the world which can compensate for such expenditure and bear the burden of competition in the global market. For this reason the role of the USA and Russia as the two superpowers has begun to subside. Superpower tension might reappear in the world only if the two-bloc system is revived. There is, however, little likelihood of this since global financial markets are so interlinked and interdependent and for all the other reasons associated with the emergent New Civilisation. This leads on to the other question of where the new centre of economic and political power will develop and who will take on the roles and responsibilities of the USA and Russia. Russia clearly needs time to reorganise its economy and bring it in line with the needs of the market. However, even if this were to take place within the shortest possible period of time -- 10--15 years, it would not be able to assume the role of a superpower, nor would it want to. On the other hand Jacques Atalie and other writers have forecast that "economic power is moving away from America towards Europe and the Pacific".[65] I believe that it would more accurate to make another conclusion. It is true that during the Third Civilisation the Euroatlantic powers made great progress in their domination of the world at the beginning of the processes of globalisation. It is also true that after the 1960's the Asian economic powers began gradually to free themselves from the protectionism of the USA and Europe and they will play a very active global role in the coming 21st century. This fact, however, is insufficient to support the claim that "economic power is moving away from America towards Europe and the Pacific". It is more likely that there will be a period of levelling and mutual balance between the Japanese, American and European economies. This is possibly the most effective solution. Of course, this is also associated with the reduction in the responsibilities and burdens of the USA and the involvement of other countries such as Japan. The superpowers will disappear but it will not necessarily follow that the USA will preserve their role as one of the world's main political and economic centres. The world can no longer benefit from American domination or its downfall. In the same way the world could have done without the political and military conflicts within the former USSR. 2. FROM IMPERIALISM TO POLYCENTRISM "The old geopolitical order has left the stage and a new world order has been born". Jacques Atalie T he central issue is what will replace the two-bloc world order based on the dominance of the superpowers. Other similar periods of transition in history have lead to geopolitical chaos, conflicts, wars and huge loss of human life. The first years after the overthrow of the totalitarian regime in Eastern Europe seemed to bear out this sad truth. Today the dangers have not yet passed and seem to confound those who are optimistic of a new world order. There is no single or single group of powers capable of establishing this order. It will have to be created through a amalgamation of local and regional resolutions and the renunciation of ideas associated with the domination of one country or nation. This is the main feature of the New Civilisation. During the entire period of the outgoing civilisation monarchs were engaged in struggles for power, conquering and losing territory and making plans on how to expand their dominions. In the 19th and 20th centuries the idea of world domination arose and the revival of the huge empires of Caesar of Fredrich Barbarossa. The greatest empires of the Third Civilisation were the two political and military blocs which dominated the world for 50 years. I believe that the era of imperialism will be replaced by a new world order based on the principle of polycentrism, the alternative to imperialism and monocentrism. This principle is a rejection of the monopolism and imperial aspirations of any single nation or ideology. Polycentrism is that level of international relations which is the most concomitant for the opening up of the world and its globalisation. Polycentrism will not appear overnight. However, I am more than convinced that it is inevitable and part of the logic of historical development. The alternative is new confrontation, new violence with the accompanying threats of thermo-nuclear conflict. There are two basic conditions without which polycentrism and the natural competition between nations and countries cannot develop: Firstly, the inevitable, albeit gradual, disappearance of the super power phenomenon. Secondly, the evolutionary nature of the development of polycentrism as a system of international relations. The natural replacement of the bi-polar model with polycentric structures will pass through a number of phases, each of which will take differing lengths of time. We are already experiencing the first of these phases. The world is undergoing transition from the bi-polar model of confrontation to a multi-polar world. It is quite realistic to assume that in the next ten or so years we will pass into a transitory phase of a tri-polar world. This tri-polar world began to emerge based on the existing framework of the bi-polar world as early as the 1970's and 1980's. This model is based on the USA and a number of states which gravitate around it, Europe and the Far East lead by Japan. These three economically integrated poles have been developing gradually over the past 25--30 years. They are economically very compact and consist mainly of the economic interdependence of the individual countries. At the same time these three economic centres are strongly dependent on and open to each other creating one of the greatest opportunities for the peaceful development of the world. The tri-polar world is the closest alternative to the bi-polar world but is not an easy way out of the current crisis. The tri-polar model is to a large extent conditional on the development of common global trends. At the very beginning of the 21st century both Russia and China will aspire to become involved in the three large centres of economic power. All the most sensible politicians in the world believe that without Russia and China the world cannot develop successfully. This has been a clear feature of US policy during the Clinton administration. During the next 20--25 years we shall no doubt witness the development of a five-six-polar world in which the three main centres will be joined by a number of other new ones. China's rapid economic development and Russia's enormous resources of raw materials and its strategical capability will exert significant influence on this process. The triangular community of the USA, EC and Japan has quite quickly replaced the bi-polar model the development of a multi-polar model will take at least 15--20 years. Russia will need time to stabilise its economy and China will need to consolidate its reform process and balance out its levels of development. There is, however, a question of principle here. Will this not take us back to the beginning of the modern age, to a situation where five or six great powers dominated the world creating a series of conflicts which may develop into regional or even world wars? May this not also lead to the grouping of these powers into two or three political and military groups and a repeat of the Third Civilisation? It is here that the difference between the outgoing civilisation and the new era lies. The new powers will not arise only on one continent, Europe or America. They will develop in all the continents and within the framework of a single global economy. I, therefore, believe that the second phase, the transition to a new world order will be characterised by the gradual transition from five or six centres to a multi-polar or polycentric world structure. Even at the beginning of the transition period countries like Brazil, India, Australia, South Africa and others will increase their geo-political roles. They will be balanced between the other "great powers" and with their geographical position and size and increased economic potential they will gradually begin to assume greater geo-political significance. When speaking of the polycentric structure of the world, I am not concerned only with the political aspect but also with the economic and cultural sides of the issue. At the same time global integration will take place simultaneously in all countries but will lead to the creation of a number of regional formations. I also believe that we can expect that the poles of the new world structure will be defined via the development of a number of economically integrated blocs which of necessity will be open to one another and will autonomous units within an expanding integral entity. L.Thorou forecast that the 21st century would be a century of "quasi-commercial blocs applying managed trade". This is true to a certain extent but only in the initial stages since I believe that with the emergence of polycentrism the autonomous economic regions and commercial blocs will gradually become very interwoven and to lose their primary borders. The principle of polycentrism is at the heart of the new world order. However, these are not the same world centres which existed in the 13th and the 19th centuries and whose monarchs and presidents went to war every 10--15 years to re-distribute their dominions. They will not be the same centres which colonised the entire world and imposed their will on other nations. Polycentrism is the principle of balance between the world's powers, the umbrella under which new centres will develop and a bridge leading to a more complete integration of the world. The essence of the Fourth Civilisation is in the gradual formation of this new world order. 3. THE FATE OF THE NATION STATE Do not be in a hurry to destroy the nation state. It will not die suddenly of cardiac arrest but will gradually fade away... T he functions and the borders of the nation state depend directly on the economic maturity of societies. Historically the nation state is a transitory category. It appeared when nations were being created and the economic conditions of life were imposing certain certain types of government and regulation. There were different versions of statism and state government during the First Civilisation and the Second Civilisation, more commonly know as the Middle Ages. Nation states, however, are a typical feature of the Third Civilisation. The reduction in their role and changes in their functions is a result of the same phenomena which created them. The globalisation of modern economies and culture, the media invasions, transnational corporations and everything else which has been mentioned in other parts of the book are leading to changes in the borders and the essence of the concept of nation state as well as in the structure of government and economies. For a number of decades the inhabitants of the most developed nations have become growingly aware that the governments for which they may have voted are not the only centres of power and that the promises of politicians seem to have little in common with realities and that the implementation of policies depends on other factors and phenomena. P.Drucker frequently speaks of a new pluralism. In this he is absolutely correct. Pluralism does not mean competition between parties and their leaders. It is a very diverse pluralism of economic, government, cultural and lobby groups. What is even more significant is that this new pluralism is becoming more and more international. Corporations and political parties, foundations and association, information groups and trans-national media have transformed pluralism in to an universal concept and the nation state into an annoying but not insurmountable barrier. It is quite evident that as society develops governmental restrictions decline along with the significance of national boundaries. For this reason open societies are a symbol not only of democracy but progress in general. I believe in the truth of this argument but it is not so simple. Openness which is inevitable and necessary means nothing in isolation from the economic processes. Many underdeveloped, ex-colonial countries are both absolutely open and absolutely poor. Progressive and stable openness comes about as a result of economic and political progress, the attainment of a certain level of economic balance. This is not a political whim but a result from the accumulation and maturity of a given society. We should not, therefore, be in a hurry to depose the role of the nation states. They will not disappear overnight but will fade slowly in the process of the development of relative economic balance. During the Third Civilisation state power was absolute. During the Third Civilisation state power was absolute. Ludwig 14th, Napoleon, Hitler, Mussolini, Lenin and Stalin were themselves incorporations of the state. Today, however, this is impossible. Dictators such as Idi Amin Dada in Uganda, Boccassa 1st in the Central African Republic or Pol Pot in Cambodia have been condemned to historical oblivion and hatred. However, many other democratically elected government have felt obliged to "protect" the national output and to isolate themselves with restrictive import duties and other protectionist barriers. Those who feel threatened and isolated as a result of their backwardness rather than integrated have to pay a high cost in terms of armies and weapons. Therefore in the under developed countries the nation state will preserve its traditional functions for a relatively longer period of time. This will be both natural and progressive if the relevant governments make efforts to open and adapt their economies to the global market. Adversely, their countries will continue to vegetate within the conditions of the Third Civilisation and will begin to lag behind in universal world development. This issue has another side to its. The movements towards world openness and integration is a resource of progress. No government will succeed in the modern world to integrate its people into processes of world progress if it does not affiliate itself with the World Trade Organisation and the international financial markets. The decline of the role of the nation state is a universal process which is taking place more rapidly in the developed countries and more slowly in those who are still aspiring to become affiliated with them and slowest of all in those countries who feel themselves obliged to defend their frail national identity. Nevertheless, no one country will be able to ignore the common processes of the globalisation of the world, markets, manufacturing and the media. What then will become of the nation state and its power? I believe that the main trends in world development will be as follows: the role of the nation states will decline in significance whereas the functions of the local institutions of authority and supra-national and global coordinators will increase. This is taking place at the moment in Europe and all other states whose governments are conceding more and more power to the trans-national corporations, the world media networks or other autonomous and influential non-governmental organisations. Louis d'Or 14th in an expression of the absolute nature of power once said, "L'Etat -- c'est moi". From the second half of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century governments began grudgingly to concede part of their economic power to the owners of large private enterprises. Now as a result of the globalisation the national governments have no choice other than to give up many of their prerogatives. This is a natural process which follows the logic of world development. Many people find it difficult to understand and regard national honour and pride as a priority and any suggestion to the contrary provokes nationalistic reaction. There have always been such governments and there, no doubt, will be for many decades to come. However, such policies which seem to forget the need for global and humane responsibility will lead nations into the back roads of development. Sooner rather than later nations will realise that they have been deceived and will seek recompense for the politicians who brought them to that state. The borders of states in the transition to the Fourth Civilisation will continue to narrow as a result of major technological and social changes. If you remember the message of A.Toffler in chapter four of this book, he predicted that the new technologies would transfer power both downwards to the local institutions of authority and upwards to the global regulators and the transnational corporations. On one hand many economic and social functions will become much more effective if they are transferred from governments to civil societies and are controlled by legislation. This is the case with the planning and coordination of a series of macro and micro-economic processes. This is also the case with social welfare and in particular pension funds, health case and academic and scientific research. ON the other hand national governments are not in a position to regulate independently the global environment, world financial markets, the global redistribution of resources, goods and services, information flow and the media etc.. The more people, goods and services cross over national borders the less significance these borders will have. This will in turn lead to changes in the prerogatives of nation states. At the end of the 20th century the state is too small an institution to resolve global problems and too large to resolve its own local issues. This is also a result of the new technology, the restructuring of manufacturing and the market. A typical example of such a bi-lateral change is offered by the member countries of the European Union. According to some researchers since 1957 about half of the authority of the nation state has been transferred either to local authority or to the European Commission in Brussels. This is perhaps an isolated example of a regional alliance. However, the same process seems to be taking place in the USA where the American political system has been stretched vertically upwards by the transnational corporations and financial markets and downwards by the individual states and the non-governmental and private organisations. Bill Clinton would hardly have the authority to implement such a wide ranging programme of reform as the "New Deal" of President Roosevelt in the 1930's. Even in the case of the states such as the USA national governments do not have the same authority that they had 40 or 50 years ago. They have also taken upon themselves a range of global responsibilities with which to compensate for the decline authority and the transfer of the real power to the trans-national corporations. The specific global role of the USA at the beginning of the 1990's will soon have to be shared with others. It is not fair on the American people to carry the huge burden of military expenditure, the peace-keeping operations of the UN and so on. It will not be long before they will also involve Russia, Japan and Europe (France and Germany). IN this way the gradual decline in the significance of the nation state is as true for the USA as it is for everywhere else. A distinguishing feature of the modern nation state is its integration and strong links with the civil society. A number of writers such as P. Drucker and J. Lukac have written that the sovereign state will become just one of a number of centres for identification and integration rather than the only one and will coexist and compete with the trans-regional, supra-national and local, even tribal structures. When this rule of logical development is applied universally then nations attain a higher level of enrichment. Switzerland, for example, leads all statistical classifications on the basis of GDP per head of population and this is not only due to the success of the Swiss banks. This is rather a result of the co-existence of the trans-national corporations and the banks, strong local authorities and the state (government and parliament) which fulfils the role of a bridge between the two sectors. The lack of bureaucracy, the active role of the local population in global business and the decision making processes is a particulary strong feature of the Swiss political system. The modern state will have less and less international authority. Globalisation opens borders and the world market "erodes" sovereignty. By transferring their authority to the new global leaders and to local leaders the national governments will have less and less capabilities. This, however, raises the issue of the preservation of the identity of nations and states in the face of the emergent global culture and global awareness. It is the "travelling peoples" which will succeed with their sustainable and strong cultural links which not only produce avant garde technology but use it to effect. It is not states and weapons but technological power plus knowledge which will play a decisive role in this question. 4. AFTER THE CRISIS OF POLITICAL IDENTITY The modern-day left is like the right undressed and the modern-day right is like a well dressed left. (political jokes from the end of the 20th century) A lthough I frequently speak of the Fourth Civilisation, the new ideological and theoretical synthesis and balanced development I realize how difficult it is for these new concepts to be accepted by the modern world. This is particularly true for the smaller (albeit proud) countries such as Bulgaria. In face of the new global changes and challenges there is no difference between the small and the large countries. We are all part of the same game. Some are quicker while some are slower but we are all undergoing the same profound changes. In Eastern Europe three years were sufficient to understand the crisis of universal political identity which the West has long been aware of. For more than 100 years the political left in the world has been associated with the new role of the working class, social guarantees, nationalisation of the basic means of production and the expropriation from the expropriators etc.. The right has always been linked with the defence of large and medium scale private capital, traditions and security, no state intervention in business and non-involvement in social matters. However, in the modern world at the end of the 20th century, with the exception of a few fringe parties and movements, there is no country or political party in the world which resembles these traditional concepts of the left and right. Together with the collapse of the Third Civilisation we are also experiencing a crisis of political identity. This is a consequence of the new ideological and theoretical synthesis, the changes in ownership and the social and class structure as well as the end of the traditional state mechanisms. The object of the differences between the left and the right is disappearing. The entire world is undergoing a process of ownership socialisation and states are being integrated into civil societies in which neither the old left nor the old right can preserve their traditional status. During the present time of chaos and the growing mistrust towards the traditional leaders, of left-wing promises made by right-wing politicians and the concern of the business sector for social issues we should expect too much. The political inertia is very strong and only a minority would take the electoral risk of trying to overthrow the traditional symbols. What we are witness to at the moment is the adaptation of the old phraseology to new world realities. Whether they want it or not the left and the right wing parties in the world are intuitively moving towards a state of "balanced development" and will fight for domination of its ideological territory. The "left" no longer reject the concept of private capital and do not demand nationalisation. The "right" are no longer ashamed to speak of social programmes and the needs of the poor. The borders between the traditional electorates are fading as a result of a process of irreversible changes in the social and class structure of society. As a consequence many new parties have appeared which give voice to localised interests within a given country or region. The "success" of Ross Perot at the presidential elections in 1992 and national independence parties in Canada or Catalonia and Northern Italy are features of the same phenomenon: the change in the foundations and structures and economic and social interests is leading to changes in political doctrines and political parties. The traditional parties which succeed in making the transition and re-orientate themselves rapidly within the complex situation of the modern world will survive and their traditional names will be no more than a mere decoration. Those who delay will fade away and gradually open the way to the new political formations. The end of the crisis of modern political identity will come quite quickly. Many of the parties of the Socialist and Liberal Internationals or Christian Democratic parties are making timid steps towards changes in their programmes. Some of them are rejecting their traditional programmes outright with the justification of the need for a new pragmatism. The former communist parties of Eastern Europe changed their names to "socialist" or "social-democratic". Some of them have become so closely associated with large-scale capital that they already resemble the bourgeois parties of end of the 19th century. Together with the changes in ownership and the social and class structure, as well as the new borders of the nation state and the transition to global polycentrism, the changes in modern political parties and doctrines is another important feature of the changes in world civilisation. The rapprochement between party programmes and views which is taking place at the moment is a consequence of the new ideological synthesis. It will not be long before political pluralism will take its stand on the new problems of the Fourth Civilisation and the transition to it. There are two further processes linked with the problem of political identity which I would like to mention. The first of these is linked with the obvious need for regional and trans-national political formations such as the Party of European Socialists, for example. The second is the need for new types of voting systems and the development of direct democracy. My friend the American political scientist Theodore Becker refers to this as "teledemocracy". The world telecommunication systems such as the Internet provide wonderful opportunities for the direct involvement of millions and billions of people in the decision-taking processes. Today, there are very few politicians who are aware of this, a few others are sceptical and concerned about preserving their own power and forces of manipulation. For me there is little doubt that the Fourth Civilisation will lead to enormous changes in political life and its structures, types of government, electoral mechanisms and decision taking. These are not utopias, nor are they long-term forecasts. These are simply the results of something which is appearing before out very eyes. 5. THE GLOBAL COORDINATORS The Fourth Civilisation will be at one and the same time an open, polycentric and integrated world. This will require a more effective system of global coordination. W hen analysing the system of the Fourth Civilisation, I naturally came upon the problem of global coordination. This once again brought to my mind the unsystematic but indicative thoughts of Lenin on the "single factory for all workers and peasants", Stalin's idea of the "world wide victory of communism", Hitler's thoughts on the "World Reich" and Fukoyama's writings on the "End of History" etc.. A great number of researchers from the World Federation for Future Studies have also written on the need for a world government. There is clearly some logic to this argument. Globalisation will require much more than ever before increased global control. As the processes develop and political polycentrism increases there will be a growing need for world coordination. Nevertheless, I do not believe that it will be possible in the near future to establish such a global government. This is an element of the distant future to which neither I nor my generation belong. Of course, the Fourth Civilisation will cover the entire period of the 21st century and no doubt future generations of our grandchildren and great-grand children will have to face the issue. Today the world is faced with hundreds of global problems which lead to collapse of the bi-polar world structures. There are a number of world organisations involved in these problems such as the UN, the World Trade Organisation and the IMF based on the need for compromises between nation states and their products. Since compromise between nation states is at the basis of the development of the world organisations their capabilities to act in the real conditions of the modern world are seriously restricted. If we want the world organisations to succeed, they will have to receive wide empowerment and responsibilities for the global problems which are outside the domain of nation states. This is the only way in which a united world of small and large states and cultures will be able to face up to the challenges of supra-national environmental interests. It is, of course, absurd to speak of a world government, but it is clear that there is an obvious need for a coordinating body which from the very outset will be able to resolve military and ecological crises, regulate the conditions for world finance and the fight against international crime etc.. It is, therefore, evident that the modern world needs a revision of the Constitution of the United Nations and the expansion of the powers of the Security Council as well as the establishment of new institutions. Many of these have already been proposed by a number of leading world politicians and intellectuals. These include the Council for Ecological Security of the United Nations. A reflection of the new directions in thought are the new structures within the United Nations and its specialised organisations including UNESCO, INIDO, FAO and others. This process of expansion has to be carried out very carefully with the gradual empowerment of specialised national organisations with the rights and responsibilities currently born by nation states. I expect that the main priority will be global economic control and the resolution of global environmental and social issues. The restructuring of the UN, the creation of an effective World Bank, the increase in the prerogatives of the World Trade Organisation and the empowerment of all these organisations to deal with the real problems of the world is the path to balanced development. This path will be difficult, slow and gradual but there is no other way. The alternative is for the new communications, computers and automated factories to dig a deeper gorge between the poor and the rich rather than a source for democracy and freedom. At the same time the large nations have to double and treble their efforts to create a new climate in the world and another type of global intercourse. This may lead to the institutionalisation of the meetings of the G-7 and its expansion to include Russia and China and perhaps a few other nations. It may be a good idea to hold regular meetings of the heads of state of the whole world. There are a number of possibilities. The most important thing is for us to realise that the new age which we are entering requires new type of thinking and a new understanding of our own responsibilities. THE NATIONS WHICH WILL SUCCEED, THE NATIONS OF THE FOURTH CIVILISATION (instead of a conclusion) T his book is an expression of my inner spiritual world and my thoughts over a number of years on the present state and the potential future of our confused world. I have been profoundly influenced by the major political changes which have taken place since the collapse of the Eastern European political systems and their economic structures. I am acutely aware that the "Fourth Civilisation" will provoke a number of different reactions. During such a watershed period in our history unanimity is dangerous and unnecessary. Indeed, the book which I have written contains a number of generalisations on the character of global change at the border between two millennia, the periodisation of history and the crisis of the entire modern civilisation. The logic of my research has lead me to a number of conclusions on the new geo-political nature of the world and the necessity of global economic and political regulation. The "Fourth Civilisation" is not based on abstract proposals or invented eloquent phrases. All my conclusions are based on experience and suffering, on years of research and reading as well as specific practical, academic experiments and political experience. The "Fourth Civilisation" is not a forecast, nor futuristic literature but an evaluation of the facts as they are. It is an attempt to overcome the academic dogma of the 19th century which have existed for over 150 years. I am interested in the clash of ideas and I realise that many of my conclusions merit further analysis, something which I intend to do in the future. I can now see with delight many new areas for creative work. The "Fourth Civilisation" is not intended to reveal all the details of the issues which it raises but to unify them within one general concept and to reveal the universal character of the global change which the modern world in experiencing. The common crisis of the bi-polar world and the collapse of the Eastern European regimes, the modern conditions of geo-political chaos in which we are living, the major re-structuring of the world economy, culture and politics shows that the new realities with which we are faced have a complex and accumulative effect. Whether we want to or not, they will lead us to new solutions. My book is concerned with these solutions and the new methodological approach to the evaluation of world processes. It is also concerned with the changes in ownership, political and economic structures and the way in which they are finding more and more common global ground. I realise that these conclusions may be quite controversial but I deeply believe in them as indicative proof. Everything which proves that the old civilisation is fading and that we are entering into a new Fourth Civilisation is based on the trends and processes to which we are already witnesses. I have to confess that everything which I have touched upon in this book is a starting point for further work based on the country in which I was born and bred. Bulgaria is now undergoing a difficult and complex crisis caused by the transition from a totalitarian to a market and pluralist economy. I have spoken little about Bulgaria in the "Fourth Civilisation" but in actual fact all my conclusions concern its fate. I believe that I have been right to keep my conclusions about Bulgaria to a separate book. This has allowed my to concentrate on the features of global change and to concentrate on the specific features of Bulgaria at a later stage. For this reason there is a direct and unifying link between the "Fourth Civilisation" and my book about Bulgaria which is soon to be published. I hope that they will both be of interest to all my friends with whom for over ten years now we have been discussing the fate of the changes and all my colleagues all over the world with whom I have argued about the future of our world and all those people with whom I have shared the good and the bad in the political life of Bulgaria over the past seven years. Whatever the fate of this book, on completing it I want to thank all those without whom it would not have been possible. I owe so much to my mother and my father who bore me and brought me up, my family who have suffered the deprivations of my almost permanent preoccupation with work, my teachers from whom I learnt so much, and my colleagues and my friends who helped me with the book. Nothing in this life can be achieved without love and I thank all those who believed in me since it was their faith, hoe and love which inspired so much of my conclusions. During the entire period of writing and preparing the "Fourth Civilisation" I asked myself the question, "Which nations will succeed and will not be lost to the chaos of the global world?". During the great migrations of the Second Civilisation many nations and ethnic groups lost their potential and remained on the periphery of the nation states which were to emerge later. Some of them have disappeared. I hope fervently that the Bulgarian spirit is not lost and that it does not become dissolved in the waves of migration of people, information and goods which is on the horizon. I shall work and I shall struggle for this not to the detriment of any other nation. I shall work to consolidate the culture and the economy of Bulgaria in the context of dignified competition. The nations which will succeed do not live only in the great countries. These will be the nations which will accept the laws of the new age and will become the people of the Fourth Civilisation. These nations will not be divided on the lines of capitalist or socialist, workers or bourgeois, imperialist or colonial. These peoples will not allow their civic freedoms to be usurped nor will they recognise cultural or political isolationism and closed economies. The nations of the Fourth Civilisation will be united with millions and billions of visible and invisible threads. They will produce the new values which belong to the whole of humanity. The road is long and there will be many storms along the way. The New Civilisation does not require social engineering it requires merely the pursuance of the logic of progress which our fathers and the outgoing 20th century have bequeathed to us. It is a difficult but glorious legacy, a legacy which will require us to be true to our time and those who will come after us. Sofia 1996. BIBLIOGRAPHY Asenov, B. Turkisation, Sofia, 1993 Atalie, J. The Millennium, Sofia, 1992 Atalie, J. The History of Time, Sofia, 1993 Atalie, J., M.Guillaume. The Economics of Freedom, Sofia. 1994 Baeva, I. Eastern Europe after Stalin - 1953-1956, Sofia, 1995. Bashev, V. Marvellous Independence, Sofia, 1977. Bell, D. The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, Sofia, 1994 Brzezinsky, Z. The Great Failure. Sofia, 1991. Burlatski, F. The New Thought (Dialogues and Thoughts on the Technological Revolution and our Reforms) Sofia, 1993. Buholtz, T. Live Ideas from Dead Economists. Sofia, 1993. The Culture of Entrepreneurialism. Edited by Bridgette Burcher. Sofia, 1994. Varzonovtsev, D., H.Tomov, M.Georgieva, N.Obrikov, V.Lichev. The Chronicle of a Failed Revolution. (Bulgaria 1990-1993) Sofia, 1994. Gardner G. The power of money, the secrecy of power and how citizens can stand up to it. Sofia, 1993. Genov, N. The Rise of the Dragon. Sofia, 1994 Grey, G. Liberalism. Sofia. 1991. Grigulevich, J. The Papacy in the 20th Century. Sofia, 1982. Galbraith, G. The Anatomy of Power. Sofia, 1993. Davidkov, Ts. The New Entrepreneurs (Results of an empirical social study - "Private Business in Bulgaria" Sofia, 1993). Darendorf, R. Thoughts on Revolution in Europe. Sofia, 1992. Jane, J. Handbook on the Essence, Priciples and Activities of the UN. Sofia, January 1993. Geffkins, F. An Introduction to Marketing, Advertising and Public Relations. Varna, 1993. Zeiffer, I. The World Revolutionaries (From Bogomil through Huss to Lenin) Sofia, 1994. Karanjulov, R., V.Milandinova. State Property in the People's Republic of Bulgaria. Sofia, 1987. Kennedy, P. Preparations for the 21st Century. Sofia, 1995. King, A., B.Schneider. Sofia, 1989. Kuzadjian,L. Ideological Campaigns in China, 1949-1970. Sofia, 1971. Kuzadjian,L. Maoism in the West - The Myth Revealed. Sofia, 1978 Labruyere, J. Characters. Varna, 1976. Levi, T. Thoughts on Management. Sofia, 1994. Lukac, J. The End of the 20th Century and the End of the Modern Era. Sofia, 1994. Mazovetski, T. Report on Human Rights on the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia. Sofia, 1992. Minkov, T. Maoism and the Agrarian Question. Sofia, 1979. Nikolov, I. The Long Waves of Kondratiev. Sofia. 1985. Nikolov, L. The Structures of Human Activity. Sofia, 1982. Newland, R. Electoral Systems (Relative analysis). Sofia 1993. Pantev, A. B.Gavrilov. The Path of the Modern World. Sofia, 1994. Peters, T., R. Waterman. Towards Perfection in Company Management. Sofia, 1988. Polimeridis, G. Modern Right Wing Revisionism in Greece. ISST, Sofia, 1979. Psevorski,A. Democratisation and the Market (Political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe) and Latin America) Sofia, 1994. Radev, R. Ancient Philosophy. Sofia. 1994. Radoslavov, S. The Fate of Our Times ( essays on the ideological development of social democracy) Sofia 1994. Rowning, H. Hitler Said (Confidential conversations with the Fuhrer on his plans for the domination of the world). Varna, 1992. Raich, R. The Labour of Nations (How to prepare ourselves for the capitalism of the 21st century), Sofia, 1992. Rostow, W. The Stages of Economic Growth (Neo-Communist manifesto) Sofia, 1993. Rumyantsev, A. Socialist Reality and the Theories of Comrade E.Kardel. 1957. Rumnyantsev, A. On the Contributions of Mao to Modern Socialism. Sofia, 1974. Savov, S. The Dethroned Idols of America, Sofia, 1976. Semov, M. Politics. Sofia, 1994. Sepetliev, D. The Theoretical Mistakes of Karl Marx. Sofia, 1994. Stalin, I. On the Socialist Economy. Sofia, 1955. Sulitzer, P. The Rich. Sofia, 1992, 1992 (two volumes). Tikhvinski, S. The History of China and Moderntiy. Sofia, 1979. Toynbee, A. Selected Works, Sofia, 1992. Toynbee, A. Studies of History (The Rise and Development of Civilisations). Volume 1. Sofia, 1995. Toynbee, A. Studies of History (The Fall and Decay of Civilisaitons) Volume 2. Sofia, 1995. Toynbee, A. Studies of History (Universal states and universal churches) Volume 3, Sofia 1995. Tomov, A. Socialism and Self-Management. Sofia, 1989. Toffler, A. The Third Wave (Man and his Labour). Sofia, 1991. Toffler, A. Forecasts and Pre-conditions. Sofia, 1992. Toffler, A. The Shock of the Future. Sofia, 1992. Toffler, A. H. Toffler. The New Civilisation. Sofia, 1995. Trendafilov, T. Capital, Man, Time (Critique of Adapting Capital). Sofia, 1977. Turen, A. What is Democracy? Sofia. 1994. Fotev, G. The History of Sociology (in two volumes). Sofia, 1994. Friedman, M. The Irreconciliability of Money. (Episodes from monetary history). Sofia, 1994. Frovain, E. The European Convention on the Rights of Man as the Social Order in Europe, Sofia, 1994. Fukoyama, F. The End of History and the Last Man. Sofia. 1993. Schweitzer, V. Modern Social Democracy, Sofia, 1990. Shishmanov, D. The Elysian Palace during the Fifth Republic. Sofia. 1984. Shu Su. Notes from an Eastern Slope. Sofia, 1985. Yakovliev, N. The CIA against the KGB. Kieve, 1983. IN RUSSIAN Abalkin, L. At the Crossroads. Moscow, 1993. Armetiev, P. The Problems of the Developing Countries and Maoist Diplomacy in the UN. Moscow, 1978. Afanasiev, V. Society, Sytems, Knowledge and Management. Moscow, 1981. Bagrov, V. Modern Capitalism and Nature. Moscwo, 1976. Bernon, S., L.Teplov. The Warsaw Pact and NATO: Two Courses, Two Policies. Moscow, 1979. Vologonov, D. The Triumph and The Tragedy. (J.V. Stalin)(Four Volumes). Moscow, 1983. Galbraith, G. Life in Our Times. Moscow, 1986. Ermilov, A. MacroEconomic Forecasting in the USA. Moscow, 1987. Zelenev, S. The Giants of British Business. Moscow, 1971. Cleer, E. Global Economy (The Logic of Development). Moscow, 1979. Klow, A. Multinational Corporations and Imperialism. Moscow, 1979. Kono Toekhiro. The strategy and structure of Japanese enterprises. Moscow, 1987. Kosolapov, V., A. Gonacharenko. The 21st Century in the mirror of Futurology. Moscow, 1987. Krechel, Yan, E. Mantser, Ch.Graber. The Shock of the Market (Materials form the Agenda Group). Moscow, 1992. Kulpin, E. The Technical and Economic Policies of the Chinese People's Republic and the Working Class of China. Moscow, 1975. Kusmin, V. China in the Strategy of American Imperialism. Moscow, 1978. MacDOnald, D. The Game Called Business. Moscow, 1979. Melnikov, D., L.Chernaya. The History of Death. Moscow, 1987. Mocherniy, S. The Essence and Evolution of Capitalist Ownership. Moscow, 1978. Nikitich, L. Labriola. Moscow. 1980. Nixon, R. In the Arena. Moscow, 1992. Plimok, E. The Political Legacy of V.I. Lenin. Moscow. 1988. Popper, K. The Open Society and its Enemies. Moscow. 1993. Porter, M. International Competition. Moscow, 1993. Seligmen, B. The Major Trends of Modern Economic Thought. Moscow. 1968. Simon, V. The Might of The Union of Entrepreneurs. Moscow, 1979. Snegurov, A. The Relationship between Political Parties and the Institutions of State Power in the Russian Federation. St. Petersburg, 1994. Trotski, L. The Stalinist School of Falsification. Berlin. 1932. Fyodorov, E. The People of Ancient Rome. Moscow, 1987. Hikks, G. R. Value and Capital. Moscow, 1987. Yakovliev, A. Foreword, Collapse, Epilogue. Moscow, 1992. Journal. "The Reference Bulletin" Ed.1/1971, Institute for Modern Social Theories. The Foreign Policy Conception of Maoism, Sofia. 1978. Global Changes in Modernity. Institute of Global Economics and International Sciences of the Academy of Science of the USSR, Sofia, 1982. Bulgarian International Agreements. Vol. 1 and 2, Sofia, 1994. International Trade Conventions and Codexes. Sofia, 1983. The Organisation of the Warsaw Pact (documents and materials 1955-85), Sofia, 1985. Participations of Workersin the Management of Enterprises in the Socialist Countries. Partisdat. 1987. Collection of current court law in the Kingdom of Bulgaria, (1878-1918). Sofia , 1918. Medieval Philosophy (Anthology). Sofia, 1994. The State of the Planet (Report of the Institute for the Observation of World Development on the Problems of the Establishments of a Society Capable of Supporting itself.) Sofia, 1991. The Secret Report of Khrushchev to the 20th Congress of the CPSU - 1956, Sofia, 1991. Spain - The Constitution and Public Legislation. Sofia, 1992. Constitutions of the World. Sofia, 1994. Bourgeois Philosophy of the 20th Century. Moscow, 1974. The Mutual Connections and Influences of Domestic and Foreign Policy. The Soviet Association of Political Science. Moscow. 1982. The History of Foreign Art. Moscow, 1980. The History of the Middle Ages, Moscow, 1980. The History of the Ancient World. Parts 1 and 2, Moscow, 1982. The Science and the Technology of Modern Capitalism. Moscow, 1987. Political Portraits. Moscow, 1991. Legislation in the Economy. Collection of Regulatory Acts. Moscow, 1986. IN ENGLISH Azam Dr. Zohra, Towards the 21st Century, Pakistan - Women, Education and Social Change. Karachi, 1993. Dr. Ravi Batra. Progressive Utilisation Theory: An Economic Solution to Poverty in the Third World. Manila, 1989. Beschloss, M. St.Talbott. At the Highest Levels (The Inside Story of the Cold War). USA, 1993. Bullock, A. Hitler - A Study in Tyranny. USA, 1995. Clinton, Bill, Al Gore. Putting People First (How can we all change America). USA, 1992. Cuthbertson, Ian M. and J.Leibowitz. Minorities: The New Europe's Old Issue. USA, 1993. Davidson, J.D. Sir, W. Rees, Moeny Blood in the Streets (Investment Profits in a World Gone Mad). New York. 1987. Davis, Stan. Bill Davidson. 2020 vision. New York. 1991. Dobrinksy, R., M.Landesmann. Tranforming Economies and European Integration. UK.1995. Dudley, J.W., H.Martens, 1993 and Beyond (New Strategies for the Enlarged Single Market). London, 1993. Forstner, H.R. Ballance, Competing in a Global Economy. UNIDO 1990. Frieden, J., D.A. Lake. International Political Economy (Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth). St.Martin's Press, New York, 1991. Frieden, J., D.A. Lake. International Political Economy, New York, 1995. Frydman, R. Andrzej Rapaczynski, J.S. Earle. The Privatisation Process in Russia, Ukraine and the Baltic States, UK. 1993. Gerhart, W.F. Principles of Insurance. N.Y. 1917. Gilland, St., D. Law. The Global Political Economy (Perspectives, Problems and Policies). Baltimore, 1988. Henderson, H. Paradigms in Progress (Life Beyond Economics). Idianapolis, 1993. Herman, Robert. Economics. USA, 1987. Hyland, W.G. The Cold War (Fifty Years of Conflict) Canada, 1991. Isham, Heyward, Remaking Russia (Voices from Within). USA, 1995. Kaskiernia, J. Stany Zjednoczone. Warsaw. 1992. Jones, B. Sleepers Awake! (Technology and the Future of Work). Oxford, 1995. Kaiser, R.G. Why Gorbachev Happened (His Triumphs, His Failure and his Fall). New York, 1992 Karlsson, M., L. Ingelsam. The World's Largest Machine. Stockholm. 1995 Kennedy, P. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. New York, 1989. Kim, Tae-Chang and J.Dator. Creating a New History for Future Generations. Institute for the Integrated Study of Future Generations. 1995. Kolko, G. Century of War (politics, conflicts and society since 1914). New Yoirk, 1994. Ludwig von Mises. Socialism. Moscow, 1981. McCoy, J. B., L.A. Frieder, R.B. Hedges Jr.. Bottomline Banking (Meeting the Challenges for Survival and Success). England, 1994. Merritt, G. Eastern Europe and the USSR (The Challenges of Freedom). London, 1991. Mannermaa, M., S. Inayatullah, R. Slaughter. Coherence and Chaos in our Uncommon Future. - Turku. Finland. 1993. Naisbitt, J., P. Aberdeen. Megatrends 2000 (Ten New Directions for the 1990's). New York, 1990. Pool, J. Charles, St.Constitution. Stamos. International Economic Policy (Beyond the Trade and Debt Crisis). Canada, 1989. Spain, P., J.R. Talbot. Handbook of American Companies. 1996. Summers, M. Economic Alternatives for Eastern Europe. New Economics Foundation. Toffler. A. Power Shift. (Knowledge Wealth and Violence at the Edge of the 21st Century). USA 1990. Toffler, A. War and Anti-War. N.Y. 1994. Vanhanen, T. Strategies of Democratisation. USA, 1992. Walleginsky, D. The 20th Century. USA, 1995. Weillenfeld, Werner. Jospeph Janning. Europe in Global Change. Gutersloh. 1993. Wundt. W. Allgmeine Logik und Erkenntnistheorie. Stuttgart, 1906. Yakovets, Y.V. At the Sources of a New Civilisation. International Kondratieff Foundation. Moskow, 1993. Zaldivar, C., MoCastells. Spain Beyond the Myths. Madrid, 1992. Zon, H. Alternative Scenarios for Central Europe. London, 1994. Science and Sustainability. Selected Papers on IIASA's 20th Anniversary, Vienna.1992. The World Almanac (and Book of Facts). USA, 1992. Public Administration in Japan, Tokyo, 1982. Banking in Switzerland, Zurich, 1990. Why Future Generations Now, Conference 3-14th June 1992. Rio de Janeiro, Brasil. ( These figures are collated from various sources. It should be noted that accurate population counts began after the 18th century. Despite the approximate nature of the figures up to that point, the trend towards growth is unmistakeable. See Britannica Micropaedia. Population. World Data. C.1993.) 2 A.Toynbee. Selected Works: Bibliotheca Idei. Sofia. University Publishers, 1992, page 32. 3 The term civilisation (the level of development, the rejection of barbarism) appears to have been first used in 1704 (civiliser - French) to make more cultured, to remove from the state of barbarism. See also. J.Lukac. The End of the Twentieth Century, page 284. 4 This figure is based on the analyses carried out by Toynby and also on comparisons I have carried out using the Encyclopedia Britannica. See. Propaedia. The history of Mankind. 5 Plato. The Republic. Books 2 and 4. S. Nauka I izkustvo. 1981. 6 K. Kautski. Origins of christianity. S., 1995. p. 366 7 P.Kennedy. The Rise and the Fall of the Great Power. N.Y. p.56 8 P.Kennedy. The Rise and the Fall of the Great Powers (see table) 9 Although between Hobson, Hilferding and Lenin there are certain differences about the historical fate of imperialism, their works relating to its origin and features are worth of academic recognition. [see. J.Hobson, Imperialism, L.1902, R.Hilferding, Financial Capital, L.1910. V.Lenin, Imperialism as the supreme state of capitalism, Essay No.5, Volume 27] 10 P.Kennedy. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers [see table] 11 P.Kennedy. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Table 28, p.299. N. Y. 1887. * Under 50 000. Source: Political Economy, Moscow, 1975. P. 150. 12 Bzezinski. The Great Failure, Sofia 1991, pages 21-54 13 The concept of the evolutionary rebirth of monopolistic capitalism, of a society of trusts and cartels within a single world "super trust" or in other words a united world society governed from a single centre (a single super trust). The author of this concept was K.Kautski, 1915 14 According to the Brent Wood (USA) agreement in 1944 a system of international financial organisations was established resulting in the American dollar becoming the leading currency in international finances. In the 1980's this "system" was profoundly changed 15 See V.I. Lenin, collected works, vol.27, page 408 16 See also Z. Brzezinsky. The Great Collapse. S., 1981 (Statistics). 17 In the summer of 1986, the Bulgarian leader, T.Zhivkov published what for the time was a courageous reformist article entitled the "July Conception". It received much criticism from Mikhail Gorbachev and his entourage since it raised questions about the leading role of the communist party. Of course the Bulgarian leaders bowed under the pressure of "comradely advice". 18 See Z. Brzezinsky. The Great Collapse. Appendiy. 19 Hundreds of books have been written on the subject of the development of the Stalinist regime. Some of them give a particulary vivid description of the essence of this process - e.g. D.Volkogonov - Stalin. Triumph and Tragedy - 4 volumes. Moscow 1991. 20 Ludwig Von Mizes. Socialism. M., 1994. Introduction. 21 This can be seen in all of the speeches made by Mikhail Gorbachev. For Example M.S. Gorbachev. On the process of implementing the decisions of the XXVII congress of the CPSU and tasks connected with the advancement of Perestroika. Moscow 1988. 22 There is no doubt the Gorbachev was frequently advised to use the army to restore "law and order" and the status quo. Ifhe had given in to such advice this would not only have returned the reform process to its initial starting point but would also have caused conflicts involving the spilling of blood. 23 At this time G. Yanaev was Vice President of the USSR. V. Pavlov was Prime Minister and V. Kruchkov -- Head of the KGB. 24 According to a number of writers, including the last advisor the Soviet president - Andrei Grachov, the decisive factors for the resignation of Mikhail Gorbachev were the opinion of the Minister of Defence, B.Shaposhnikov and his support for Boris Yeltsin. In a conversation I had in December 1995 A.Grachov once more re-iterated his astonishment at this fact and described it as the key factor in the collapse of the USSR. 25 The Madrid summit meeting of the member states of the EU spoke eloquently of this. Even if the deadline for the introduction of the common currency is postponed there is apparently no doubt of its eventual implementation. 26 The statistics in this paragraph are taken from the Economist - World in figures L., 1994 27 K. Marx. Das Kapital. V.1. C., 1984. P.484. 28 This was the dominant thesis of the leaders of on the leading parties in Bulgaria -- the union of democratic forces between 1990--1993. 29 J. Grey. Liberalism. Sofia. 1991. P. 92. 30 V. Lenin. Complete Works. V. 29. P. 121. 31 These three conclusions were developed for the first time in my books "Socialisation and democratic centralism" (1987) and "Socialism and Self Management" (1989)". 32 A.Toffler. Forecasts and pre-conditions, Sofia, 1991, page 64 33 A.Toffler - Ibid 34 See Fortune, 1995, April, August 35 The Best Companies To Work For In America. N.Y. 1993. P. 285. 36 Samuel Huntington. The Clash of Civilisations? Democratic review ed.2-3, 1995, page 167 37 Foreign Affairs, vol.72, No.4, page 16 38 A. Toffler. "The Shock of the Future". S., 1991. 39 See Creating A New History For Future Generations. Ed. By T. Him and J. Dator. Kyoto. 1994. 40 J. K. Galbraith. The Anatomy of Power. S., 1993, p. 54. 41 A. Toffler. Forecasts and Preconditions. 42 Employee Ownership. National Center for Employee ownership, 1985, p. 53. 43 Calculated on the basis of "Germany's top 500", Frankfurt/Main 1995. 44 A. Toffler. Forecasts and Preconditions. 45 P.Drucker. Post-capitalist society. Harper, 1994, p.96 46 J.Stalin. Economic problems of the development of socialism in the USSR (in his book, J.V.Stalin on the Socialist Economy). Sofia 1955. 47. P.Drucker. Post Capitalist Society. N.Y.,1994 47 P. Drucker. Post Capitalist Society. N. Y., 1994. 48 See. H.Genov. The Path of the Dragon. Sofia, 1992. 49 L.R.Braun. K.Braun and S.Pastel. I. The Condition of the Planet (A Picture of a Stable Society). S.1990.II. Thinking about Future Generations. Tokyo.1994 50 R.Allen. Mathematical economics. (Russian translation) Moscow. 1963. 51 Leon Walras. Elements of Pure Economics. L.1954. 52 What I am referring to here is Marx's claim that during the historical processes "the civil society will come again to engulf the state". This conclusion which he came to during the period of the Paris Commune (France 1871) was entirely ignored by the majority of his followers and especially the founder of "real socialism". 53 Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU with responsibility for ideology during the term of Gorbachev. 54 St. Gill and D. Law. The Global political economy, p. 151. 55 UNCTAD World Investment Report. 1993. 56 The world in 1996. L., 1995, p. 113. 57 Based on statistics by M.Porter. The Competitive Advantage. N.Y., 1990 58 Jacques Atalie. The Millenium. Sofia. P. 52. 59 The Federal Reserve system fulfils the role of the central bank in the USA. It is currently under the directorship of A.Greenspan. 60 Based on "The Economist" World in Figures, L.1994. 61 Based on the "The Economist","World in Figures" L.1994. 62 Inc. Middle East. 63 Republics of the Former Soviet Union. 64 The military balance 1994--5. UK;Brassey. 65 Jacques Atalie. The Millenium. S., 1992, page 15. ?? THE FOURTH CIVILISATION ALEXANDER TOMOV

Last-modified: Fri, 24 Nov 2000 20:11:29 GMT
World LibraryРеклама в библиотекеПроект для детей старше 12 лет!
Проект Либмонстра, партнеры БЦБ - Украинская цифровая библиотека и Либмонстр Россия